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Essays on Courts, Randomization, and Experiments 
Dane Ross Thorley 
  
This dissertation comprises three chapters that explore and expand on the use of 
experimentation and randomization in the study of courts, judges, and the law: 
Chapter 1: This Chapter reviews the two most prominent procedural approaches to 
addressing judicial conflicts of interest in U.S. courts—judicial self-recusal and in-court 
disclosure. These procedural approaches fail to account for the legal and institutional dynamics 
that surround the relationship between judges, attorneys, and the adjudicative process. I argue 
that judges do not recuse themselves, that attorneys will not ask them to, and that if we 
understand both the legal and extra-legal incentives at play in these decisions, this should not 
surprise us. The shortcomings of recusal and disclosure are particularly salient in the context of 
judicial campaign finance, where judges often face the acute dilemma of being assigned to 
preside over cases in which one of the parties or attorneys has contributed to their election 
campaign. 
To support these claims, Chapter 1 presents the results of a randomized field experiment 
which I identify active Wisconsin and Texas civil cases that feature donor-attorneys. The 
experiment randomly assigns a portion of the judges presiding over these cases to receive a 
letter from an NGO identifying the potential conflict and requesting recusal. The empirical 
results support the growing skepticism surrounding judicial self-recusal and raise doubts that 
judicial disclosure is an efficacious remedy. Building on these results, the Chapter explores two 
potential alternatives—one procedural and one institutional—that better account for the realities 
of judicial conflicts of interest and the incentives of court actors. 
    
 
Chapter 2: This Chapter contributes to the growing literature challenging the general 
assumption of and reliance on random judicial assignment by identifying common court 
procedures and practices that threaten unbiased causal inference. These “de-randomizing” 
events, including differing probabilities of assignment, post-assignment judicial changes, non-
random missingness, and non-random assignment itself, should be accounted for when making 
causal claims but are commonly either ignored or not even recognized by researchers utilizing 
random judicial assignment. The Chapter explores how these de-randomizing events violate the 
key empirical assumptions underlying randomized studies and offers methodological solutions 
and presents original data from a survey of the 30 largest U.S. state-level criminal courts, 
outlining their assignment protocols and identifying the extent to which they feature the de-
randomizing events described. 
Chapter 3: In Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar (2015), the Supreme Court ruled that a 
Florida law banning direct campaign solicitation by judicial candidates was not a violation of the 
First Amendment. In doing so, the majority relied on several untested empirical claims, 
including the assertion that direct solicitation has a distinctly stronger impact on the public’s 
confidence in the judiciary than indirect solicitation. This chapter provides a short but focused 
evaluation of these empirical claims. A nationally-representative survey experiment presents 
subjects with a hypothetical vignette in which a state trial-level judge runs for election and 
utilizes one of various campaign fundraising tactics. The survey then presents subjects with 
questions relating to the trust and legitimacy that they associate with both the judicial system 
presented in the vignette and their actual state- and federal-level government institutions. The 
results suggest that the public does not discern any significant difference between direct and 
indirect judicial solicitation but does see other judicial campaign features (promises of recusal 
and the amount of the donations) as salient in regard to trust and legitimacy. These findings are 
at odds with the empirical assumptions that the majority relied upon in the Williams-Yulee 
    
 
decision and highlight the value that survey experiments can play in evaluating empirical claims 
made by the Supreme Court.  
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Experimental research design is widely regarded as the gold standard for making causal 
claims through empirical research. Recognizing this, social scientists are increasingly utilizing 
randomization and experimentation to explore an ever-expanding array of questions and 
theories.1 Political scientists and legal scholars who study courts, however, have yet to fully 
adopt this methodological innovation.2 Field experiments involving judges or conducted in a 
courtroom context are nearly non-existent. Naturally occurring randomization in the court—
predominantly the random assignment of judges—is exploited in a growing number of studies 
but is often used incorrectly. And while survey experiments have occasionally been used to study 
judges, they are rarely used to investigate and critique the assumptions underlying the legal 
doctrines that U.S. courts generate. This dissertation advances the use of experiments and 
randomization in the courtroom through three essays addressing three distinct methodological 
techniques.  
Chapter 1 features the first ever randomized field experiment conducted on judges 
presiding over active cases. It begins by reviewing the two most prominent procedural 
approaches to addressing judicial conflicts of interest in U.S. courts—judicial self-recusal and in-
court disclosure. These procedural approaches fail to account for the legal and institutional 
dynamics that surround the relationship between judges, attorneys, and the adjudicative 
 
1 See James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, & Arthur Lupia, Experimentation in 
Political Science in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL POLITICAL SCIENCE 3-14 (James N. Druckman, 
Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia, eds., 2010);  Steven D. Levitt & John A. List, Field 
Experiments in Economics: The Past, Present, and Future, 53 EURO. ECON. REV. 1 (2009). 
2 See Donald P. Green & Dane R. Thorley, Field Experimentation and the Study of Law and Policy, 10 ANN. 
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 53 (2014); Dane Thorley and Jacob Kopas, Experiments in the Court: The Legal and 
Ethical Challenges of Running Randomized Field Experiments in the Courtroom, Working Paper (2018), 
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2994298. 
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process. I argue that judges do not recuse themselves, that attorneys will not ask them to, and 
that if we understand both the legal and extra-legal incentives at play in these decisions, this 
should not surprise us. The shortcomings of recusal and disclosure are particularly salient in the 
context of judicial campaign finance, where judges often face the acute dilemma of being 
assigned to preside over cases in which one of the parties or attorneys has contributed to their 
election campaign. 
To support these claims, Chapter 1 presents the results of a randomized field experiment 
which I identify active Wisconsin and Texas civil cases that feature donor-attorneys. The 
experiment randomly assigns a portion of the judges presiding over these cases to receive a 
letter from an NGO identifying the potential conflict and requesting recusal. The empirical 
results support the growing skepticism surrounding judicial self-recusal and raise doubts that 
judicial disclosure is an efficacious remedy. Building on these results, the Chapter explores two 
potential alternatives—one procedural and one institutional—that better account for the realities 
of judicial conflicts of interest and the incentives of court actors. 
Chapter 2 is a methodological essay that contributes to the growing literature 
challenging the general assumption of and reliance on random judicial assignment by 
identifying common court procedures and practices that threaten unbiased causal inference. 
These “de-randomizing” events, including differing probabilities of assignment, post-
assignment judicial changes, non-random missingness, and non-random assignment itself, 
should be accounted for when making causal claims but are commonly either ignored or not 
even recognized by researchers utilizing random judicial assignment. The Chapter explores how 
these de-randomizing events violate the key empirical assumptions underlying randomized 
studies and offers methodological solutions and presents original data from a survey of the 30 
largest U.S. state-level criminal courts, outlining their assignment protocols and identifying the 
extent to which they feature the de-randomizing events described. 
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Chapter 3 features a randomized survey experiment that assesses the key empirical 
assumptions relied upon by U.S. Supreme Court Justices in Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar 
(2015). In that case the Supreme Court ruled that a Florida law banning direct campaign 
solicitation by judicial candidates was not a violation of the First Amendment. In doing so, the 
majority relied on several untested empirical claims, including the assertion that direct 
solicitation has a distinctly stronger impact on the public’s confidence in the judiciary than 
indirect solicitation. This chapter provides a short but focused evaluation of these empirical 
claims. A nationally-representative survey experiment presents subjects with a hypothetical 
vignette in which a state trial-level judge runs for election and utilizes one of various campaign 
fundraising tactics. The survey then presents subjects with questions relating to the trust and 
legitimacy that they associate with both the judicial system presented in the vignette and their 
actual state- and federal-level government institutions. The results suggest that the public does 
not discern any significant difference between direct and indirect judicial solicitation but does 
see other judicial campaign features (promises of recusal and the amount of the donations) as 
salient in regard to trust and legitimacy. These findings are at odds with the empirical 
assumptions that the majority relied upon in the Williams-Yulee decision and highlight the 












Why Judges Don’t Recuse Themselves and Attorneys Don’t Ask Them To: 




 The experimental study in this Chapter has received IRB approval and was funded by grants from the 
Open Society Foundation, the Democracy Fund, and the Columbia University School of Arts and Sciences, 
none of which is responsible for the content of this Chapter. 
Portions of the experimental analysis were conducted as a collaborative effort with Jonathan S. Krasno 
(Binghamton University), Donald P. Green (Columbia University), Costas Panagopoulos (Northeastern 
University), and Michael Schwam-Baird (Columbia University). The results of these portions of the analysis 
will also be presented in a preceding, coauthored article, Please Recuse Yourself: A Field Experiment 
Exploring the Relationship Between Campaign Donations and Judicial Recusal.  
 
Note: Although this chapter is a solo-authored piece, in order to reflect the contributions of my colleagues 
in designing and implementing portions of the field experiment, this Chapter will use the pronoun “we.” 
 
A pre-analysis plan for the experimental design and analysis featured in this Chapter is registered with 
Evidence in Governance and Politics and can be found at http://egap.org/registration/719. Any deviations 
from that pre-analysis plan are noted in the accompanying text. 
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“If you point the barrel of a recusal motion at a Texas judge, make sure it is loaded with a silver 
bullet.” – Common saying among attorneys in Texas3 
 
I. Introduction 
In theory, judicial recusal is a simple and effective procedural remedy for judicial 
conflicts of interest—the judge will be on the lookout for factors in a case that might prevent her 
from ruling impartially, and if she identifies any, she can remove herself and have the case 
assigned to a more neutral adjudicator. As a safeguard, the judge is expected to disclose 
potential conflicts so that the parties and attorneys who might be disadvantaged can then push 
for recusal when necessary. These behavioral assumptions undergird the current legal regime of 
judicial recusal and disqualification in almost all U.S. courts. However, these assumptions are 
likely false. Working within a legal framework that allows for but does not explicitly require 
recusal under most circumstances, judges are unlikely to remove themselves because judges do 
not like to recuse: doing so requires a recognition of the conflict, takes time, may result in lost 
knowledge of a case, and is often perceived as a dereliction of judicial duties.  
With an increasing understanding of the role that these extra-legal factors play in the 
recusal decisions of judges, those skeptical of existing recusal laws have suggested that an 
increased focus on in-court disclosure of conflicts can serve as a simple and efficacious 
procedural complement. By informing all the participants in a case of a potential conflict of 
interest, the recusal decision can be transferred, in part, to the individuals who are more 
incentivized to identify partiality and seek removal—namely the parties and attorneys against 
whom the conflict lies. Attorneys, however, are faced with their own set of extra-legal incentives 
that discourage them from asking for recusal when necessary: they know that the decision to 
 
3 Jeff Nobles, Judicial Recusal and Attorney Disqualification: An Ethic for Litigators & Other Aliens in a 
Strange Land, Texas Bar College of Legal Education: Advanced Civil Appellate Courses (1999), available at 
http://www.texasbarcle.com/Materials/Events/1295/66861_01.pdf.  
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recuse is almost entirely up to the personal discretion of the judge, and they do not want to risk 
the repercussions of impugning the judge’s character in the likelihood that the judge will not 
recuse and the near certainty that they will be back in front of the judge again for future cases. 
These behavioral considerations are particularly salient in the context of judicial 
campaign finance, where judges often face the acute dilemma of being assigned to preside over 
cases in which one of the parties or attorneys has contributed to the judge’s election campaign. 
Empirical work is increasingly evidencing a strong causal relationship between whether a court 
participant had donated to a judge and how well that participant fares in the case, and a 
majority of both the public and the legal community (including the judges themselves) believe 
that campaign donations are unfairly influencing judicial decisions. If recusal and disclosure 
procedures are efficacious in addressing conflicts of interest, judges should be recusing in some, 
if not many, of the cases that feature campaign donors. Yet the nature of judicial elections and 
campaign finance is such that both the cost to judges of recusal and the cost to attorneys of 
asking the judges to recuse is likely even higher than usual. 
--- 
This Chapter evaluates modern recusal procedures and practices, with a particular focus 
on how well they address potential conflicts in cases where an elected judge has received a 
campaign contribution from either a party to the case or an attorney involved in the case. It 
makes the following four contributions:  
First, it outlines and consolidates the incentive structures behind both the judge’s 
decision to recuse and the attorney’s decision to request recusal. Although the last decade has 
produced a litany of scholarship exploring the judge’s decision to recuse, the literature has spent 
relatively little time on the decision of the attorney to seek recusal, particularly in the context of 
state trial-level courts. Understanding the behavioral incentives of all the participants in the 
courtroom is essential to developing legal policy that adequately addresses its intended purpose, 
and this Chapter ultimately concludes that judicial self-recusal, in almost all its forms, is 
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unlikely to mitigate real or perceived judicial bias, even when supplemented by disclosure and 
transparency. 
Second, this Chapter provides much-needed empirical evidence supporting the growing 
skepticism surrounding the current judicial recusal regime in U.S. courts. Although the 
Caperton v. Massey4 ruling produced a veritable explosion in legal scholarship exploring (and 
usually deriding) the current state of recusal law in relation to judicial campaign finance, almost 
none of this analysis provides any empirical support for its conclusions. The data in this Chapter 
come from a randomized field experiment (also known as a randomized controlled trial, or 
RCT)—the first ever conducted on judges presiding over active cases. In the experiment, we 
identify active civil cases in the Wisconsin and Harris County, Texas trial courts in which one of 
the attorneys had donated to the judge’s previous political campaign. We then randomly assign 
half of these judges to receive a letter identifying the potential conflict and asking the judge to 
recuse. The results show that judges almost never recuse themselves from these sorts of cases, 
even when they receive outside pressure to do so.  
Third, the design of the experiment also allows us to explore the efficacy of judicial 
disclosure to non-donor parties as a supplement to current recusal procedures. Increased 
judicial disclosure of campaign contributions is among the most common remedies suggested in 
the literature on judicial conflicts of interest, both from those who support the current regime 
and those who criticize it. Those who are comfortable with the status quo assume that the 
current disclosure rules ensure that parties in a case are informed regarding potential sources of 
judicial bias. Those who criticize the current regime believe that if disclosure rates could be 
increased, the potentially disadvantaged attorneys would request recusal when appropriate. 
Although both perspectives are informed by reasonable behavioral assumptions, neither has 
much empirical support. The experimental results show that without our experimental 
 
4 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
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intervention, on-the-record disclosure of campaign donations is virtually nonexistent—in the 
over 300 cases we track during the study, we did not identify a single disclosure. However, 34 
percent of the judges who received the letter requesting recusal disclosed the contribution on the 
court record, allowing us to then measure the downstream impact of disclosure on both requests 
for recusal and recusal itself. Contrary to the predictions of the literature, increased disclosure 
rates had no discernable effect on either the propensity for attorneys to move for recusal or for 
the judge to eventually recuse herself.  
Lastly, building on the empirical results of the experiment (but being careful to account 
for its limitations), this Chapter explores potential solutions to the problems caused by donors 
in the courtroom. It looks first at common procedural solutions, arguing that neither automatic 
per se recusal nor independent recusal review are likely to be tenable. This Chapter then posits 
that the problem of money in the courtroom is best ameliorated by the combination of limited 
no-cause peremptory challenges paired with mandatory disclosure by the court system, as 
opposed to disclosure made by judge herself. It concludes by briefly exploring broad 
institutional reform and argues that first-order solutions such as the elimination of judicial 
elections or bans on judicial campaign fundraising are non-starters in the current political 
environment, although anonymized donations in judicial campaigns may be both feasible and 
effective. 
--- 
This Chapter proceeds as follows. Part II reviews recusal rules and procedures, discusses 
the threat that judicial campaign fundraising may have on judicial impartiality and legitimacy, 
and then examines recusal specifically in the context of campaign finance. Part III details the 
incentive structure behind the judge’s decision to recuse, explores disclosure as a potential 
solution to non-recusal, and details the incentive structure behind an attorney’s decision to 
move for recusal. Part IV describes the randomized experiment, and the resulting data are 
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presented and analyzed in Part V. Part VI offers potential alternatives to the current system. 
Part VII concludes. 
 
II. Judicial Conflicts of Interest, Recusal, and Campaign Finance 
In this Part, we provide background on the recusal rules and procedures most commonly 
used in U.S. courts, with a particular focus on how they address judicial conflicts of interest 
stemming from campaign contributions. Subpart A briefly reviews recusal more broadly. 
Subpart B explores the potential effects that judicial campaign contributions have on judicial 
behavior and public perceptions of the judiciary, including a review of the empirical studies that 
have been conducted in this area. Subpart C then outlines how states with judicial elections have 
engineered their recusal regimes to address those potential effects.  
A. Recusal in U.S. Courts 
Although the U.S. legal system has devised methods for a judge to avoid conflicts of 
interest before they reach the bench (screening procedures, preemptive elimination of the 
source of bias, etc.),5 it is inevitable that potentially problematic cases will be assigned to judges, 
so there must be a systematic procedural and ethical approach for dealing with such cases. For 
nearly every judicial body in the United States, judicial recusal is the primary solution and 
“perhaps the States’ most reliable weapon for maintaining both the reality and the appearance of 
a fair hearing in a fair tribunal for every litigant.”6 
Simply defined, judicial recusal is the process through which a judge relinquishes or is 
disqualified from a case because of a perceived or actual bias.7 Under most circumstances, 
 
5 One prominent approach to preemptive elimination of bias is to prevent judicial candidates from making 
direct campaign solicitations. The constitutionality and effectiveness of these restrictions was at issue in 
Williams Yulee v. Florida Bar, the most recent judicial election case before the U.S. Supreme Court 
(Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015)). 
6 Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2009), at 16 (internal quotations omitted). 
7 In many jurisdictions, there is a technical distinction between recusal and disqualification, with the 
former being a decision that is up to the judge and the latter being a decision that is imposed upon the 
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judges are responsible for recusing themselves sua sponte, although in many cases the recusal 
evaluation is prompted by a motion for recusal filed by the litigants or an interested third party. 
In this Chapter, we distinguish between for-cause recusal and peremptory challenges, the latter 
of which are discussed in infra Part VI as a potential remedy for the shortcomings of recusal. 
In their current manifestations, federal and state judicial recusal requirements in the 
United States stem from three distinct legal sources: constitutional rights of due process, 
statutory and procedural rules, and judicial ethics codes. At the federal level, there is no explicit 
constitutional basis for judicial recusal, but the Supreme Court has found that the Due Process 
Clause requires recusal when “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or 
decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”8 Although this somewhat circular test 
does not provide a clear threshold at which the probability of bias becomes unconstitutional, the 
Court has provided examples of violations in some of its decisions, most prominently in 
Caperton v. Massey.9 A few state constitutions do have provisions that call for recusal under 
certain circumstances,10 but the vast majority of state constitutions invoke recusal only through 
 
judge (see, e.g. Goolsby v. State, 914 So. 2d 494, at n.1 (Fla. App. 2005); State v. Desmond, 2011 Del. 
Super. LEXIS 6, at 23-24 n. 62 (2011)). In practice, however, this distinction is not particularly clear (see 
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.11, Comment [1] (2011) (“In many jurisdictions, the term 
“recusal” is used interchangeably with the term “disqualification.””); Note, Caesar’s Wife Revisited - 
Judicial Disqualification After the 1974 Amendments, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1201 n.5 (1977)), and so for 
the remainder of this chapter we will refer to both processes as recusal unless the distinction plays a 
specific role in our argument. This is a common approach in the recusal literature (see RICHARD E. FLAMM, 
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 4 (3rd ed. 2017)). 
8 Caperton v. Massey, at 872, quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S. Ct. 1456 (U.S. Apr. 16, 1975). 
9 Specifically in regard to campaign donations, the court found that the requisite probability of bias exists 
when “a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence 
in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case 
was pending or imminent.” (Caperton v. Massey, at 884). 
10 See RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES, (3rd ed. 
2017), at 31-104 (providing a comprehensive overview of the recusal approaches of all 50 states). 
Maryland’s constitution states that, “[n]o Judge shall sit in any case wherein he may be interested, or 
where either of the parties may be connected with him, by affinity or consanguinity, within such degrees 
as now are, or may hereafter be prescribed by Law, or where he shall have been of counsel in the case.” 
(Md. Const., Art. IV, section 7). Mississippi’s constitution states that, “No judge of any court shall preside 
on the trial of any cause, where the parties or either of them, shall be connected with him by affinity or 
consanguinity, or where he may be interested in the same, except by the consent of the judge and of the 
parties.” (Ms. Const. Article 6, section 165). Similar language exists in the New Mexico Constitution (N.M. 
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their own due process requirements, interpretations of which have varied depending on the 
state but are generally similar to the form and function of the federal Due Process Clause.11 
The majority of federal recusal disputes are controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 455.12 455(b) 
specifies that judges must recuse when certain conditions exist, including: personal knowledge 
regarding the facts of the case, previous employment dealing with the case, financial interest in 
the case, or a familial relationship (to the third degree) with a participant in the case. 455(a) 
outlines the broad provision of the rule, stipulating that “[a]ny justice, judge or magistrate judge 
of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.”13 The appearance-of-bias standard in this “catchall” provision 
reflects the most common approach to regulating non-itemized sources of bias in U.S. recusal 
regimes.  
Like the federal courts, most states have statutory regulation on when and why a judge 
should recuse from a case, although there are a handful of states that rely solely on 
constitutional provisions or court rules to address removal.14 These statutes generally provide a 
list of per se recusal rules, although the circumstances that require recusal vary from state to 
state. States also vary on the standard used to make determinations regarding potential sources 
of bias that fall outside of the explicitly listed categories, with twenty-four states using 
 
Const. Art VI, section 18), Tennessee Constitution (Tenn. Const. Art. 6, section 11), and Texas Constitution 
(Tex. Const. Article V, section 11). 
11 See Melinda A. Marbes, Reforming Recusal Rules: Reassessing the Presumption of Judicial 
Impartiality in Light of the Realities of Judging and Changing the Substance of Disqualification 
Standards to Eliminate Cognitive Errors, 7 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 238 (2016-
2017), at 287. 
12 Marbes explains that the other two federal statutory venues for recusal, 28 U.S.C. sections 47 and 144, 
are applicable only to certain cases or have the difficult-to-attain standard of actual bias and are therefore 
not widely used (Melinda A. Marbes, Reforming Recusal Rules: Reassessing the Presumption of Judicial 
Impartiality in Light of the Realities of Judging and Changing the Substance of Disqualification 
Standards to Eliminate Cognitive Errors, 7 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 238 (2016-
2017), at ft. 207). 
13 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2002). 
14 See RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES, (3rd ed. 
2017), at 31-104. 
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appearance of partiality, five states requiring a showing of actual bias on the part of the judge, 
and the remaining states adopting a standard that incorporates both the appearance and actual 
bias approaches or falls somewhere in between.15 
Additionally, both federal and state judges are ostensibly governed by additional recusal 
rules outlined in the respective court rules and ethics codes, although it is generally unclear to 
what extent these sources have the force of law and subsequently allow for justiciable claims 
when not followed. Although it has no force of law, the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct has 
long been the leading influence on these provisions; the Code of Conduct for U.S. judges is 
practically identical to the ABA Model Code, and forty-nine states have used the 1972 edition in 
creating their own codes.16 
B. The (Potential) Impacts of Judicial Campaign Finance 
Of the sources of conflicts facing judges, judicial campaign finance is likely the most 
astonishing. In almost any other context, the transfer of money from any potential litigant or 
attorney to an active judge is seen as an explicit threat to judicial impartiality.17 But in the 
majority of judicial elections, citizens, businesses, and even active lawyers are transferring 
thousands, and sometimes millions, of dollars to judges through direct contributions and 
independent expenditures.18 
 
15 See Melinda A. Marbes, Reforming Recusal Rules: Reassessing the Presumption of Judicial 
Impartiality in Light of the Realities of Judging and Changing the Substance of Disqualification 
Standards to Eliminate Cognitive Errors, 7 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 238, 287 
(2016-2017). 
16 Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1213, 
1229-30 (2002). 
17 To quote popular political comedian John Oliver, “Think about it. Giving money to judges wouldn’t be 
acceptable in a state fair squash growing competition.” See also the American Bar Association’s Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3.13 Comment (which states that, “Whenever a judge accepts a gift or 
other thing of value without paying fair market value, there is a risk that the benefit might be viewed as 
intended to influence the judge’s decision in a case.”) However, the ABA Model Code does allow the 
receipt of certain items, including valuable items, but requires that the judge report such occurrences (Id. 
at Canon 3.13 and 3.15). 
18 As it currently stands, judicial elections occur in the vast majority of states, although the form of 
election and the level of courts for which it is employed varies. 33 of 50 states employ judicial elections to 
initially select their judges at some level, with 33 using elections to select trial court judges, 19 using them 
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And yet, in elections, where judges are required to garner the popular vote in order to 
attain or stay in office, campaign fundraising is almost unavoidable. Responding to the rise in 
both the influence of judges and the competitiveness of their seats over the last three decades,19 
the cost of judicial election campaigns skyrocketed, both in terms of fundraising and spending.20 
Whereas in 1990 the average judge running in partisan supreme court races spent $425,000 on 
her campaign (an amount that was already drastically higher than it was just a few election 
cycles earlier),21 judges were spending $1.5 million in races just fourteen years later.22 Judicial 
candidates in non-partisan races saw a similar spike in spending during that period, moving 
from $300,000 to $600,000.23 Data on lower-level courts is less widely available but generally 
show a similarly seismic shift in the scale of campaigns leading up to the turn of the century.24 
 
to select intermediate judges, and 22 using them to select high-court judges. Of the 17 states that do not 
hold popular elections for the initial selection of judges, 6 hold retention elections, meaning that the 
number of states in which there are no judicial elections at all currently sits at 11. (National Center for 
State Courts, Methods of Judicial Selection (2018), available at 
http://www.judicialselection.com/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm?state=). 
19 Bonneau documents that just from 1990 to 2000, the percent of judicial elections for state supreme 
court seats that were contested rose from 68% to 95% and from 44% to 75% for partisan and non-partisan 
elections, respectively. Chris W. Bonneau, Patterns of Campaign Spending and Electoral Competition in 
State Supreme Court Elections, 25 JUST. SYS. J. 21, 27 at tbl.6 (2004). 
20 See Chris W. Bonneau, What Price Justice(s)? Understanding Campaign Spending in State Supreme 
Court Elections, STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 5: 107-125 (2005). 
21 See American Bar Association, Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on Lawyers’ 
Contributions to Judicial Campaigns (1988). 
22 Chris W. Bonneau, The Dynamics of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections, in 
RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 63 fig.4.1 
(Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007). 
23 Chris W. Bonneau, The Dynamics of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections, in 
RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 63 fig.4.1 
(Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007). 
24 See, e.g., Phillip L. Dubois, Voting Cues in Nonpartisan Trial Court Elections: A Multivariate 
Assessment, 18 L. & SOC. REV. 395 (1984) (reporting that the cost of election in the California Superior 
Courts (the trial courts) doubled from 1978 to 1982); California Commission on Campaign Financing, The 
Price of Justice: A Los Angeles Area Case Study in Judicial Campaign Financing (1995) (reporting that 
the “spending for Los Angeles County Superior Court races increased 22-fold’’ (at 51) between 1976 and 
1994). 
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More recently, the cost of these elections has stabilized and even dipped in some states,25 but the 
days in which judicial elections were “low-key affairs”26 are clearly over.  
To complicate matters, studies also show that a significant percentage of donations to 
judicial campaigns—in some cases a majority of them—come from potential participants in that 
judge’s courtroom.27 The most recent reports by the Brennan Center calculate that 31.7 percent 
of the over $40 million raised by judicial candidates from 2015 to 2016 come from lawyers and 
lobbyists, while an additional 24.1 percent come from business interests.28 
i. Effect on Judicial Behavior: The obvious question stemming from the recent trends in 
judicial campaign financing is whether this money is potentially influencing the judges’ legal 
decisions.29 Many—primarily judges—deny that such a connection exists. In the face of polls that 
indicated that two-thirds of his electorate questioned his ability to be impartial in an 
embarrassingly public Supreme Court case, West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Benjamin 
vehemently denied that the over $3 million in independent spending on his behalf had anything 
 
25 See Chris W. Bonneau, Fundraising and Spending in State Supreme Court Elections, at 85 tbl. 5.1, in 
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Chris W. Bonneau & Melinda Gann Hall eds., 2017); Brian 
Frederick & Matthew J. Streb, Paying the Price for a Seat on the Bench: Campaign Spending in 
Contested State Intermediate Appellate Court Elections, 8 St. POL. & POL’Y. Q. 410 (2008). 
26 Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One “Best” Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1, at 19 (1995). 
27 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Adam R. Long, The Independence and Democratic Accountability of the 
Supreme Court of Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 455, at 474 (2002) (positing that “[o]ften, lawyers or litigants 
who are likely to appear before the judge constitute large proportions of the contributions to judicial 
candidates.”); Shira J. Goodman et al., What’s More Important: Electing Judges or Judicial 
Independence? It’s Time for Pennsylvania to Choose Judicial Independence, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 859, at 865 
(2010) (finding that in over 60 percent of the cases that were heard by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
featured a donor as either a party or attorney). See also Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d at 990 (noting that 
lawyers who “appear before the candidate who wins” are often the key contributors to judicial campaigns). 
28 Alicia Bannon, Cathleen List & Peter Hardin, Who Pays for Judicial Races?: The Politics of Judicial 
Elections 2015-2016. Brennan Center for Justice and National Institute on Money and State Politics, at 11 
(2017). 
29 Another key concern is whether the system puts undue pressure on attorneys to donate to judges. See, 
e.g., Mary Flood, Got Money? I Beat the Guy You Supported, Chron (Nov. 19, 2008 at 1:34 PM), 
https://blog.chron.com/legaltrade/2008/11/got-money-i-beat-the-guy-you-supported/ (reporting on an 
email sent to a Texas attorney from Court of Appeals Judge Jim Sharp which read in part, “I trust that you 
will see your way clear to contribute to my campaign account in an amount reflective of the $2,000 
contribution you made towards my defeat…”). 
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to do with his decision in Caperton.30 Others believe that the connection between contributions 
and judicial decisionmaking is obvious, particularly when a contributor is a participant or has 
stake in the outcome of a case;31 to not feel the need to engage in reciprocity would “would defy 
bedrock social norms.”32 Even judges who deny the influence that money may have on their 
decisions bemoan the position that fundraising puts them in. As one judge colorfully put it: “I 
never felt so much like a hooker down by the bus station in any race I’ve ever been in as I did in 
a judicial race. Everyone interested in contributing has very specific interests. They mean to be 
buying a vote.”33 
But providing evidence of those effects is difficult, an empirical reality that has been well 
established by scholars attempting to identify the causal impact of campaign donations on the 
behavior of legislators and executives.34 Although it has been repeatedly shown that campaign 
donors (attorneys, parties, and special interest groups) fare better in the courtroom than non-
donors,35 such observations are consistent with at least two explanations. On the one hand, 
 
30 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
31 See Thomas M. Susman, Reciprocity, Denial, and the Appearance of Impropriety: Why Self-Recusal 
Cannot Remedy the Influence of Campaign Contributions on Judges’ Decisions, 26 J. L. & POL. 359, 366 
(2011) (for a discussion of the “reciprocity principle). See also the recognition of this problem in 
Caperton: “Though not a bribe or criminal influence, Justice Benjamin would nevertheless feel a debt of 
gratitude to Blankenship for his extraordinary efforts to get him elected.” (556 U.S. at 882). 
32 Dmitry Bam, Recusal Failure, 18 LEG. & PUB. POL’Y 631, at 639 (2015). 
33 Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 
2006, § 1, at 11, quoting Justice Paul E. Pfeifer (a member of the Ohio Supreme Court). 
34 For an early review of this problem, see Henry W. Chappell, Campaign Contributions and 
Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit-Tobit Model, 64 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 77 (1982). See also 
Stacy Gordon, All Votes Are Not Created Equal: Campaign Contributions and Critical Votes, 63 J. Pol. 
249 (2003). 
35 See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics, and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration Law in 
Alabama, J. L. & POL. 25: 645 (1999) (finding that an individual judge’s propensity for supporting 
arbitration is strongly correlated with the source of that judge’s election funding, with judges receiving 
funding from businesses more likely to support arbitration than those receiving funding from plaintiff’s 
lawyers); Eric N. Waltenburg & Charles S. Lopeman, Tort Decisions and Campaign Dollars, 28 SE POL. 
REV. 241 (2000); Vernon Valentine Palmer & John Levendis, The Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: 
An Empirical and Statistical Study of the Effect of Campaign Money on the Judicial Function, 82 
TULANE L. REV. 1291 (2008); Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An 
Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N. Y. U. L. REV. 69 (2011); Eric 
N. Waltenburg & Charles S. Lopeman, 2000 Tort Decisions and Campaign Dollars, 28 SE POL. REV. 241, 
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judges may be favoring contributors in their rulings (either intentionally or unintentionally—
more on this distinction in infra Subpart III.A), leading to better outcomes for cases in which 
those contributors are participating. On the other hand, contributors may simply be donating to 
judges who harbor a legal or political sensibility that will naturally (and innocently) lead them to 
vote in ways that benefit the contributor.36 This causal question is made all the more difficult by 
the fact that it does not easily lend itself to experimentation—the methodological approach that 
best addresses causal concerns.37  
Nonetheless, recent studies have used clever empirical methods that—to some extent—
get around some of the causal problems inherent in the enterprise. For example, a pair of 
studies instrumented for campaign contributions using the presence of a public defender and 
the incumbency status of the judge during the campaign—variables the authors argued were 
exogenous predictors of the amount of campaign contributions a judge receives.38 Another 
approach has been to identify existing institutional features that might create discrepancies in 
contributions across otherwise similar judges. A recent study by Hazelton et al. utilized North 
 
248, 256 (2000) (examining tort cases before supreme courts in Alabama, Kentucky, and Ohio, finding 
that judges rule in line with the interests of donors when they are approaching reelection). 
36 See Chris W. Bonneau, A Survey of Empirical Evidence Concerning Judicial Elections, Federalist 
Society White Paper (March) (providing a particularly good explanation of this two-way causal problem); 
and Douglas D. Roscoe & Shannon Jenkins, A Meta-Analysis of Campaign Contributions’ Impact on Roll 
Call Voting, SOC. SCI. Q. 86:52–68 (2005) (discussing this sort of “friendly giving” in the context of the 
legislative branch). 
37 This does not mean that experimentation in this arena is not possible. For a particularly fantastic 
example of how field experiments can be applied to seemingly implausible circumstances, see Joshua L. 
Kalla and David Broockman, Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A 
Randomized Field Experiment, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 545 (2016). The researchers partnered with a political 
organization whose members had made donations to over 191 congressional representatives and 
randomly varied whether it revealed the contributions when attempting to schedule meetings with the 
representatives. Kalla and Broockman found that the congressional offices were over three times willing 
to meet with donors than with non-donors. 
38 Chris W. Bonneau, The Effects of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections, 60 POL. RES. 
Q. 489 (2007); Chris W. Bonneau & Damon M. Cann, Campaign Contributions, Judicial 
Decisionmaking, and Institutional Context, Unpublished Manuscript (2009). 
This approach, while novel, has been criticized based on the use of instruments that are likely not 
independent of the error term. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, Impact of Judicial Elections on Judicial 
Decisions, 12 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 353 (2016). 
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Carolina’s opt-in public financing system for supreme court candidates and compared the 
decisions of judges before and after they entered into the system against those who privately 
funded all of their campaigns.39 The authors found that the advantage that attorney donors had 
when all judges ran privately funded campaigns diminished when they shifted to public funding, 
reasonably strong evidence that the donations were affecting decisions.40 Similarly, a number of 
nationwide studies by Shepherd compared state supreme court judges who were potentially 
running for an additional term against those who were prevented from doing so due to 
mandatory retirement rules.41 Shepherd’s studies focus primarily on the relationship between 
case outcomes and the business interests of donors and show a strong relationship between the 
two. These findings were recently validated and extended by another national study conducted 
by Heise, who found that non-business interests of donors are also influential on judicial 
behavior.42    
The integrated implications of these studies are nuanced, in large part because the 
influence of campaign money on case outcomes seemed to depend on the circumstances of the 
election and the nature of the campaign contribution. Not surprisingly, judges who won by 
slimmer margins in their previous election were more likely to rule in favor of contributors than 
judges who won by wider margins,43 and judges appeared to more greatly favor the interests of 
 
39 Morgan L. W. Hazelton, Jacob M. Montgomery, & Brendan Nyhan, Does Public Financing Affect 
Judicial Behavior? Evidence from the North Carolina Supreme Court, 44 AM. POL. RES. 587 (2015). 
40 The key causal concern here is that the judges who opted into the publicly funded systems might be 
(and probably are) systematically different than the judges who did not. 
41 Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE  L. J. 623 (2009); Michael S. 
Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign 
Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69 (2011). 
42 Michael Heise, The Complicated Business of State Supreme Court Elections: An Empirical Perspective, 
Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper (2018). 
43 See Ryan J. Rebe, Analyzing the Link Between Dollars and Decisions: A Multi-state Study of 
Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decision Making, 35 AM. REV. POL. 65 (2016). 
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their donors when approaching reelection.44 The structure of the electoral system seems to be a 
factor as well: Bonneau and Cann found that judges selected in the partisan races of Michigan 
and Texas appeared to be more influenced by contributions than judges in the non-partisan 
elections of Nevada, although those differences may also have been due to other unobserved 
variances in the individual states’ systems or politics.45  
The weight of the current evidence suggests a positive causal relationship between the 
source of donations and the outcomes of court cases, with some studies showing that donation 
differences of just $100 can have a significant effect on how the judge will determine the 
outcome of cases.46 Nonetheless, there are still gaps in this relatively new body of scholarship. Of 
particular importance in the context of this Chapter’s empirical study, these studies have almost 
always analyzed the relationship between money and judicial decisions in state supreme courts, 
giving little attention to intermediate and trial courts (a bias that is present throughout the 
entire subfield of courts and judicial studies).47  
ii. Effect on Public Perception: Even if one is skeptical about the causal link between 
political donations and the outcomes of individual cases, donations to judges can still be 
detrimental to the legal system if there is a perceived relationship between the two. In fact, some 
evidence suggests that a public perception of impropriety and partiality is even more concerning 
 
44 See Eric N. Waltenburg & Charles S. Lopeman, 2000 Tort Decisions and Campaign Dollars, 28 SE. 
POL. REV. SE. POL. REV. 241 (2000) (examining tort cases before supreme courts in Alabama, Kentucky, 
and Ohio across the judges’ election terms). 
45 Chris W. Bonneau & Damon M. Cann, Campaign Contributions, Judicial Decisionmaking, and 
Institutional Context, Unpublished Manuscript (2009). 
46 See Damon M. Cann, Chris W. Bonneau, & Brent D. Boyea, Campaign Contributions and Judicial 
Decisions in Partisan and Nonpartisan Elections, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN JUDICIAL POLITICS (Kevin T. 
McGuire ed. 2012). After controlling for ideology and case-specific variables, the authors find that there is 
a significant relationship between the donations of attorneys and the outcomes of cases. “For a judge who 
received $100 more from the liberal party’s attorney(s), the odds of a liberal decision are more than 
double the odds (specifically 2.29 times greater) where the respective parties’ contributions are at parity. 
For a judge who receives $100 more contributions from the conservative party, the odds of a liberal 
decision decrease by a factor of 0.44” (at 49). 
47 See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Judging the Judiciary by the Numbers: Empirical 
Research on Judges, 13 ANN. R. L. & SOC. SCI. 1, at 3-4 (2017) (noting that “most research on judges 
emphasizes decisions of the US Supreme Court…”).  
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than actual bias.48 And while the evidence supporting the link between campaign spending and 
judicial behavior is open to criticism, the evidence that the public, lawyers, and even judges are 
concerned with the effect that donations have on judicial decisionmaking is undeniably strong.  
Polling data has consistently shown that nearly every important demographic group sees 
the increased role of money in judicial elections as both a source of bias in individual cases and a 
general threat to the legitimacy of the court system. 76 percent of voters in in a national poll 
believed that campaign contributions had at least “some influence” on judicial decisions, and an 
additional 14 percent believed that there is “a little influence” on case outcomes.49 In another 
poll, more than 90 percent of those polled believed that judges should not hear cases involving 
contributors.50 Similarly, 90 percent of business leaders are concerned about the role that 
money plays in judicial behavior.51  
Even lawyers and judges, presumably the individuals who would be best informed 
regarding the true impact that donations play in court decisionmaking, appear to be concerned 
about the impact that campaign contributions have on case outcomes. 46 percent of state judges 
polled in 2001 indicated that they thought campaign contributions influenced judges’ decisions, 
compared to 36 percent who believed there was no influence,52 and 60 percent of these judges 
supported proposals to make recusal mandatory in cases that feature parties who had financially 
supported the presiding judge’s campaign.53 
 
48 See, e.g., Tom Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT. J. PSY. 117 (2010). 
49 Justice at Stake, Justice at Stake Frequency Questionnaire, available at 
http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/ JASNationalSurveyResults_6F537F99272D4.pdf. 
50 Justice at Stake, Polls of Voters, Business Leaders and Judges Themselves Shows Overwhelming 
Concern About the Impact of Special Interest Money on the Integrity of American Courts, available at 
http://www.justiceatstake.org/ resources/polls.cfm. 
51 Christian W. Peck, Attitudes and Views of American Business Leaders on State Judicial Elections and 
Political Contributions to Judges, Zogby International, (2007), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org 
/media/cms/CED_FINAL_ repor_ons_14MAY07_BED4DF4955B01.pdf 
52 16 percent said they did not know whether contributions influenced decisions, and 2 percent did not 
answer the question. Justice at Stake, State Judges Frequency Questionnaire (2002), available at 
http://www.justiceatstake.org /media/cms/JASJudgesSurveyResults_EA8838C0504A5.pdf. 
53 Justice at Stake, State Judges Frequency Questionnaire (2002), available at 
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A growing literature of survey experiments led by the work of Gibson and Caldeira have 
further explored the mechanisms behind the public’s views on campaign spending in judicial 
elections.54 By randomly varying the content of vignettes about a candidate’s judicial campaign—
including the existence, type (independent or direct), and size of campaign contributions; 
whether the judge accepted the contributions; and whether the judge recused from cases that 
featured campaign contributors—the authors are able to identify the extent to which each of 
those factors impact perceptions of judicial legitimacy. The results of their nationwide study 
show that when judicial candidates accept contributions, survey participants are more than 30 
percentage points less likely to believe that the judge can be fair and impartial. Perceptions of 
legitimacy are also damaged by judges who hear cases that feature campaign contributors 
relative to those who recuse (a 20 percentage-point difference).  
C. Recusal and Judicial Campaign Finance 
i. Caperton v. Massey Coal: The touchstone case for discussing the confluence of judicial 
politics and recusal is undoubtedly Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.55 It features prominently 
in the introductions of nearly all post-2009 law review articles that cover judicial campaign 
finance or recusal, and it is easy to see why: it is a spectacular example of the potential threats to 
judicial impartiality and legitimacy that come from judicial elections. But the extreme 
circumstances of the case also make it a somewhat unhelpful case study for understanding the 
current status of recusal law in the United States. Although the Supreme Court ultimately found 
the judge’s failure to recuse to be a violation of due process, the resulting precedent is so 
ambiguous and tied to such extraordinary facts, that states were given little guidance in how to 
 
http://www.justiceatstake.org /media/cms/JASJudgesSurveyResults_EA8838C0504A5.pdf. 
54 James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Judicial Impartiality, Campaign Contributions, and Recusals: 
Results from a National Survey, 10 J. EMP. L. STUD. 76 (2013); James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, 
Campaign Support, Conflicts of Interest, and Judicial Impartiality: Can Recusals Rescue the Legitimacy 
of Courts?, 74 J. POL. 18 (2012). 
55 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
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address the frequent but much more mundane conflicts created by campaign donors in the 
courtroom. Nonetheless, the expressed confidence of the judge in question in being able to 
remain unbiased and the contrasting perspectives of the Supreme Court justices in the Caperton 
opinions are emblematic of the diversity of views regarding the nature of judicial campaign 
finance and the extent to which we are willing to give judges a presumption of impartiality. 
Consequentially, we feel the case warrants an overview (plus, the facts truly are fascinating).  
Caperton originated as a contractual suit in the West Virginia trial court in which Hugh 
Caperton and several other plaintiffs laid suit against the A.T. Massey Coal Company for a 
contractual dispute.56 The trial court awarded $50 million in compensatory and punitive 
damages to the plaintiffs.  
Knowing that the case would be appealed to the West Virginia Supreme Court,57 
Massey’s chief executive officer and president, Benjamin Blankenship, threw substantial 
financial support behind Brent Benjamin, a local attorney who was challenging Justice McGraw, 
an incumbent in the 2004 state supreme court elections. Blankenship spent over $500,000 in 
independent expenditures on political advertisements and direct mailers supporting Benjamin 
and donated just under $2.5 million to “And For The Sake Of The Kids,” a section-527 
organization supporting Benjamin’s run for office. In total, Blankenship spent roughly $3 
million on Benjamin’s campaign, an amount that Caperton alleged was $1 million more than 
what Benjamin’s and McGraw’s campaign committees spent combined.  
In November 2004, Benjamin defeated McGraw to become the first Republican Supreme 
Court justice in West Virginia in over 80 years, and Benjamin took office in January 2005. In 
October 2005, Caperton preemptively moved for Benjamin’s removal based on West Virginia’s 
Code of Judicial Conduct and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. After reviewing 
 
56 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2 (2009). 
57 West Virginia has a two-court system for substantial cases such as Caperton. See West Virginia State 
Court Structure Chart, Court Statistics Project, available at http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-
Pages/State_Court_Structure_Charts/West-Virginia.aspx 
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the motion, Benjamin found “no objective information . . . to show that [he] has a bias for or 
against any litigant, that [he] has prejudged the matters which comprise this litigation, or that 
[he] will be anything but fair and impartial.”58 Massey subsequently filed petition for appeal in 
December 2006, and the West Virginia Supreme Court granted review. In a 3-2 decision, the 
court reversed the trial court’s decision in favor of Massey Coal based on a forum-selection 
clause in one of the relevant contracts that barred the suit from review in West Virginia and 
based on res judicata stemming from a previous judgement to which Massey Coal was not a 
party.  
Caperton subsequently sought rehearing based in part on recent evidence that had 
emerged showing that Justice Maynard—one of the three votes in favor of Massey Coal—had 
vacationed with Blankenship in the French Rivera while the case was pending in the West 
Virginia Supreme Court.59 Caperton submitted a motion to recuse to Maynard and again 
submitted a motion to recuse to Benjamin for the campaign support of Blankenship. At the same 
time, Massey Coal sought recusal of Justice Starcher—one of the two dissenting votes—due to 
his public criticism of Benjamin’s failure to recuse before the original hearing. Maynard and 
Starcher recused, but Benjamin denied the recusal motion against him. 
The court, led by Acting-Chief Justice Benjamin, and composed of three of the original 
justices and two new justices selected by Benjamin, reheard the case, but only after a third 
recusal request against Benjamin was denied. With a recent push poll showing that over two-
thirds of West Virginians questioned Benjamin’s ability to be fair and impartial, Caperton 
argued that, in accordance with West Virginia’s Code of Judicial Conduct, it was clear that “a 
reasonable and prudent person” would question Benjamin’s ability to be impartial. In April 
2008, the five-person panel again found in favor of Massey Coal in a 3-2 decision.  
 
58 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 3 (2009). 
59 See Adam Liptak, Motion Ties W. Virginia Justice to Coal Executive, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008, 
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/15/us/15court.html. 
  23  
 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted cert in the case, and in a 5-4 decision found in favor of 
Caperton, overturning the West Virginia Supreme Court’s ruling. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
previous standard required recusal when the probability of judicial bias “is too high to be 
constitutionally tolerable,”60 and the Court found that the probability of bias in this case reached 
that level. 
The constitutional question at issue, at least as it was framed by the Kennedy-penned 
majority opinion, was specifically whether the donations and support given to Benjamin by 
Blankenship (the validity of which were not in question) created an intolerable risk of bias, not 
“whether in fact [the justice] was influenced.”61 In fact, the majority made it clear that they were 
not questioning Benjamin’s impartiality and that due process “may sometimes bar trial by 
judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice 
equally between contending parties.”62  
The dissenting justices disagreed with the majority’s approach in a number of ways that 
are worth highlighting. First, they noted that the Court’s previous jurisprudence had never 
found a failure to recuse to be a violation of due process except when the judge has a financial 
interest in the case or when the judge is deciding on a criminal contempt resulting from previous 
hostility to that same judge. The Court had explicitly stated that even issues as problematic as 
kinship to the judge may not be constitutional in nature.63 Second, in addition to venturing 
beyond previous rulings, they felt that the majority had based its decision on a standard—
probability of bias—that “fail[ed] to provide clear, workable guidance for future cases.”64 Third, 
the dissenting justices held a much stronger presumption of impartiality in regard to judges. 
 
60 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, at 47 (1975). 
61 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 8 (2009), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 
U. S. 813, 825 (1986). 
62 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). 
63 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U. S. 813, 820 
(1986). 
64 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
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They questioned whether the facts of the cases were really all that extreme, emphasizing that the 
vast majority of Blankenship’s support was made via independent expenditures and was 
therefore out of Benjamin’s control.65 Scalia’s dissent even argued that the majority’s ruling was 
more deleterious to the public’s perception of the judiciary than the facts of the case 
themselves.66 
In some ways, this ruling was seen by many as a monumental shift in the approach that 
the Supreme Court takes toward elections and campaign spending—it was the first time that the 
Court had ever found a failure to recuse due to campaign contributions to be a violation of due 
process, and it was one of the few times where the Court was willing to push back against the 
growing influence of campaign spending in elections. In regard to recusal jurisprudence, 
however, the decision provided very little guidance. The Court made clear that there exists some 
“constitutional floor”67 at which point judges must recuse due to campaign contributions but left 
questions regarding the possible bias associated with smaller, more common, donations (that is, 
donations less than $3 million) as “matters merely of legislative discretion.”68  
ii. Recusal for Campaign Contributions: Despite the Supreme Court punting on the 
specifics of recusal in relation to campaign contributions, recusal is still understood by many as 
the most practical antidote to judicial impartiality. Indeed, in the case of campaign 
contributions, some have argued that recusal is not only the best means for dealing with bias but 
“the only effective means to ensure the impartiality of elected judges.”69 Dmitry Bam, one of the 
leading scholars on recusal policy (and a skeptic regarding its efficacy in regard to campaign 
 
65 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (Roberts, J., dissenting at 13). 
66 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting at 1). 
67 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 19 (2009), quoting Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U. S. 899, 
904 (1997). 
68 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 6 (2009), quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, at 
523 (1927). 
69 Molly McLucas, The Need for Effective Recusal Standards for an Elected Judiciary, 42 LOY. LA. L. REV. 
671, 692 (2009) (emphasis added). 
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contributions), explains: “[r]ecusal has tremendous allure because, in theory, it allows us to 
ensure judicial impartiality at the point of delivery.”70 In other words, it provides a post hoc 
remedy to a problem that is an inherent part of the current political regime without a wholesale 
dismantling of the regime itself.  
However, the particular legal approach that states should take to regulating recusal in 
relation to campaign contributors is still an open question. Much of this discussion has been led 
by the American Bar Association and their Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which has no force 
of law but is widely seen as the preeminent source for judicial standards in this area. The ABA 
first suggested recusal as a solution for contributor bias in a 1999 amendment, and the current 
rule (most recently amended in 2007) remains largely the same.71 Rule 2.11 calls for automatic 
recusal when “The judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that a party, a party’s 
lawyer, or the law firm of a party’s lawyer has within the previous [insert number] year[s] made 
aggregate contributions to the judge’s campaign in an amount that is greater than $[insert 
amount] for an individual or $[insert amount] for an entity [is reasonable and appropriate for 
an individual or an entity],” leaving the specific contribution amounts at which the rule is 
triggered up to the individual states. This provision has subsequently led to a complex (and 
often heated) debate within the ABA’s organizational bodies, both regarding the ethical 
implications it imposes for judges and the potential it creates for attorneys and parties to 
intentionally avoid certain judges through making strategic contributions (see a discussion of 
this “pay-not-to-play” problem in infra Part VI of this Chapter). 
Despite widespread adoption of the ABA Model Code as a basis for their state codes of 
judicial conduct, only a handful of states have implemented Rule 2.11(4)’s inclusion of campaign 
contributions in the list of enumerated per se recusal requirements.72 Most prominently, 
 
70 Dmitry Bam, Recusal Failure, 18 LEG. & PUB. POL’Y 631 (2015). 
71 Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3E(1)(e) (1999) (Am. Bar Ass’n, amended 2011). 
72 See American Bar Association, Comparison of Jurisdictional Codes of Judicial Conduct to Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct, available at 
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California passed a 2010 amendment to their Code of Civil Procedure to require recusal for trial 
judges if a party or an attorney in a case had donated more than $1,500 in the previous six 
years73 or for any donation amount if it a reasonable person might “entertain a doubt that the 
judge would be able to be impartial.”74 The California Supreme Court also amended the code of 
judicial ethics to require recusal for appellate judges for donations above $5,000.75 Similarly, 
Arizona implemented mandatory recusal for aggregate contributions that exceed the campaign 
contribution limits at the time,76 and in 2014 Alabama adopted rules stipulating that judges 
must recuse if the contributions of a lawyer or party in a case exceed ten, fifteen, or twenty-five 
percent of the total money raised by the appellate, circuit, and district court judge, respectively.77 
On a much more extreme level, Utah similarly requires recusal for donations, except the cap is 
any aggregate contribution amount above $50.78  
Interestingly, two state supreme courts—one of which is a venue for this Chapter’s 




73 California Code of Civil Procedure § 170.1(9)(A). 
74 California Code of Civil Procedure § 170.1(9)(A) Comments. 
75 California Supreme Court Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 3E(5)(j), which reads in whole: “The justice has 
received a campaign contribution of $5,000 or more from a party or lawyer in a matter that is before the 
court, and either of the following applies: (i) The contribution was received in support of the justice’s last 
election, if the last election was within the last six years; or (ii) The contribution was received in 
anticipation of an upcoming election. Notwithstanding Canon 3E(5)(j), a justice shall be disqualified 
based on a contribution of a lesser amount if required by Canon 3E(4). The disqualification required 
under Canon 3E(5)(j) may be waived if all parties that did not make the contribution agree to waive the 
disqualification.” 
76 Arizona’s contribution limits change systematically on a yearly basis according to A.R.S. Section 16-905. 
77 Alabama Laws Act 2014-455 http://legiscan.com/AL/text/HB543/2014. Interestingly, Alabama had 
previously had a mandatory recusal cap at $4,000, that was never implemented. See Little v. Strange, 796 
F. Supp. 2d 1314 (2011) (in which the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama dismissed a 
suit challenging the statute because of a lack of ripeness). 
78 Utah Supreme Court Code Rule 2011(A)(4), requiring disqualification when ““the judge knows or learns 
by means of a timely motion that a party, a party’s lawyer, or the law firm of a party’s lawyer has within 
the previous three years made aggregate contributions to the judge’s retention in an amount that is 
greater than $50.” Note that one reason why the cap is so low is because Utah judges fundraise only 
during retention elections, which are considerably less expensive than competitive races. 
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Voters of Wisconsin79 and a former Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice80 submitted petitions to 
require recusal for donations above $1,000 and $10,000. Responding instead to two contrary 
proposals filed by the Wisconsin Realtors Association81 and Wisconsin Manufacturers and 
Commerce,82 the court included an explicit provision in the supreme court rules that clarified 
that previous endorsements, contributions, or independent expenditures by participants in a 
case do not induce automatic removal.83 Similarly, Nevada’s supreme court rejected a provision 
recommended by the Commission on the Amendment to the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct 
that required recusal for contributions exceeding $50,000 or five percent of the judge’s total 
fundraising. 
Other states have explicitly incorporated considerations for campaign contributions into 
their recusal regimes but have stopped short of requiring the judge to remove herself for certain 
amounts. Mississippi now allows parties to file motions to recuse84 based on donations of more 
than $2,000 for appellate judges and $1,000 for trial judges,85 but this requires only that the 
motion be “considered and subject to appellate review as provided for other motions for 
recusal.”86 Georgia incorporated a list of factors that “may be considered” to determine 
 
79 Petition of The League of Women Voters of Wisconsin Education Fund, In re creation of rules for when 
a party or a lawyer in a case made contribution affecting a judicial campaign, Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, available at https://wicourts.gov/supreme/docs/0816petitionamend.pdf. 
80 Petition of Justice William A. Bablitch, In the Matter of Amending the Code of Judicial Conduct, 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, available at https://www.wicourts.gov/supreme/docs/0911petition.pdf. 
81 Petition of The Wisconsin Realtors Association, In the Matter of Amending the Rules of Judicial 
Conduct, Wisconsin Supreme Court, available at https://wicourts.gov/supreme/docs/0825petition.pdf. 
82 Petition of Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, In the Matter of Amending the Rules of Judicial 
Conduct, Wisconsin Supreme Court, available at 
https://www.wicourts.gov/supreme/docs/0910petition.pdf. 
83 Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules 60.04 (7) (which discusses direct contributions) and 60.04 (8) (which 
discusses independent expenditures). See also, Tom Solberg, Supreme Court Revises Judicial Recusal 
Guidelines, State Bar of Wisconsin, July 9, 2010, available at 
https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/InsideTrack/Pages/Article.aspx?Volume=2&Issue=37&Articl
eID= 5912 
84 This is distinct from a requirement of automatic recusal. 
85 Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E(2). 
86 Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E(2). 
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impartiality due to campaign support (which includes donation amount in addition to the 
timing and impact of that donation), but clarifies that “[t]here is a rebuttable presumption that 
there is no per se basis for disqualification where the aggregate contributions are equal to or less 
than the maximum allowable contribution permitted by law.”87 Since 2010, similar provisions or 
amendments to existing code that address campaign contributions have also been made in 
Iowa,88 Michigan,89 Oklahoma,90 Pennsylvania,91 Tennessee,92 and Washington;93 and 
Arkansas,94 Missouri,95 New Mexico,96 and North Dakota,97 have added relevant language in the 
comments to their rules.98 
For these states with recusal laws and rules that simply mention campaign contributions 
as a potential source of bias or do not address such relationships at all, whether or not a judge 
should recuse from cases in which a donor is a participant is governed by the generalized bias or 
 
87 Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E(1)(d)). 
88 Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, Chapter 51:2.11(A)(4). 
89 Michigan Rules of Court, Rule 2.003(C)(1)(b). 
90 Oklahoma Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.11A(4). 
91 207 Pennsylvania Code Rule 2.11A(4). See also Robert A. Graci, Press Release: Board Issues Statements 
of Policy Regarding Investigations of Campaign Contributions and Electronic Communications, 




92 Rule 10 Tennessee Code of Judicial Conduct, Cannon 2.11A(4). See also Comment 7. 
93 Washington Code of Judicial Conduct, Cannon 2.11(D). 
94 Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11, comment 4 (which reads: “The fact that a lawyer in a 
proceeding, or a litigant, contributed to the judge’s campaign, or publicly supported the judge in his or her 
election does not of itself disqualify the judge. However, the size of contributions, the degree of 
involvement in the campaign, the timing of the campaign and the proceeding, the issues involved in the 
proceeding, and other factors known to the judge may raise questions as to the judge’s impartiality under 
paragraph (A).”) 
95 Missouri Supreme Court Rule 2-4.2 Comment. 
96 New Mexico Supreme Court Rule 21.211 Comment. 
97 North Dakota Code of Judicial Conduct, Cannon 2.11 Comment. 
98 For a thorough overview of these changes and all the recent legal moves relating to recusal and 
campaign contributions, see Cynthia Gray, Judicial Disqualification Based on Campaign Contributions, 
National Center for State Courts Center for Judicial Ethics (2016). 
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appearance of bias provisions discussed in supra Subpart II.C. As a result, it is not surprising to 
see that, upon review of cases in which judges have refused to recuse,99 the majority of state 
courts have found that judges are not required to recuse due purely to campaign donations if 
those judges have determined that they can remain impartial.100 This does not preclude judges 
from recusing themselves regardless of the absence of a precedential requirement to do so, but it 




99 When evaluating patterns in the case law, it is important to be aware of how the institutional framework 
of the courts might result in a biased picture of the legal practice and outcomes in that area. With cases 
dealing with recusal motions, we should expect to find a disproportionate amount of cases in which the 
initial judge has refused to recuse because it is unlikely (and legally tenuous) for parties to appeal in cases 
when the judge has either recused herself or granted a motion to recuse. See Sande L. Buhai, Federal 
Judicial Disqualification: A Behavioral and Quantitative Analysis, 90 Or. L. Rev. 69 (2011) (for a 
discussion of this limitation in the context of recusals in the Federal Courts). 
100 See RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 367-386 
(3rd ed. 2017) (providing a short review of the current approach to this issue by U.S. courts, including a 
summary of a good number of relevant cases). See, e.g., Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. App. 1983) 
(not requiring recusal despite the fact that two of the three judges had received thousands in 
contributions from one of the attorneys and had thrown their victory celebrations at the attorneys’ 
offices); Storms v. Action Wisconsin Inc., 2008 WI 110, 314 Wis. 2d 510, 754 N.W.2d 480 (Wis. 2008) 
(arguing that there is “no case in Wisconsin or elsewhere” where recusal is mandated simply because a 
participant in the case made a contribution to the judge’s political campaign); Williams v. Viswanathan, 
65 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. App. 2001) (finding that because a reasonable person would certainly know that 
judges have to raise money in order to run for election, simply having received a donation from a 
participant in a case is not enough to warrant required recusal); Braynen v. State, 895 So. 1169 (Fla. App. 
2005) (finding a judge cannot be required to remove herself purely based on a campaign donation, but in 
a concurring opinion, it was noted that in "spite of our extant precedent, a judge would be well advised to 
grant recusal under these circumstances," because a reasonable person could very well "understandably 
fear" impartiality (at 1170)); Whalen v. Murphy, 943 So. 2d 504 (La. App. 2006) (finding that "the 
evidence simply does not establish actual bias," (at 508) in a case in which the judge vacated a previously 
granted summary judgement in favor of a party after the opposing party made a campaign contribution); 
Shepherdson v. Nigro, 5 F. Supp.2d 305, 308-311 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (acknowledging that the state of 
campaign finance creates an unfortunate situation but that it would be unfair to punish the judge for 
accepting legal contributions by forcing recusal). 
But see Gude v. State, 289 Ga. 46 709 S.E.2d 206 (Ga. 2011) (not requiring recusal but opining that judges 
should recuse from cases "involving a party who has previously made an exceptionally large campaign 
contribution…" (at 50)); Reems v. St. Joseph’s Hospital, 536 N.W.2d 666 (N.D. 1995) (not requiring 
recusal in a case in which one of the lawyers was a co-chair for the judge’s campaign finance committee, 
but noting that campaign contributions are not irrelevant in determining whether recusal is necessary). 
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III. Why Judges Don’t Recuse Themselves and Attorneys Don’t Ask Them 
To 
We are not the first to claim that the current system of recusal in the United States is 
inefficacious. Coming after the controversy surrounding the Caperton case, scholarship 
skeptical of recusal in the context of judicial elections has become a cottage industry.101 Across 
this literature, the message—recusal does not work—is the same but the concerns are varied. 
Below, we attempt consolidate these concerns and build an informal model of judicial behavior 
that identifies the various factors that disincentivize recusal even when a legitimate conflict of 
interest exists. This is not a functional formal model—it does not attempt to provide a numerical 
framework for the decision—but it is an attempt to be comprehensive. As we argue below, the 
analysis leads to the conclusion that recusal rates, particularly when the recusal question 
pertains to campaign contributions, are likely very low—even lower than the literature skeptical 
of recusal might suggest.  
The model, which will later be adjusted to explore the incentives surrounding an 
attorney requesting recusal, focuses on the judge’s behavior but accounts for three primary 
actors: the presiding judge for whom the conflict of interest is a potential issue; the “inside” 
party, who has the questionable relationship with the judge; and the “outside” party, who does 
not have the relationship with the judge. In this structuring, we will generally treat the parties to 
a case and their attorneys as single actors with unified preferences, although as we will highlight 
in infra Subpart III.C, there are instances when the long-term interests and subsequent 
behavior of the attorney diverge from the short-term interests of her client. 
It should be noted that for many readers, particularly those trained in U.S. law schools, 
this analysis may seem to paint an overly critical image of the American judiciary. The 
traditional legal pedagogy is strongly influenced by a formalist strain of judicial philosophy that 
 
101 Morrow notes that, as of 2018, there are 682 law review articles that cite Caperton. (Kevin Morrow, To 
Judge or Not to Judge? Judge Shopping, Recusal & Judicial Defendants, Unpublished Manuscript (2018). 
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sees judges as legal umpires who “call balls and strikes”102 and are able to apply the law without 
consideration of extra-legal factors.103 Our analysis espouses a more realist-oriented approach, 
arguing that a litany of behavioral considerations—for example, a judge’s reputation among 
peers or her chances for reelection—influence a judge’s behavior in addition to and in tandem 
with the relevant legal considerations at hand.104 But it does not follow from this approach that 
all judges intentionally spurn the law to accomplish their own ends. One can, as we do in this 
Chapter, simultaneously adopt the position that judges are susceptible to a wide variety of 
incentives and biases and still maintain that most judges are sincerely trying their best and are 
among the most qualified and capable individuals in the legal profession. 
A. Why Judges Don’t Recuse Themselves 
i. Judicial Latitude in Recusal Determinations: The foundational factor in 
understanding why judges are likely not inclined to recuse is the procedural structure of the 
recusal process itself. The entire premise of employing a judge to make legal determinations is 
based on the well-known edict that “no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause.”105 And 
yet, with few exceptions, the judge to whom the recusal motion is filed and the judge who rules 
on the recusal motion is the very individual whose impartiality is being questioned.106 This 
practice of self-recusal is both a problem in and of itself and also lays the groundwork for a host 
of other considerations that influence the judge’s decision to recuse or not. 
 
102 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United 
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005). 
103 See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 30 
(2009). 
104 John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 247 (1987). 
105 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 59 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)). The full quote states that, 
“No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, 
and, no improbably, corrupt his integrity.” 
106 As an example of an exception, Illinois recusal law allows for the substitution of the judge for recusal 
determinations in both civil (737 ILCS 5/2 1001) and criminal cases (735 ILCS 5/114-5), although doing so 
requires additional filings. 
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The extent to which self-recusal is a problem varies depending on the purported source 
of bias. For a fairly standard set of potential conflicts (familial relationships, financial interests, 
pre-judicial legal work on the case, etc.), judges are subject to bright-line, per se recusal rules. In 
making determinations on these issues, the legal sufficiency of the allegations of bias are 
generally much easier to produce and evaluate, so less judicial discretion is involved.107 The 
judge does technically have the option to refuse removal but doing so would almost certainly 
result in appeal and an ethical sanction.108  
For the majority of recusal decisions, however, judges are granted much more decisional 
freedom. Because it is impractical to predict and outline all of circumstances that might warrant 
recusal, regimes generally employ broad “catchall” rules that require removal in circumstances 
in which the judge is sufficiently biased or, in most cases, may be perceived to be biased. In 
addition to being harder to prove,109 the standards used to make these self-recusal 
determinations vary across (and within)110 jurisdictions and are largely underdeveloped, giving 
judges such wide latitude that the decision comes down as much to personal choice and 
perspective as it does to legal standards.111 This is particularly true in the jurisdictions that use 
 
107 See Melinda A. Marbes, Reforming Recusal Rules: Reassessing the Presumption of Judicial 
Impartiality in Light of the Realities of Judging and Changing the Substance of Disqualification 
Standards to Eliminate Cognitive Errors, 7 ST. MARY’S J. L. MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 238 (2017) (which 
explores the distinction between per se recusal rules and rules that rely on more judicial discretion. 
Marbes argues that a separate legal regime should be applied to the two types of recusal decisions.) 
108 Sande L. Buhai, Federal Judicial Disqualification: A Behavioral and Quantitative Analysis 69 (2011) 
(for a review of the cases in the U.S. Circuit Courts in which a decision not to recuse was appealed). 
109 See RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 229 
(3rd ed. 2017). 
110 See, e.g., U.S. v. Mikalajunas, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 21054 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that the proper 
standard for recusal is whether a reasonable person “would” doubt the judge’s impartiality), as compared 
to U.S. v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that the proper standard is whether a reasonable 
pers “might” doubt the judge’s impartiality). 
111 See RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 227 (3rd 
ed. 2017) (”The fact is…that the term ‘appearance of bias’ has, for the most part, not been defined and, 
because that is so, courts have not always used that term to mean precisely the same thing.”). 
One of the likely reasons why this area of law is underdeveloped is that judges often do not need to state 
the reasons for their recusal on the record when they voluntarily recuse. See Patrick A. Woods, Reversal 
by Recusal: Comer v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc. and the Need for Mandatory Judicial Recusal Statements, 
13 U.N.H. L. REV. 177 (2015). Similarly, voluntary recusal in a previous case does not necessarily 
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the appearance-of-bias test, as this standard generally requires the judge to “evaluate the 
evidence of possible bias in the same manner a reasonable and informed other would.”112 
As some have previously highlighted, the difference in judicial decisionmaking created 
by these two substantive standards—per se and catchall rules—is substantial and likely 
necessitates divergent procedural approaches.113 The current regime of judicial recusal continues 
to put a premium on providing judges with broad flexibility to determine which cases warrant 
removal due in large part to the fact that judges vociferously defend their own decisionmaking 
territory. There is a fear that a full-scale reversion back to the previous recusal regime—an 
approach hallmarked by automatic recusals and the inherent assumption that judges are biased 
in many cases—will reflect poorly on the judges and the judiciary more broadly.114 It is no 
surprise, then, that the decisions of judges in regard to recusal decisions in specific cases should 
be—as with their approach to recusal rules and regulation more broadly—partly self-preserving. 
ii. The Psychology of Judicial Decisionmaking: Likely the most well-understood—and 
most discussed—factors that work to disincentivize judicial recusal are the cognitive and 
psychological difficulties in identifying and overcoming bias and partiality.115 As we outlined 
 
demonstrate the need for recusal in subsequent cases. See Mackey v. U.S., 221 F. App’x 907, 910 (11th Cir. 
2007) ("It is simply not true that once recused, always recused…"); Diversified Numismatics, Inc. v. City 
of Orlando, 949 F.2d 382, 385 (11th Cir. 1991) ("Prior recusals, without more, do not objectively 
demonstrate an appearance of partiality."); 
112 Melinda A. Marbes, Reforming Recusal Rules: Reassessing the Presumption of Judicial Impartiality 
in Light of the Realities of Judging and Changing the Substance of Disqualification Standards to 
Eliminate Cognitive Errors, 7 ST. MARY’S J. L. MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 238, 288 (2017). 
113 See Melinda A. Marbes, Reforming Recusal Rules: Reassessing the Presumption of Judicial Impartiality 
in Light of the Realities of Judging and Changing the Substance of Disqualification Standards to Eliminate 
Cognitive Errors, 7 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 238 (2016-2017) (arguing that a two-
pronged approach to recusal is necessary to balance the costs of unnecessary disqualification disputes in 
recusal determinations that involve little judicial discretion against the prominent role that cognitive errors 
play in recusal determinations that are more discretionary). 
114 See CHARLES E. [SIC] GEYH & W. WILLIAM HODES, REPORTERS’ NOTES TO THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT 17-18 (2007) (chronicling the heated debate with the ABA regarding the appearance-of-bias 
standard). See also Charles Geyh, Myles Lynk, Robert S. Peck & Toni Clarke, The State of Recusal 
Reform, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 515 (2015) (a panel discussion between a …on the evolution of 
recusal standards, particularly in regard to the ABA standards). 
115 For a more substantial review of the importance of judicial psychology as it relates to recusal, see Melinda 
A. Marbes, Refocusing Recusals: How the Bias Blind Spot Affects Disqualification Disputes and Should 
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earlier, the current judicial recusal regimes in the United States consist of a combination of per 
se recusal rules, which require removal under certain circumstances, and broad catchall 
provisions, which generally rely almost exclusively on the judge’s discretion in determining 
whether sufficient bias or appearance of bias exists to warrant removal. The discretion provided 
by this latter category puts the decisionmaking process of the judge front and center, making 
any cognitive limitations key factors in determining whether and when a judge will actually 
recuse. 
A series of recent studies in psychology have provided evidence that judges are 
susceptible to many, if not all, of the same cognitive errors and illusions impacting the 
decisionmaking processes that have long been identified in the wider psychological literature.116 
Judges, for example, are prone to hindsight bias—or the tendency to underestimate the difficulty 
of past decisions once present outcomes are known117—and framing effects—the categorization 
of difficult decision options as a loss or a gain that depends on how the decision is initially 
presented118—despite their legal training and perception as mechanistic legal arbiters. 
Whereas these cognitive errors may arguably lead to the sorts of judicial partiality that 
might necessitate recusal, the “bias blind spot” is a cognitive error that is particularly relevant to 
 
Reshape Recusal Reform, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 235 (2013); Melinda A. Marbes, Reshaping Recusal 
Procedures: Eliminating Decisionmaker Bias and Promoting Public Confidence, 49 VALPARAISO U. L. REV. 
807 (2015); Melinda A. Marbes, Reforming Recusal Rules: Reassessing the Presumption of Judicial 
Impartiality in Light of the Realities of Judging and Changing the Substance of Disqualification 
Standards to Eliminate Cognitive Errors, 7 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 238 (2016-
2017); W. Bradley Wendel, Campaign Contributions and Risk-Avoidance Rules in Judicial Ethics, 67 
DEPAUL L. REV. 255 (2018);  
116 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL 
L. REV. 777 (2001) (featuring an empirical study of over 160 federal magistrate judges—one of the first 
psychological studies on actual judges—testing five common cognitive illusions that had previously been 
identified to exist among the lay population). 
117  Stephen Hoch and George F. Lowenstein, Outcome Feedback: Hindsight and Information, 15 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING MEMORY & COGNITION 605 (1989). 
118 See the famous work of Kahneman and Tversky for a detailed discussion and evaluation of framing: Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 221 SCIENCE 453 
(1981); Daniel Kahneman and Amon Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 30 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 
(1984); Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. 
S251 (1986). 
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the ability for judges to make self-recusal determinations because it relates specifically to one’s 
ability to judge one’s self. Originally coined by social psychologist Emily Pronin and her 
associates, the bias blind spot is a descriptor for two related psychological phenomena.119 First, 
individuals are systematically apt to underestimate or not even recognize the extent to which 
they are biased in a particular area. These findings cut to the core questions surrounding judicial 
recusal, as judges are required to self-determine the existence or perception of bias and will 
likely not perceive the bias or dismiss it if claims of partiality are raised by outside sources 
(litigants, their attorneys, or third parties). Second, individuals overestimate the extent to which 
others are prone to the same bias.120 
Although it is currently unclear exactly how susceptible judicial decisionmaking and 
recusal decisions specifically are to this blind spot—no empirical studies have used judges as 
subjects—leading scholars in recusal law and analysis have appropriately argued that the weight 
of current evidence suggests that judges are prone to the same errors as the rest of us, so we 
should presume that they fall prey to the blind spot as well.121 In the context of recusal, this is 
particularly problematic because recusal determinations in all the circumstances that do not fall 
into the enumerated per se recusal categories are almost exclusively up to the determination of 
the judge.  
But what of the judges who are successfully able to identify their partiality and sincerely 
seek to address it, whether through their own inner exploration or through the arguments of one 
 
119 Emily Pronin, Daniel Y. Lin, and Lee Ross, The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus 
Others, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369 (2002). See also, Emily Pronin, Perception and 
Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment, 11 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE 37 (2007); Joyce Ehrlinger, 
Thomas Gilovich, Lee Ross, Peering Into the Bias Blind Spot: People’s Assessments of Bias in Themselves 
and Others, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 690 (2005); Irene Scopelliti et. al, Bias Blind Spot: 
Structure, Measurement, and Consequences, 61 MANAGEMENT SCI. 2648 (2015). 
120 This second phenomena may explain the dissonance between what judges say should happen in regard 
to recusal (see supra notes 50 and 51) and what they actually do in practice (see empirical results in infra 
Part V). 
121 Melinda A. Marbes, Reforming Recusal Rules: Reassessing the Presumption of Judicial Impartiality in 
Light of the Realities of Judging and Changing the Substance of Disqualification Standards to Eliminate 
Cognitive Errors, 7 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 238 (2016-2017) 
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of the parties? The circumstances surrounding Caperton are again relevant in this regard. The 
West Virginia Supreme Court justice in question was well aware of the donations made by the 
CEO of Massey Coal and the potential, if not likely, effect that such a relationship could have on 
his ability to be a neutral decisionmaker in the case.122 Yet he adamantly declared his ability to 
ignore the money and stay on the case. Aren’t judges particularly well-suited to ignore these 
sorts of issues or even “de-bias” themselves? Recent findings in psychology are again helpful 
here. Participants in psychological studies who were informed of the bias blind spot were still 
prone to believe that they were more able to overcome bias than their peers.123 
iii. Reputational Costs: Even if judges are successfully able to identify circumstances that 
lead to partiality or the appearance of partiality, the current ethos of judicial practice frames 
recusal in such a way that doing so will likely be seen as an abdication of one’s role as a judge 
and may further impugn the judge’s colleagues and legal associates.  
Recall that in the Caperton decision, one of the primary disagreements between the 
majority and dissenting opinions was the extent to which the justices felt that judges should be 
presumed to be impartial. Writing in dissent, Justice Roberts argued that the court should be 
careful to find judges in violation of the “promise” of impartiality, implying that doing so would 
“impute to judges a lack of firmness, wisdom, or honor.”124 In his own brief dissent, Justice 
Scalia not only expressed a strong presumption of impartiality, but emphasized that overly 
 
122 In the case, Caperton moved for recusal three times, including arguments as to why Justice Benjamin 
would be biased by the contributions and data from a push poll showing that 67% of West Virginians 
questioned his ability to be partial (Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,  129 S. Ct. 2252, 4 (2009)). 
123 Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28 PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 375 (2002) (finding that “even the immediate experience of having displayed a 
particular bias, and then being given an explicitly description of it…, was insufficient to prompt confessions 
of susceptibility equal to that of one’s peers.”) (375) 
124 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Bridges 
v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 273 (1941)) (emphasis added). 
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inclusive recusal requirements would actually “erod[e] public confidence in the Nation’s judicial 
system . . . .”125 
The association between recusal and “bad” judging has long been a part of this country’s 
legal culture. William Blackstone (not an American jurist but influential nonetheless) was 
famously opposed to recusal: “The law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favor in a judge, 
who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon 
that presumption and idea.”126 According to Blackstone, a judge cannot recuse himself from a 
case because, by definition, a judge is someone who would simply never need to recuse. Within 
this cultural context, to recuse can be seen as an abandonment of the judicial commitment to 
fairness as opposed to an attempt to maintain it. These cultural motivations are particularly 
salient when it is one of the participants in the case who raises the issue of bias as opposed to a 
sua sponte motion for recusal from the judge, as “a successful motion to recuse requires the 
[judge] to admit that he failed in the first instance to adhere to statutory and ethical 
requirements.”127  
In the context of recusal for campaign donations, the anti-recusal bias is compounded by 
the fact that almost all judges are trained to be and practiced as lawyers in the communities and 
political systems where they serve. As Barton describes in his book, The Lawyer-Judge Bias in 
the American Legal System, the shared background and experience between lawyers and judges 
naturally produces a jurisprudence and judicial culture that favors lawyers.128 This also means 
that many of the judges likely participated in the system of campaign contributions from the 
side of the attorney donor, making it difficult for them to subsequently legitimize the claims that 
it produces bias by recusing themselves from cases in which an attorney donor is a participant. 
 
125 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 1 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
126 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND v. 3, at 361. 
127  R. Matthew Pearson, Note, Duck Duck Recuse?: Foreign Common Law Guidance and Improving 
Recusal of Supreme Court Justices, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1799, 1833–34 (2005). 
128 BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (2010). 
  38  
 
iv. Institutional Costs: In addition to potential social costs, recusal also brings 
institutional costs to the judges and the participants in a case. Any judicial transfer will 
inherently cause at least some administrative burden to the judge and the court system; the case 
will have to be formally transferred to another judge, requiring some paperwork, a physical 
transfer of files from one office to another, and some rescheduling. Depending on the 
jurisdictional procedures and practices, recusal can also trigger a formal review by a peer or 
presiding judge. Although such costs are likely de minimis when recusal occurs at the beginning 
of the adjudicative process, they can become substantial as the case develops and the filings, 
deadlines, and scheduled hearings become more closely tied to the specific judge.129   
Moving from one judge to another can also result in significant loss of invested 
institutional capital, both to the departing judge and the parties involved in the case. For cases 
that go beyond the initial stages, judges become familiar with the arguments and participants, 
meaning that it is difficult for a new judge to catch up mid-case. Similarly, although the legal 
system relies on and is built to support the general presumption that adjudicative disputes will 
be resolved in the same way regardless of the individual decisionmaker, it is well known (and 
supported by empirical evidence) that judges do vary in their procedural approach, legal 
philosophy, and general disposition,130 leading to attorneys often tailoring their legal arguments 
and case-management strategies to the specific judge who is presiding over the case. Having to 
adjust to a new judge mid-case will likely require additional work hours for the attorneys. 
 
129  See Matthew Menendez and Dorothy Samuels, Judicial Recusal Reform: Toward Independent 
Consideration of Disqualification, Brennan Center for Justice Report (2016), available at 
https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/judicial-recusal-reform-toward-independent-consideration-
disqualification.   
130  See, e.g., Miguel de Figueiredo, Alexandra D. Lahav, and Peter Siegelman, Against Judicial 
Accountability, Working Paper, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2989777 (exploring the variations 
in the time it takes judges to work through cases in the federal court); David S. Abrams, Marianne Bertrand, 
and Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Judges Vary In Their Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 347 (2012) 
(exploring variations in sentencing behaviors towards defendants of differing racial categories); Sean 
Farhang, Jonathan P. Kastellec, and Gregory J. Wawro, The Politics of Opinion Assignment and Authorship 
on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Evidence From Sexual Harassment Cases,44 J. LEGAL STUD. 59 (2015).   
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v. Future Elections: When deciding whether or not they will recuse from a case, elected 
judges must also consider how their decision might impact future election campaigns. The 
concern that elected judges might spurn the law in order to increase the likelihood that they are 
reelected lies at the heart of the debate regarding the legitimacy of popular elections as a method 
for selecting judges.131 We have already discussed the empirical research indicating that the legal 
decisions that the judges make are influenced by the proximity and competitiveness of 
reelection campaigns,132 and it is not unreasonable to expect that the “majoritarian difficulty” 
plays a role in recusal considerations as well.133 
One might think that the pressures of reelection should actually incentivize higher rates 
of recusal. The electorate has, after all, shown that they are distrustful of judges raising money 
for election in large part because they are concerned that the money might impact the judges’ 
decisions in court cases.134 By actively recusing themselves from cases, particularly those that 
are more publicly salient, the judges may be able to proactively mitigate some of that mistrust.  
 
131 See Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 VA. L. REV. 719, 
731 (2010) (arguing that, “elective judiciaries pose a risk to the rule of law, which is compromised whenever 
a judge’s ruling is influenced by majority preferences.”). 
132 See, e.g., Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L. J. 623 (2009) (finding 
that judges who are not eligible for reelection behave differently than judges who are eligible); Michael S. 
Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign 
Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69 (2011); Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, 
The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behavior, 2 Q. J. Pol. Sci. 107, at 107 (2007) (finding 
that “judges in partisan systems sentence more severely than those in retention systems.”); Gregory A. 
Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 247 (2004) (finding that judge become more punitive in criminal cases as the next election 
gets closer); Richard W. Brooks & Steven Raphael, Life Terms or Death Sentences: The Uneasy 
Relationship Between Judicial Elections and Capital Punishment, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 609, 610 
(2002) (finding that the likelihood that criminals convicted of murder are 15% more likely to be given the 
death sentence during the year leading up to the next judicial election).  
133 Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 689 (1995). 
As California Supreme Court Justice Otto Klaus famously put it, “There’s no way a judge is going to be able 
to ignore the political consequences of certain decisions, especially if he or she has to make them near 
election time. That would be like ignoring a crocodile in your bathtub.” (LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR 
AUDIENCES 61 (Princeton University Press ed., 2006)). 
134 See James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy Theory and 
‘New-Style’ Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 59 (2008); James L. Gibson, ‘New-Style’ Judicial 
Campaigns and the Legitimacy of State High Courts, 71 J. POL. 1285 (2009). 
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It is not clear, however, that this is the direction that electoral incentives will push the 
judges. A survey experiment conducted by Gibson and Caldeira presented subjects with 
descriptions of various judicial campaigns, in which some of the judges recused from cases 
featuring donors and some did not. Although they found that individuals do perceive judges that 
recuse themselves as more impartial, the overall positive effect was minimal compared to the hit 
to legitimacy that judges take by accepting contributions in the first place.135 Additionally, as we 
discussed above, the act of recusal is often perceived to be an admission of bias, so, as Bam has 
surmised, “judges might feel that recusing themselves for their campaign statements and 
conduct would imply that the campaigning itself had been improper.”136 
In addition to being potentially unpopular among the electorate, regularly recusing 
oneself from cases in which a party or attorney is a campaign contributor is likely going to 
decrease future donations and, as a result, jeopardize the judge’s chances for reelection.137 
Although many, if not most, of such donors contribute to judges simply because they want to 
help that judge to win election, it would be naive to believe that none of them did so without the 
hope or the expectation that it would benefit them in the courtroom. An empirical study on the 
behavior of judicial campaign donors by Miller and Curry lends credence to this intuition. They 
examined the effect of an Alabama statute that required recusals for donations above a certain 
dollar amount and found that attorneys and business owners are 81 percent and 40 percent less 
likely to donate more than the threshold amount, resulting in lower fundraising overall.138 
 
135 James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Judicial Impartiality, Campaign Contributions, and Recusals: 
Results from a National Survey, 10 J. EMP. L. STUD. 76 (2013). 
136 Dmitry Bam, Recusal Failure, 18 LEG. & PUB. POL’Y 631, at 653 (2015). 
137 For a comprehensive review of the literature linking campaign spending and electoral success, see Chris 
W. Bonneau and Damon M. Cann, Campaign Spending, Diminishing Marginal Returns, and Campaign 
Finance Restrictions in Judicial Elections, 73 J. POL. 1267 (2011) (finding that while the link between 
spending and winning does exist in judicial elections, it is a nuanced one that depends in part on whether 
the candidate is an incumbent or challenger). 
138 Banks Miller & Brett Curry, The Effect of Per Se Recusal Rules on Donor Behavior in Judicial Elections, 
34 Just. Sys. J. 125, at 139-140 (2013) 
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Correspondingly, Shepherd found that judges who are eligible for reelection are more likely to 
rule in favor of past campaign contributors than judges who are not eligible for reelection, 
suggesting that judges rule “in a way that will likely increase the future contributions from 
interest groups at the time of their next reelection campaign.”139 
B. Disclosure as a Supplement to Recusal 
As we highlighted earlier, scholars and policymakers have grown increasingly skeptical 
of the current system of self-recusal and have presented a number of potential remedies in the 
form of procedural reform, increased ethical training, and widescale institutional 
transformation. Of all these suggestions, increased transparency and disclosure of potential 
conflicts are the most common and often believed to be among the most cost-free and 
efficacious.140 
 
139 Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L. J. 623, at 672 (2009). These 
findings were confirmed in a later study by Kang (Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan 
Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 69 (2011)). 
140 See, e.g., Amanda Frost, Keeping up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 
53 U. Kan. L. Rev. 531 (2005) (“The proposal discussed here takes this disclosure requirement significantly 
further by requiring the judge to provide directly to litigants in pending cases any information that might 
be considered to have an impact on the judge’s partiality.” (at 583)); James Sample and David E. Pozen, 
Making Judicial Recusals More Rigorous, 46 The Judges’ J. (2007) (“One way to increase the odds that 
litigants will learn pertinent information would be to require judges to disclose, at the outset of the 
litigation, any facts that might reasonably be construed as bearing on the judges’ impartiality.”) (at 5)); 
Deborah Goldberg, James Sample, and David E. Pozen, The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts Should Lead 
Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L. J. 503 (2007) (“In the wake of the White decision, enhanced disclosure 
might be one of the simplest and most important reforms available.” (at 527) Although “[d]isclosure is also 
an incomplete solution, in the sense that provides only the grounds for disqualification; it does not 
guarantee that a judge will recuse…” (at 528)); Leslie W. Abramson, Judicial Disclosure and 
Disqualification: The Need for More Guidance, 28 Justice Sys. J. 301 (2007) (“At a minimum, required 
reports about a judge’s financial investment or any other disqualifying circumstance should be readily 
available both to the support staff in the clerk’s office where the judge works and to the litigants and 
counsel.” (at 303) “Two modifications to the new [ABA] Code are essential. First, the Code needs broader 
disclosure provisions so that litigants believe that the integrity of the judicial system and individual judges 
is self-evident.” (at 308)); David K. Stott, Zero-Sum Judicial Elections: Balancing Free Speech and 
Impartiality through Recusal Reform, 2009 BYU L. REV. 481 (2009) (Specifically discussing recusal for 
political speech, “Mandatory disclosure would strengthen a currently ineffective method of disclosing past 
speech.” (at 509)); Gabriel D. Serbulea, Due Process and Judicial Disqualification: The Need for Reform, 
39 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1109, at 1143 (2011); Thomas M. Susman, Reciprocity, Denial, and the Appearance 
of Impropriety: Why Self-Recusal Cannot Remedy the Influence of Campaign Contributions on Judges’ 
Decisions, 26 J. L. & POL. 359 (2011) (“Whenever a judge is called upon to hear a case—at the trial or 
appellate level—in which a lawyer or party has been a supporter of that judge and the judge knows (or 
reasonably should have known) of that support, the judge should issue at the start of the proceeding (1) a 
statement that sets out the nature and size of the contribution or other financial support known to the judge” 
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The logic behind these proposals is simple: if judges are not incentivized to pursue self-
recusal even when there is a legitimate conflict of interest, we should empower those individuals 
who are properly incentivized—namely the “outside” party and attorney who are likely to be 
disadvantaged by the conflict. And the primary mechanism for such empowerment is informing 
interested parties of the conflict via in-court disclosure. Although parties and attorneys are 
generally not able to unilaterally force the removal of a judge, they can raise the issue through a 
formal motion for recusal, push for more information from the judge and opposing party, and 
later appeal the judge’s decision if they feel it was incorrect.141 Even if the outside party decides 
not to ask a judge to recuse or affirmatively waives a recusal motion submitted by the court sua 
sponte, “[n]othing provides stronger evidence to the parties of impartiality than open 
disclosure.”142 Without proper disclosure, however, the issue may be unknown to the outside 
party, and none of (or very few of) the procedural protections will be in place to govern the 
decisionmaking process that normally exist for adversarial adjudication.143  
 
and the person making it and (2) an affirmation specifically and in writing that the judge has considered 
the applicable ethical proscriptions and concluded that the donation will not affect the judge’s impartiality 
in that proceeding. Such a disclosure “statement” will not only alert the parties to the contribution, but also 
it will focus the judge’s attention on the dangers of unconscious reciprocity-based bias.” (at 384)); Melinda 
A. Marbes, Reshaping Recusal Procedures: Eliminating Decisionmaker Bias and Promoting Public 
Confidence, 49 VALPARAISO U. L. REV. 807 (2015) (“[I]n order to make these two reforms regarding who will 
be the sole or final arbiter in disqualification disputes worthwhile, all jurists and the parties must provide 
meaningful and timely disclosure of possible grounds for conflict or bias.” (at 855) “In addition, the other 
proposed procedural protections will promote more openness and transparency that will positively affect 
outcomes in disqualification disputes. The requirement of full disclosure of all interests and connections 
beyond the more limited disclosures now required by both the jurist and the parties will help ensure that 
all the relevant information is available to both the litigants and the decision maker.” (at 868)). 
Even proponents of the current regime feel that increased disclosure has merits beyond simply increasing 
recusal. See David M. Rothman, CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL CONDUCT HANDBOOK, at 215-16 (“The purpose of the 
requirement of non-disqualifying disclosure is, in part, to give the attorneys information they would need 
for an affidavit of prejudice…. The purpose is to reaffirm the integrity and impartiality of the court. Nothing 
provides stronger evidence to the parties of that impartiality than open disclosure. In addition, because the 
parties are intimately aware of all the circumstances of their case, they are in a better position to bring to 
the judge’s attention information that might cause the judge to consider recusal.”) 
141 The exception to this is in jurisdictions that allow for no-cause peremptory disqualifications, which are 
discussed further as potential solutions in infra Part VI. 
142 Merk & Co. v. Superior Court, 2005 WL 880112 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005), at n. 5 (quoting David M. Rothman, 
CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL CONDUCT HANDBOOK, at 216. 
143 See Amanda Frost, Keeping up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. 
Kan. L. Rev. 531, at 555-56 (2005) (identifying five procedural elements necessary for legitimate 
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Before continuing in a discussion of disclosure, we note that in the context of judicial 
conflicts of interest (and particularly those coming from campaign contributions), disclosure is 
confusingly used to describe a variety of conceptually similar but legally distinct actions. This 
Chapter is focused on the formal, on-the-record disclosure of potential conflicts of interest to the 
parties within a legal case (what is sometimes called “in-court” disclosure), but disclosure is 
most commonly used in reference to the laws and practices surrounding the provision of 
campaign contribution records to the state election commission by the candidate. Most 
literature that addresses campaign finance disclosure does so in this regard.144 Of course, these 
campaign finance disclosure rules, which exist in some form in all 50 states,145 are invariably 
tied to in-court disclosure—it is unlikely that the latter is possible without the former—but it is 
important to draw a distinction between the two. Additionally, in the recusal context, disclosure 
can also refer to transparency regarding the reasons that recusal was (or was not) made.146 
i. In-court Disclosure Rules and Procedures: Unlike recusal rules, which feature 
prominently in the judicial disqualification statutes and ethical codes, in-court disclosure rules 
are given little attention in either the laws or the literature. Recall that recusal procedures and 
rules in the United States generally fall into one of two categories—automatic per se recusal 
statutes and broad catchall provisions. To the extent that states and the federal courts have 
 
adjudication: “(1) litigants, not courts, initiate disputes; (2) the disputes are presented through an 
adversarial system in which two or more competing parties give their conflicting views; (3) a rationale must 
be given for decisions; (4) decisions must refer to, and be restricted by, an identifiable body of law; and (5) 
the decisionmaker must be impartial.” 
144 See, e.g., Abby K. Wood, Campaign Finance Disclosure, 14 Ann. Rev. L & Soc. Sci. _ (forthcoming 2018). 
145 Stuart Banner, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign Contributors, 40 STAN. 
L. REV. 449, at 471 (1988) (“All fifty states and the District of Columbia require candidates for elective office 
to file reports disclosing all campaign contributions and, for contributions over a certain amount, the names 
of contributors.”). 
146  See Patrick A. Woods, Reversal by Recusal: Comer v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc. and the need for 
Mandatory Judicial Recusal Statements, 13 U.N.H. L. REV. 177 (2015) (discussing the potential merits of 
requiring written explanations of why recusals were or were not made). 
  44  
 
specific disclosure rules, they also follow that general pattern, although the list of enumerated 
circumstances requiring disclosure is much shorter.  
The most substantial (and well-known) mandatory disclosure requirements exist in the 
federal courts in relation to financial information. Under Sections 101 and 102 in the Ethics in 
Government Act, federal officers—including federal judges—are required to report nearly all 
their sources of income, gifts, property interests, investments, and liabilities on a yearly basis.147 
After a 2006 expose by the Washington Post that described a myriad of ethical conflicts in the 
federal courts,148 most courts began to use these reports to create automatic screening 
procedures so that potential conflicts would always translate into in-court disclosures to the 
parties (and usually recusal).149 Even this system, however, relies on full and accurate initial, ex 
ante disclosure by the judge in order for the conflict to be flagged in a given case, and recent 
study by the Center for Public Integrity found that at least 26 cases from 2011 to 2014 featured a 
judge who owned stock in a company party in the case.150  
For other sources of judicial conflict in the federal system and in the fifty percent of 
states that do include formal disclosure rules and procedures, judges are usually required to 
inform the parties of relevant, potentially disqualifying information under broad catchall 
provisions similar to those used for recusal.151 These provisions are often based on commentary 
in the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which suggests a rule that judges disclose any 
 
147 Ethics in Government Act, §§ 101–102, 5 U.S.C. app. 4 (2000). 
148 Joe Stephens, “Ethics Lapses by Federal Judges Persist, Review Finds,” WASHINGTON POST (April 18, 
2006). 
149 For an example of these plans, see Judicial Council of the District of Columbia Circuit, Mandatory 




150 Reity O’Brien, Kytja Weir, and Chris Young, Federal Judges Plead Guilty, The Center for Public Integrity 
(accessed August 21, 2018), available at https://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/04/28/14630/federal-
judges-plead-guilty. 
151 Leslie W. Abramson (Judicial Disclosure and Disqualification: The Need for More Guidance, 28 JUSTICE 
SYS. J. 301, at 304-5 (2007)) suggests that such codes exist in roughly half of states. 
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information that the parties or their attorneys “might reasonably consider relevant to a possible 
motion for disqualification.”152 Some state rules provide an even broader obligation on the judge 
to disclose, such as in Tennessee courts, where “[a] judge should disclose on the record 
information that the judge believe the parties or their lawyers might reasonably consider 
relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no basis for 
disqualification.”153  
Because in-court disclosure has primarily been presented as a solution or supplement to 
recusal as opposed to a topic of study unto itself, it is not well known how these provisions are 
approached in practice by judges dealing with potential conflicts. On the one hand, the language 
in the legal provisions require disclosure even when the judge may not believe there is a conflict, 
as long as the information might be considered relevant to the issue by one of the parties or their 
attorneys. This would suggest that, at a minimum, disclosure rates should be at least as high as 
recusal rates and would likely occur much more frequently across a more diverse set of potential 
conflicts. In practice, however, because the decision to disclose involves even more discretion on 
the part of the judge than the decision to recuse, many of the same perverse incentives pushing a 
judge away from recusal likely play into the decision to disclose as well.154 By definition, 
disclosure is to make public something that was previously unknown and is possibly 
problematic, so by introducing a potential conflict via disclosure, the judge is opening herself up 
to reputational and electoral costs.  
 
152 Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11 Comment[5] (2011). This is a change from the previous code, 
which recommended disclosure that court participants “might consider relevant…” (Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct Canon 3E(1) Commentary (1999) (Am. Bar Ass’n, amended 2011)). 
It is also unclear whether this provision, which states that judges “should” disclose, technically requires 
disclosure or is merely strongly suggestive. See Raymond J. McKoski, Disqualifying Judges When Their 
Impartiality Might Reasonably Be Questioned: Moving Beyond a Failed Standard, 56 AZ. L. REV. 411 
(2014), at note 116. 
153 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 10 Canon 3D, Rule 2.11, Comment 5 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. 
Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(E)(1) (2000); Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules 60.04 (4) Comments. 
154 See Leslie W. Abramson, Judicial Disclosure and Disqualification: The Need for More Guidance, 28 
JUSTICE SYS. J. 301, at 305 (2007). 
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Disclosures of campaign contributions may be particularly costly in these regards—
previous survey work on judicial campaign finance and recusal has shown that public knowledge 
of donors in the courtroom damages the perception of that judge, an effect that is only partially 
mitigated by the judge eventually recusing herself.155 Disclosure may also be understood to be 
arming the opposition (generally the “outside” party) with more ammunition for a valid recusal 
motion. This, of course, is one of the primary purposes of disclosure, but as recusal scholar 
Grant Hammond has noted, “[m]any judges will query why they should hand counsel a stick, 
with which they can then be beaten.”156 Some jurists have also expressed concern that a 
disclosure of an innocuous potential bias may damage the litigant’s confidence in the judge’s 
ability to be impartial.157 
C. Why Attorneys Don’t Ask Judges to Recuse (And Why Disclosure Doesn’t Help) 
Just as with the judge’s decision to recuse, fully understanding why a party may or may 
not formally make a motion for recusal, even when the potential partiality has been made known 
to the outside attorney, requires an exploration of the sometimes perverse incentive structure 
surrounding the attorney’s decision to request recusal.  
i. Judges Take Requests for Recusal as Impugning Their Judicial Character: If, as we 
have suggested above, judges do not like to recuse in part because they see it as a dereliction of 
their judicial duties, they will certainly not appreciate parties or their attorneys suggesting they 
do as much.158 Additionally, because a motion for recusal made by an attorney is necessarily 
 
155  James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Campaign Support, Conflicts of Interest, and Judicial 
Impartiality: Can Recusals Rescue the Legitimacy of Courts?, 74 J. POL. 18 (2012). 
156 GRANT HAMMOND, JUDICIAL RECUSAL: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PROBLEMS, 90 (2009). 
157 See Lord Woolf’s comments in Taylor v. Lawrence, (2003) QB 528, 549 (Opining that “‘judges should 
be circumspect about declaring the existence of a relationship where there is no real possibility of it being 
regarded by a fair-minded and informed observer as raising a possibility of bias,” at the risk of 
“unnecessarily undermin[ing the litigant’s confidence in the judge.]” 
158 See Penny J. White, A New Perspective on Judicial Disqualification: An Antidote to eh Effects of the 
Decisions in White and Citizens United, 46 INDIANA L. REV. 103 (observing, as a judge herself, that “Perhaps 
human nature causes judges to view disqualification motions as a challenge to their personal integrity. 
Certainly, no judge, and arguably no person, enjoys being told that he or she is, or appears to be, unfair. It 
is understandable, therefore, that some (perhaps, many) judges take umbrage at the filing of 
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done in the absence of the same sua sponte motion by the judge, it further suggests that the 
judge failed in appropriately raising the issue in the first place.159 Asking for recusal due to 
campaign contributions—which inherently suggests some form of judicial and electoral 
impropriety in addition to partiality—is even more likely to offend a judge’s sensibilities. 
Many, if not most, judges are likely quite modest in their reactions to recusal motions, 
but given the relative power imbalances between judges and attorneys, the costs of angering 
some judges can range from mild social discomfort to outcome-changing bias and even 
professional repercussions for the attorney.160 The literature and legal cases dealing with judicial 
recusal are replete with examples showing judges’ distaste for recusal motions, including the 
quote shared at the beginning of this Chapter161 and a similar sentiment expressed by a judge in 
the 19th century: “[l]awyers who wanted to try to disqualify a federal judge were ‘advised to write 
out their motion to disqualify on the back of their license to practice law.’”162 In his dissenting 
opinion in Caperton, Chief Justice Roberts bemoaned the position that recusal motions put 
judges in, both at an individual and institutional level.163 
 
disqualification motions.” (at 118)) 
159 See Richard K. Neumann Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Bush v. Gore: Did Some Justices Vote Illegally?, 16 
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 375, 392 (2003). 
160  See Melinda A. Marbes, Reforming Recusal Rules: Reassessing the Presumption of Judicial 
Impartiality in Light of the Realities of Judging and Changing the Substance of Disqualification 
Standards to Eliminate Cognitive Errors, 7 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 238 (2016-2017), 
at ft. 158) (describing a case in which a judge referred an attorney to the state disciplinary council for filing 
a recusal motion (see Matthew Mosk & Brian Ross, ‘Circus’ Continues? Judge Goes After a Lawyer Who 
Challenged Her Over Controversial Jet Deal, ABC NEWS (Feb. 11, 2015, 10:45 AM), 
http://abcnews.go.com/ US/circus-continues-judge-lawyer-challenged-controversial-jet-
deal/story?id=28886937) and a case where a judge threatened to report an attorney to the state bar for the 
same reasons (see In Re Cohen, 99 So.3d 926, 940 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam)). 
161 “If you point the barrel of a recusal motion at a Texas judge, make sure it is loaded with a silver bullet.” 
(Jeff Nobles, Judicial Recusal and Attorney Disqualification: An Ethic for Litigators & Other Aliens in a 
Strange Land, Texas Bar College of Legal Education: Advanced Civil Appellate Courses (1999), available at 
http://www.texasbarcle.com/Materials/Events/1295/66861_01.pdf). 
162 RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES at 761 (2d ed. 
2007). 
163 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (asking whether “the 
judge get[s] to respond to the allegation that he is probably biased, or is his reputation solely in the hands 
of the parties to the case.” (at 10) And positing that “sometimes the cure is worse than the disease…. I believe 
that opening the door to recusal claims under the Due Process Clause, for an amorphous ‘probability of 
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ii. Attorneys Are Aware that Judges Will Probably Not Recuse: In addition to 
accounting for the negative consequences of arguing that a judge is unable to be impartial, the 
submitting attorney has to adjust the potential benefits of having the judge recuse according to 
the probability that the judge actually will recuse. Although the study we present in this Chapter 
is among the first to empirically demonstrate low rates of recusal among judges with potential 
conflicts of interest, it appears to be well known among practicing attorneys that asking a judge 
to recuse is not only dangerous but likely fruitless as well. When discussing recusal, one Texas-
based attorney stated: “There’s been a number of times that I thought it would be best for my 
client if the judge was recused, but I knew that he wouldn’t, so why risk it?”164  
The little collected research on the jurisprudence of recusal determinations bears these 
empirical observations out, particularly when it comes to potential conflicts stemming from 
campaign financing. In addition to Caperton, in which a judge declined to recuse despite the 
CEO of one of the parties having spent more than $3 million on the judge’s campaign,165 judges 
have made the determination not to recuse in cases featuring campaign donors in Louisiana, 
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Nevada, Wisconsin, Georgia, Ohio, Texas, and Florida.166 Judges 
have even refused to remove themselves for circumstances as extreme as the donor attorneys 
hosting the judge’s election victory party at their law firm. 
iii. Attorneys Are Repeat Players in the Court System: Even in the best-case scenario—
where an attorney is aware of a potential conflict, submits a request for recusal, and the judge 
actually removes herself—the attorney still bears the risk of future prejudice against themselves 
 
bias,’ will itself bring our judicial system into undeserved disrepute, and diminish the confidence of the 
American people in the fairness and integrity of their courts.” (at 14)) 
164 One Texas-based attorney stated that, “There’s been a number of times that I thought it would be best 
for my client if the judge was recused, but I knew that he wouldn’t, so why risk it?” (cite) 
165 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
166 See Flamm (2017) supra note 119. See also In re Pet’n to Recall Dunleavy, 769 P.2d 1271 (Nev. 1988); 
Gude v. State, 289 Ga. 46 709 S.E.2d 206 (Ga. 2011); In re Disqal. Of Burnside, 113 Ohio St. 3d 1211, 2006 
Ohio 7223, 863 N.E.2d 617 (Ohio 2006) (all cases reviewing a lower-court judge’s determination not to 
recuse due to campaign contributions). 
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and their clients. In most court systems, particularly smaller state courts, the same attorney-
judge pairings are frequent, both because attorneys generally practice within a limited 
geographic space and because some courts have only a few judges—or just one judge—to whom a 
case in that jurisdiction can be assigned. In the Wisconsin and Texas data featured in our study, 
for example, some attorneys argued over 20 cases that were assigned to the same judge over a 
two-year period.167 
Attorneys who are aware of a potentially deleterious conflict of interest must then weight 
the benefits of submitting a motion for a judge to recuse against the likelihood that recusal 
occurs, the potentially increased bias against the attorney and her party if the judge does not 
recuse, and the potential bias against the attorney and her future parties whether the judge 
recuses or not. Not only does this incentivize against submitting motions or requests for recusal, 
it raises significant questions regarding the problem of imputed knowledge and attorney-client 
conflicts of interest.  
iv. Attorneys May Have Donated to Other Judges: When it comes specifically to 
campaign finance contributions, attorneys may also be disincentivized from pushing for recusal 
because they themselves have donated to and appeared in front of judges in the past. Although 
the results of this Chapter’s study do not support oft-expressed concerns that every attorney 
donates to every judge, attorney donations often constitute a significant portion of all the 
contributions that judges receive, meaning that a non-donor in one case may be a donor in 
another case. In such a system, strong or repeated motions for recusal could be seen as 
hypocritical if made by attorneys that are known to have donated to other judges. Successfully 
persuading a judge to recuse might also set a precedent that would disadvantage that attorney 
 
167 These were donor-attorneys as opposed to non-donor-attorneys, who’s behavior this part is modeling. 
Because we tracked only cases featuring donor-attorney/judge pairs, we have complete information only 
on the frequency of those pairings. However, unless the litigation behavior of attorneys who donate are 
substantially different than attorneys who do not donate, we should expect to see similar rates of 
appearances in front of a judge over the same time period. 
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(and her clients) in the future when she argues in front of a judge to whom she donated and 
from whom she could have received preferential treatment. 
v. Judges May Not Disclose: Up to this point, this informal model of attorney behavior 
has assumed that disclosure has been made and, as a result, the relevant parties were aware of 
the potential conflict. It is not clear, however, that this assumption is prudent, especially given 
the nebulous disclosure obligations imposed on judges by the legal regime.168 As we outlined in 
supra Subpart III.B, the laws and rules dealing with recusal suggest that judges should 
ostensibly disclose potential conflicts at much higher rates than they recuse due to them, but 
there is no previous empirical evidence of this, and many of the same factors that disincentivize 
recusal are relevant in regard to the judge’s decision to disclose.169 Interested parties and 
attorneys may, of course, avail themselves of contribution data provided to the state election 
commission by the judge’s campaign, but such data may be difficult to obtain (although the 
empirical study in this Chapter shows that doing so in some states is not prohibitively costly).170 
 
IV. The Randomized Experiment 
In this Part, we present the results of the ever first field experiment conducted on judges. 
In the experiment, we identify active Wisconsin and Texas trial-court cases in which one of the 
listed attorneys had donated to the judge’s previous election campaign(s), send a random 
 
168 See Leslie W. Abramson, Judicial Disclosure and Disqualification: The Need for More Guidance, 28 
JUSTICE SYS. J. 301, 304-5 (2007) (“In these provisions, a judge should disclose information that the judge 
believes a party or the party’s lawyer might consider relevant to disqualification, a provision that depends 
on the judge’s subjective belief about what a party or lawyer might think is relevant.”). 
169 For a valuable analysis of judicial behavior in relation to disclosure more generally, see Scott C. Idleman, 
Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1995) (which presents a theory of judicial 
candor (of which disclosure is included), outlining and critiquing nine rationales for candor—
accountability, power, quality, authoritativeness, justification, notice, catharsis, progress, and moral duty—
and six practical and normative constraints on candor—limited foresight, relative inefficacy, consensus-
building, moral exigency, institutional legitimacy, and legal phraseology. While Idleman doesn’t address 
judicial recusal or conflicts of interest stemming from campaign finance, much of his analysis provides 
helpful framing for a discussion on the judge’s decision to disclose). 
170 See the descriptions of our data collection processes in infra Part IV. 
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selection of those judges a letter highlighting the potential conflict and asking for recusal, and 
then track a number of outcomes related to the decision to recuse. 
We begin in Subpart A with an overview of the previous empirical work that has been 
done on judicial recusal and disclosure. Subpart B describes the institutional structures, election 
systems, and recusal procedures in the Wisconsin Circuit Courts and the Harris County District 
Courts. Subpart C outlines the design of the experiment, including the data collection efforts and 
the implementation of the randomized recusal requests. Subpart D discusses the ethical 
considerations necessary in an experiment such as this. 
A. Previous Empirical Work on Recusal and Disclosure 
As we discussed above, the literature expressing skepticism regarding recusal rules in 
U.S. courts is substantial—scholars, policy makers, and even judges have identified a litany of 
problems with self-recusal and have called for various levels of reform, ranging from minor 
procedural adjustments to wholesale institutional restructuring. There has been, however, 
almost no empirical evidence presented on whether these predictions play out.171 This empirical 
lacuna is particularly prominent in regard to conflicts resulting from campaign finance.172 In 
fact, in our review of the literature, we found only four studies that reported on recusal rates at 
all, and only two of them featured an empirical evaluation on judicial recusal as part of the 
primary analysis.  
In one of these studies, Buhai identifies all of the U.S. federal courts of appeals cases 
from 1980 to 2007 in which one of the parties appealed the District Court judge’s decision not to 
recuse.173 She provides comprehensive descriptive data on the grounds for which the recusal 
 
171 Upon reflecting on the array of proposals in this area, Le Epstein questioned “the wisdom of adopting 
any approach to recusal…in the absence of empirical evidence.” (Lee Epstein, Shedding (Empirical) Light 
on Judicial Selection, 74 Missouri L. Rev. 563, at 564-65 (2009)). 
172 While not quantitative, these articles do report on a lot of cases. 
173 Sande L. Buhai, Federal Judicial Disqualification: A Behavioral and Quantitative Analysis, 90 OR. L. 
REV. 69 (2011). 
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request was made (the trial judge had a personal or professional relationship with an attorney, 
had a racial bias against the party, had prior rulings on the legal issue, etc.) and the rates at 
which the lower-court decision not to recuse were reversed (19.2 percent to 0.8 percent, 
depending on the grounds for recusal).174 The second study addresses a very different question. 
In their 2013 article, Miller and Curry take advantage of a change in Alabama law that made 
recusal mandatory if an attorney or party donated above $4,000 to a judge’s campaign.175 
Although the law was never enforced,176 they found that recusal was 450 percent more likely if 
the donation threshold had been reached.177 
The other two studies were focused primarily on whether campaign donations affected 
case outcomes and only reported on recusal rates as supplementary data. In an empirical 
evaluation of the Louisiana Supreme Court, Palmer found that in 425 cases judges never recused 
or even disclosed the donations, some of which exceeded $35,000.178 A similar study conducted 
on the Ohio Supreme Court by New York Times journalists Liptak and Roberts found that in 215 
cases that featured donor parties, judges only recused 9 times, and that “[r]ecusals in cases 
involving [attorney] contributors were all but unheard of.”179 
 
174 Sande L. Buhai, Federal Judicial Disqualification: A Behavioral and Quantitative Analysis, 90 OR. L. 
REV. 69, at 70-71 (2011). 
175 Banks Miller & Brett Curry, The Effect of Per Se Recusal Rules on Donor Behavior in Judicial 
Elections, 34 Just. Sys. J. 125 (2013) (their primary findings indicate that the per se recusal requirements 
have a substantial effect on the amount that donors are willing to give to judges). 
176 In 1995, the Alabama legislature passed a rule that required recusal when a party or attorney had 
donated more than $4,000 to the judge’s previous election campaign. However, the law was never cleared 
by the Department of Justice and subsequently never enforced. See Little v. Strange, 796 F. Supp. 2d 1314 
(2011) (in which the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama dismissed a suit challenging 
the statute because of a lack of ripeness). 
177 Banks Miller & Brett Curry, The Effect of Per Se Recusal Rules on Donor Behavior in Judicial 
Elections, 34 Just. Sys. J. 125, at 129-30 (2013) 
178 Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Recusal of American Judges in the Post-Caperton Era: An Empirical 
Assessment of the Risk of Actual Bias in Decisions Involving Campaign Contributors, 10 GLOBAL JURIST 
(2010); Vernon Valentine Palmer & John Levendis, The Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: An 
Empirical and Statistical Study of the Effects of Campaign Money on the Judicial Function, 82 TULANE 
L. REV. 1291 (2008). 
179 Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 
2006. 
  53  
 
Unlike work on recusal itself, the common proposition that disclosure can augment the 
current recusal rules is based on a substantial amount of empirical and theoretical research 
exploring the effects of transparency. None of this research, however, has been directly applied 
to the realm of judicial disclosure, and as we argue above, the institutional framework in which 
recusal decisions are made—specifically the relationship between the attorney and the judge—is 
such that disclosure is likely to be less efficacious.  
B. Experimental Setting 
i. Judicial Systems: The Wisconsin Court System has a similar structure to most state 
court systems. Wisconsin’s municipal courts oversee common, low-level cases such as traffic 
violations, ordinance matters, and juvenile crimes. Circuit courts, the state’s single-level trial 
courts, take on the majority of the remaining first-instance cases. Appeals are either taken by the 
Court of Appeals or—more rarely—by the Supreme Court, Wisconsin’s highest court.180 
The circuit courts, those that are the focus of this study, are tasked with conducting most 
cases that require judge-supervised trials, including most felony crimes and civil cases. Each 
county in Wisconsin has a circuit court with a jurisdiction that matches the county’s 
geographical boundary, with the exception of three pairs of neighboring counties with small 
populations (Buffalo/Pepin, Florence/Forest, and Shawano/Menominee), which share a single 
circuit court judge. The number of judges in each circuit court varies from 1 (26 counties have 
just one judge) to 47 (Milwaukee County). In total, there are 249 Wisconsin circuit court judges, 
divided into 69 circuits. Day-to-day procedure in each circuit court is a mixture of state-
mandated rules and individualized county practices. Every circuit court is part of one of 10 
judicial administrative districts presided over by a chief judge who is appointed by Wisconsin’s 
 
180Wisconsin Court System, Court System Overview (2014), available at 
https://www.wicourts.gov/courts/overview/overview.htm. 
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supreme court. These chief judges take care of the administrative duties for each district and 
meet monthly with the other chief judges.181 
Texas’ court structure essentially matches that of Wisconsin except the trial-level courts 
that handle civil matters with at least $200 in dispute are District Courts as opposed to Circuit 
Courts. The geographical boundaries of these District Courts are drawn at the county level, with 
a number of counties sharing one district and the largest county—Harris County—having 60. 
Each county is part of one of 9 administrative judicial regions.182 The Harris County criminal 
and civil courts are housed in the same building, but at any given time, a given district judge is 
assigned to either the civil docket, the criminal docket, or one of the juvenile or family dockets.  
ii. Elections and Campaign Finance: Circuit court judges in Wisconsin are elected to 
staggered six-year terms. The state holds judicial elections in the spring of every year, including 
a primary if more than two people run for the nonpartisan position. However, most circuit court 
elections are uncontested and very few require a primary. In the six- year cycle of elections held 
from 2009 to 2014, just 22 percent of circuit court elections were contested and only 10 percent 
of elections included a primary. In most cases, incumbents ran unopposed. 
Because Wisconsin circuits are coterminous with counties (with the exception of the 
three sparsely populated circuits mentioned earlier), they vary widely by population. In the 
population centers in and around Milwaukee County and in Dane County (which contains the 
city of Madison), election vote totals range from 50,000 to 100,000 and spending is relatively 
high. In the smallest counties, by contrast, turnout in judicial elections rarely exceeds a few 
thousand votes. 
Wisconsin law exempts state candidates from filing campaign finance reports if their 
campaigns raise and spend less than $1,000 in a calendar year. As a result, many judges do not 
 
181 Wisconsin Court System, Circuit Courts (2014), available at 
https://www.wicourts.gov/courts/circuit/index.htm. 
182Texas Judicial Branch, State District Courts – Map (2017) available at http://www.txcourts.gov/ 
media/914401/district-court-map-sept-2017.pdf. 
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file campaign contributions reports with the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board. By 
necessity, our campaign finance data consists of the 113 winning judges in the 2009-2014 cycle 
that did file reports with the state, many of whom ran in contested elections. Table 1 provides 
descriptive statistics from the campaign finance data submitted by these winning judicial 
candidates. 
District Court judges in Texas run in elections every four years, which are staggered 
depending on when the judge’s district was organized. Any judge who intends to receive more 
than $500 in contributions is required to report campaign finance data,183 and Texas judges 
have consistently reported among the highest dollar amounts in the country.184 
In an attempt to quell the rising cost and potential for conflict that judicial campaigning 
presented, Texas passed the Judicial Campaign Fairness Act,185 which places restrictions on the 
amount of money organizations and individuals can contribute to judicial campaigns. Although 
candidates for statewide judicial office (namely the state supreme court) can accept individual 
donations of up to $30,000, the amount that District Court judges (the focus of our study) can 
raise depends on the size of their judicial district. Those with districts of over 1 million, between 
250,000 and 1 million, and less than 250,000 are restricted to donations of less than $30,000, 
$15,000, and $6,000, respectively.186 
iii. Recusal and Disclosure Procedure: Recusal procedure in Wisconsin Circuit courts is 
regulated primarily by Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 60 and Section 757.19 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes. Although Section 757.19 is technically the “mandatory” disqualification statute,187 both 
 
183 Texas Ethics Commission, Campaign Finance Guide for Judicial Candidates and Officeholders, available 
at https://www.ethics.state.tx.us/guides/JCOH_guide.htm#RequirReports. 
184  Daniel Becker & Malia Reddick, Judicial Selection Reform: Examples from Six States, American 
Judicature Society Report, available at 
http://www.judicialselection.com/uploads/Documents/jsreform_1185395742450.pdf. 
185 Texas Election Code Section 253.165(b). 
186 Texas Ethics Commission, Campaign Finance Guide for Judicial Candidates and Officeholders, available 
at https://www.ethics.state.tx.us/guides/JCOH_guide.htm#RequirReports. 
187 See supra note 5 for a discussion of the distinction between disqualification and recusal. 
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Section 757.19 and SCR 60 govern judicial recusal in Wisconsin courts. Wisconsin does have a 
Code of Judicial Ethics, but a violation of that code cannot be used as legal grounds for 
recusal.188 
After emphasizing the expectation and importance of judicial integrity more broadly, 
SCR 60.04(4) outlines the circumstances in which a judge is required to recuse, a list that more 
or less reflects the general approach to these enumerated situations described earlier in this 
Chapter: personal bias or knowledge of the case, previous legal work on the case (including work 
as a judge in another court), relation to participants, financial interest in the case or the subject 
matter, and any public statements made that commit the judge to a decision at issue in the 
case.189 Section 757.19 has a very similar set of recusal requirements, except that it also 
mandates recusal when a judge is a party or material witness in the case.190  
Both SCR 60.04(4) and Section 757.19 also includes broad catchall provisions for when 
recusal is necessary even if the specific, enumerated rules do not apply. SCR 60.04(4) declares 
that a judge shall recuse herself when, “reasonable, well-informed persons knowledgeable about 
judicial ethics standards and the justice system and aware of the facts and circumstances the 
judge knows or reasonably should know would reasonably question the judge’s ability to be 
 
188 State v. Carviou, 154 Wis. 2d 641, 454 N.W.2d 562 (1990). 
189 SCR 60.04(4)(a-f) reads in whole: “(a) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party 
or a party’s lawyer or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. 
(b) The judge of an appellate court previously handled the action or proceeding as judge of another court. 
(c) The judge served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom the judge previously 
practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge has been a 
material witness concerning the matter. (d) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, 
or the judge’s spouse or minor child wherever residing, or any other member of the judge’s family residing 
in the judge’s household has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the 
proceeding or has any other more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the 
proceeding. (e) The judge or the judge’s spouse, or a person within the third degree of kinship to either of 
them, or the spouse of such a person meets one of the following criteria: 1. Is a party to the proceeding or 
an officer, director or trustee of a party. 2. Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding. 3. Is known by the 
judge to have a more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding. 4. Is 
to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. (f) The judge, while a judge or a 
candidate for judicial office, has made a public statement that commits, or appears to commit, the judge 
with respect to any of the following: 1. An issue in the proceeding. 2. The controversy in the proceeding.” 
(comments excluded) 
190 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations Chapter 757, Section 19. 
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impartial….”191 The official comments included in the SCR clarify that even when circumstances 
do not fit the clear grounds for recusal outlined above, a judge should apply for recusal any time 
the “judge knows or reasonably should know to raise reasonable question of the judge’s ability to 
act impartially, regardless of whether any of the specific rules in SCR 60.04 (4) applies.” Section 
757.19 similarly requires a judge to remove herself if she “determines that, for any reason, he or 
she cannot, or it appears he or she cannot, act in an impartial manner.192“ As with most of these 
catchall provisions, both of these rules rely heavily on the objective determination of the 
judge.193 
Of particular importance to our study is the fact that the SCR specifically addresses 
circumstances in which an individual involved in the case had previously contributed to the 
presiding judge’s election campaign. SCR 60.04(7) states that “[a] judge shall not be required to 
recuse himself or herself in a proceeding based solely on any endorsement or the judge’s 
campaign committee’s receipt of a lawful campaign contribution, including a campaign 
contribution from an individual or entity involved in the proceeding.194“ The comments on this 
portion of the code outline the reasoning for this approach, explaining that involuntary recusal 
due to campaign contributions would discourage democratic participation and “create the 
impression that receipt of a contribution automatically impairs the judge’s 
integrity.195“ Although this clearly establishes the fact that judges in Wisconsin are not legally 
required to recuse for campaign donations, and likely reflects a professional culture in which 
recusals for this reason are not expected, it is clear from both SCR 60 and Section 757.19 that a 
judge can still recuse due conflicts stemming from campaign contributions if she feels it is 
 
191 Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules 60.04(4) 
192 Wisconsin Statutes & Annotations Chapter 757.19(g). 
193 See State v. Pinno, 2014 WI 74, 93 (Wis. 2014) (“The relevant recusal standard in the Wisconsin 
Statutes is a subjective one, [and is] drafted so as to place the determination of partiality solely upon the 
judge…”). 
194 Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules 60.04(7). 
195 Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules 60.04(7) Comments. 
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appropriate. It is only within this discretionary arena that the experiment in this Chapter would 
work. 
The circumstances in which disclosure is necessary under SCR 60 exceed circumstances 
in which the rules require recusal. Judges are expected to “disclose on the record information 
that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of 
recusal, even if the judge believes there is no real basis for recusal.”196 After full disclosure is 
made, recusal can be waived when all the interested parties formally agree to allow the judge to 
continue to participate.197 Any such agreement or discussion is recorded in the case files.  
Once a judge has found reason to recuse or one of the parties to the case has asked for 
recusal, the court must submit an application for judicial assignment to its district’s chief judge. 
The chief judge subsequently reviews the application against the laws listed above, and either 
approves or disapproves the action. The chief judge may also request clarification or additional 
information regarding the circumstances that led to the application.198 
For most of its history, the recusal regime in Texas was based almost exclusively on 
disqualification conditions in the Article V, Section 11 of the Texas Constitution.199 The rule in 
Section 11 is relatively limited, only prohibiting judges from sitting on cases where “the judge 
may be interested or where either of the parties may be connected with the judge, either by 
affinity or consanguinity…or when the judge shall have been counsel in the case.200“ 
 
196 Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules 60.04 (4) Comments. 
197 Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules 60.04 (6): “A judge required to recuse himself or herself under sub. 
(4) may disclose on the record the basis of the judge’s recusal and may ask the parties and their lawyers to 
consider, out of the presence of the judge, whether to waive recusal. If, following disclosure of any basis 
for recusal other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, the parties and lawyers, without 
participation by the judge, all agree that the judge should not be required to recuse himself or herself and 
the judge is then willing to participate, the judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall 
be incorporated in the record of the proceeding.” 
198 Wisconsin Uniform Rules for Trial Court Administration, Section 3: Disqualification of Judges (2007). 
199 See John C. Domino, The Origins and Development of Judicial Recusal in Texas, 5 Br. J. Am. Leg. 
Studies 149 (2016) (reviewing the historical development and current status of recusal procedure in 
Texas). 
200 Texas Constitution Article V, Section 11. 
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More recently, recusal in Texas has begun to resemble a similar mix of legislative code 
and ethical rules similar to those that exist in Wisconsin, at least in theory. Rule 18b(1) of the 
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure enumerate grounds for mandatory disqualification—close 
relationships with the parties, interest in the case, previous personal legal work on the case, or 
legal work on the case by a former attorney associate—and rule 18b(2) outlines circumstances in 
which a judge may voluntarily recuse—a list similar to 18b(1) except that it includes “any 
proceeding in which…his impartiality might reasonably be questioned….”201 The Texas Code of 
Judicial Conduct Rule 3(C)(1) has also been applied to the question of recusal,202 although there 
is some question in the jurisprudence as to the particular legal effect that this ethical provision 
can have on a judge’s decision to recuse or not. An appeals court has recently found that a 
violation of one or more of the recusal provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct is not 
sufficient grounds to require recusal.203 
There are no specific rules addressing recusal for parties or attorneys who have made 
campaign contributions, meaning that motions to recuse submitted by either the judge or the 
parties must be based on either the catchall recusal provision in Rule 18b(2) or a more general 
appeal to the ethical norms of the Texas Code of Conduct. Attempts to require recusal for 
contributions on strictly legal grounds have been unsuccessful in the past, even in extreme 
circumstances.204 
 
201 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 18b. 
202 See, e.g., Rhodes v. State, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 9431 (2011) (using a reasonable person standard to 
rule on a recusal motion). 
203 See KB Realtron Mgmt. v. Leleon, Number 13-13-00411-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 11879 (Tex. App. - 
Corpus Christi-Edinburg [13th Dist.] Nov. 19, 2015) (finding that a disciplinary action is the proper 
resolution to a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct). See also Manges v. Martinez, 683 S.W.2d 137 
(1984) (where respondent’s request for a writ of mandamus to compel voluntary recusal under Rule 
18a(d) was denied for lack of legal grounds due to the Code of Judicial Conduct not being sufficient cause 
for invocation of Rule 18a(d)). 
204 See Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. App. 1983) (in which the court found that recusal was not 
required despite two of the three appellate judges having received thousands of dollars in campaign 
contributions from the appellee’s attorneys for previous campaigns. Additionally, the judges’ victory 
celebrations were held at the attorneys’ office.) 
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The procedures for filing and ruling on a recusal motion vary depending on the court in 
which the case is heard,205 with the relevant rules for the cases in this experiment coming from 
Rule 18a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Under this rule, if the judge finds, on her own 
volition, that there are grounds for recusal, the court can sign an order of recusal and refer the 
case to the presiding judge for reassignment. Parties may also submit motions for recusal, 
although they must do so more than ten days before the next hearing or trial and must include a 
detailed argument regarding the legal basis for recusal and the evidence available to support the 
claims in the motion.206 Orders on motions to recuse are only subject to appellate review if the 
motion was denied and there was “an abuse of discretion….”207 
C. Experimental Design 
i. Availability of Electronic Case Data: Pursuant to the open records laws of Wisconsin 
and Texas, all information regarding the affairs of the government—including individual case 
files—is presumed to be available to the public. Although there are exceptions to this general 
principle (for example, financially identifying information or the names of vulnerable 
individuals may be redacted from court records and cases regarding civil commitments or 
minors may be excluded entirely),208 the vast majority of cases in both venues are publicly 
accessible. 
The Wisconsin court system provides a number of services that facilitate the gathering of 
individual case information. Basic, up-to-date information on cases in the circuit courts, such as 
case type, case status, judge name, and information on the parties and their attorneys can be 
 
205 See, e.g., Texas Government Code Section 26.011 (governing recusal of the constitutional county 
courts); Texas Government Code Section 25.00255 (governing the recusal of the probate courts); Texas 
Government Code 29 (governing the municipal courts); Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 528 
(governing the justice courts). 
206 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 18a. 
207 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 18a(j)(1). 
208 Wisconsin Circuit Court Access, Access to the Public Records of the Wisconsin Circuit Courts, available 
at http://wcca.wicourts.gov/index.xsl. 
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accessed online through Wisconsin’s Circuit Court Access database (WCCA). We also used 
Wisconsin’s Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) to perform court-wide searches for donor-
judge pairs. Unlike the WCCA, which is available at no charge, SOAP is a subscription-based 
data-extraction program that allows for tailored programming and more accurate case 
identification. As with most courts, the Wisconsin Circuit Courts also provide access to the legal 
documents submitted in a given case, although these have to be ordered through the court 
clerks.  
We utilize both WCCA and SOAP to identify donor-judge pairs and measure outcomes of 
interest. We contracted with Court Data Technologies, a privately-owned Wisconsin-based case 
data service, to write the programming for and run weekly searches of the SOAP database for 
treatable pairs. Once treatable pairs are identified, we use the individual case information 
available through WCCA to verify case details, check on case status, and eventually collect 
outcomes of interest. 
Unlike Wisconsin’s state-unified court structure, Texas courts function on the county 
level. Although the Harris County District Clerk’s online case search system allowed us to track 
cases featuring donor-judge pairs,209 we were unable to locate an access point for the raw Harris 
County case data similar to Wisconsin’s SOAP and therefore had to manually identify treatable 
cases using LexisNexis’ state court docket search engine. Each week, we ran searches for each 
judge who had received campaign donations using a list of the last names of self-identified 
attorneys who had donated to that judge’s previous political campaigns provided by Texas’ 
publicly available campaign finance disclosures. Cases verified to feature donor-judge pairs 
using the criteria detailed below were then tracked using the Harris County Clerk online 
dockets. 
 
209  Harris County District Clerk, Search Our Records and Documents, available at 
http://www.hcdistrictclerk.com/edocs/public/Search.aspx?ShowFF=1. 
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ii. Defining Conflicts: In order to find clear potential conflicts of interest, we focus on 
identifying contributions from attorneys to judges. The states of Wisconsin and Texas encourage 
campaigns to collect occupation and employer data from contributors, but many contributions 
lack this information. For both venues, we placed each verified attorney who gave $200 or more 
to a sitting circuit court judge into our conflict data set.210 We refer to each unique pairing of a 
contributing attorney and a receiving judge as a “conflict pair.” We then search newly filed 
Wisconsin and Harris County cases for these pairs every week. These cases, which involve an 
attorney who gave money to the presiding judge’s campaign, are our “conflict cases.” 
To identify the Wisconsin cases, we obtained a list of attorneys who are members of the 
Wisconsin Bar Association and matched the attorney list to the list of judicial campaign 
contributors. Though we used computer matching as an initial guide to likely matches, we 
verified each attorney match manually. Since our contribution records went back to 2008, we 
looked up some attorneys online to see if we could cross reference earlier employers listed in the 
contributor file with what the Bar Association listed as their current employer in professional 
biographies or LinkedIn profiles. We then uniquely identified each verified Wisconsin attorney 
with his or her Wisconsin Bar ID number. 
Verifying donor-judge pairs in Harris County using the less data-rich search results 
produced by the LexisNexis engine was considerably more complicated. Using lists of the 
surnames of attorneys who had donated to a given judge’s previous political campaigns, we 
compiled weekly sets of cases that might possibly feature a donor attorney. We then manually 
checked the full attorney names in each of those cases to see if any of them approximately 
 
210  Note that this amount includes only reported, direct contributions, a limitation that limits the 
generalizability of our study in a political environment that where “dark money” is common. See Abby K. 
Wood, Campaign Finance Disclosure, Unpublished manuscript (2018) (discussing the empirical 
implications of not including “dark money” in studies dealing with campaign finance). 
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matched211 the names from the campaign finance lists, and the case numbers for cases with 
matching attorneys were entered into the Harris County Clerk’s online docket system. Because 
neither the LexisNexis results nor the online dockets included Bar ID numbers (or any other 
truly unique attorney identifiers) we used a systematic—but admittedly less accurate—protocol 
that excluded cases for consideration if there were multiple attorneys in the Texas Bar database 
with the same or very similar names who could not be differentiated using additional available 
data such as place of employment or zip code.212 
iii. Defining Treatable Cases: Although our data collection method gives us access to 
information on all types of cases, we have excluded a number of different case types from our 
study.213 Many of these case types are not treated because they are inherently non-contentious or 
simply matters of paperwork (i.e. legal name changes, adoption proceedings, and paternity 
acknowledgement). We felt that other cases, such as small claims and certain types of probate 
cases, were so uncontroversial that judges were less likely to take our letter treatments seriously. 
Restraining order/injunction cases were excluded because, by their nature, the most important 
portions of such proceedings are finished before we can treat the judges. As noted above, we 
omit all criminal cases. 
iv. Assignment Procedure: Over the course of the study, we identified over 700 cases 
(398 from Wisconsin and 307 from Harris County) that featured attorneys who had donated to 
 
211 Any names that were similar in spelling or had similar components (e.g. middle name matched first 
name, initials were similar, name looked like it could be a nickname for another name [Rusty = Russel, 
Tony = Anthony]) were considered “approximate” matches. 
212 For the full protocol, see Appendix: Harris County Attorney Verification Protocol. 
213 The list of excluded case types in Wisconsin are as follows (Wisconsin case codes in parentheses): All 
criminal cases (34001,34003), all small claims (31001-31010), restraining orders/injunctions (30704, 
30708-30711, 30713, 30709-30711), adoptions (40401, 40403), support/maintenance actions (40402), 
paternity acknowledgement (40503), informal and ancillary proceedings (50102, 50103), summary 
assignments and settlements (50105, 50106), determinations of descent (50109), wills filed/filed for 
safekeeping (50110, 50111). A full list of all Wisconsin Circuit Court case types can be found at 
http://www.wicourts.gov/courts/circuit/circuitcodes.htm.  
All similar case types were also excluded in Texas, in addition to expunction of records and garnishments. 
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the presiding judge’s political campaign. Of these cases, 228 were excluded from our 
experimental sample because they were of “untreatable” case type, the judge had been presiding 
over the case for too long, or we could not verify that the attorney on file was the same individual 
as the attorney from the campaign finance records, resulting in 472 treatable cases (270 from 
Wisconsin and 202 from Harris County), or an average of 4 cases per week. 
Although all 472 of these cases were eligible for random assignment, not all of them 
received a treatment. As a general matter, we only assigned cases if they were presided over by a 
judge who had not previously had a case assigned to either condition. However, because the 
treatment period of the study lasted almost two years, we felt that judges with cases originally 
assigned to control (meaning the judge had not received a letter) would become re-eligible for 
analysis after the original case had concluded or after a 5-month cooling-off period.214 Any 
treatable cases presided over by judges 5 months after that judge was assigned to control or after 
the case had concluded were assigned according to the normal procedures described above. If, 
on the other hand, the judge presiding over a new treatable case had presided over a case that 
was assigned to the treatment group in previous weeks (meaning the judge had received a 
letter), the case was excluded from the assignment process.215  
If, in a given week, we identified only one assignable case, the case was randomly 
assigned to the treatment condition with either a 50% or 66.6% probability of treatment.216 If we 
identified more than one treatable case in a given week, those cases were assigned in a block 
using a form of complete random assignment that ensured that the number of cases assigned to 
 
214 We were able to verify whether a case had concluded using the online docket systems. 
215 Although these cases were therefore not included in the experimental analysis, they provide valuable 
supplementary data on the base rates of recusal among the broader population of cases, so we include 
descriptive statistics for them in our analysis, below. 
216 Near the end of the experiment, the probability of treatment was increased from 50% to 66% in order 
to bolster the size of the treatment condition. As we describe below, we account for this variation in 
treatment probability using inverse probability weights. 
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treatment and control were roughly equal.217 We account for the differing probabilities of 
assignment in our analysis. 
The exception to this general assignment protocol occurred in the first week of treatment 
in both venues. When the experiment was launched (October 2014 in Wisconsin and April 2015 
in Harris County), we had a backlog of treatable cases that were still “fresh” under our criteria 
for inclusion. Each judge with more than one case in the backlog group was placed into 
individual blocks, with one of the judge’s cases randomly assigned to treatment and the others to 
control. Judges in the backlog group with only one case were placed into a single block for 
random assignment. An example of the blocking for some cases is shown in the Appendix: 
Sample of Assignment Blocks in Wisconsin. 
v. Treatment Procedure: With the exception of the first week of treatment in Harris 
County, where the 13 treatment letters were sent in three waves over the course of two weeks, 
treatment letters were sent via UPS Next-Day Delivery to the corresponding judge’s chambers 
(see Figure 1, below, for letter text) within a week after a treatable case featuring a judge-donor 
pair was identified. If chamber-specific addresses were not available, we sent the letter to the 
county court address, presuming that all mail will be delivered to the judges or their clerks. The 
treatment letters themselves came from the Center for Electoral Politics and Democracy at 
Fordham University.  
Upon receiving a letter, four of the judges contacted our organization directly. When this 
occurred, we responded with a simple description of our organization’s goals (judicial integrity) 
and reemphasized our belief in the importance of unbiased judicial decisionmaking, while 
 
217 By “complete” assignment, we simply mean that instead of assigning each case individually (often 
called “simple” random assignment), we assigned the weekly group so that the number of treatment case 
and control cases were pre-determined. For weeks with an even number of cases, equal numbers of cases 
were assigned to each condition (with two cases, one case was assigned to each condition; with four cases, 
two cases were assigned to each condition; etc.). For weeks with an odd number of cases, equal number of 
cases were assigned to each condition with the remainder case assigned to the control condition (with 
three cases, two cases were assigned to the control condition and one to the treatment; with five cases, 
three cases were assigned to the control condition and two to the treatment). 
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clarifying that we will not contact any parties other than the judge herself. To the maximum 
extent possible, our responses followed an identical protocol across cases. All conversations 
proceeded in a way that we believe maintained the ethical and methodological integrity of the 
study. 
Figure 1: Treatment Letter Contents 
 
Dear Judge XXX : 
 
It has recently come to our attention that you have been assigned to preside over CASE 
NAME (CASE NUMBER#). What attracted our attention is that Ms. PARTY NAME’s 
attorney, ATTORNEY NAME, has been a significant contributor to your election 
campaign. In particular, Ms. ATTORNEY NAME gave $AMOUNT to your campaign 
committee. 
 
We are sure that you agree that the administration of justice must be perceived as 
impartial to maintain public confidence. We have no connection to this case or any of the 
parties involved, but as citizens concerned about judicial integrity, we believe your 
involvement in CASE NAME may raise concerns due to Ms. ATTORNEY NAME’s ties 
to your campaign. In light of those potential concerns, we respectfully request that you 




Judicial Integrity Project, Center for Electoral Politics and Democracy 
 
 
vi. Measurement and Outcomes of Interest: Cases assigned to both treatment and 
control were monitored for a minimum of two months218 before outcomes were collected. 
Outcomes were measured using the online dockets, which included information on the presiding 
judge, the attorneys involved with the case, and (purportedly) any case filings or activity. Once 
all (or most) the cases have concluded and the courts been informed of the study, we will review 
these applications in more detail. In order to ensure accurate measurements and allow for future 
 
218 The majority of cases were monitored for much longer. 
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reproducibility, we saved images of the online case docket at the time of assignment and of 
measurement. 
The primary outcomes of interest in this project was whether and when judges recuse 
and disclose the potential conflict. While in Harris County, judges can simply recuse themselves 
from cases, judges in Wisconsin must submit an application for recusal (formally called an 
“Application for Judicial Assignment”) to the chief judge in the district. We have spoken with 
Wisconsin court officials and have been told that all recusals require such an application and 
that the submission of and reasons behind such applications should be noted in the online case 
history. For each case we recorded applications for recusal and recusals granted, although 
because one never occurred without the other, we report them as one outcome. 
We define judicial disclosure as any case document or docket activity in which the judge 
discloses the financial relationship between herself and the attorney. This can occur in the 
course of recusal itself, through the submission of the treatment letter into the court record, or 
via a conversation between the judge and the parties. 
Because judges might also seek to address conflicts of interest through more informal 
and inconspicuous means than an actual recusal, we measure judicial transfers (non-recusal 
changes in judicial authority) and whether the donor attorney left the case. To measure the 
possible impact that the letters have on case outcomes, we record the number of days before a 
case is resolved219 and how the case is resolved (whether by default,220 settlement/stipulation, 
dismissal, or judgment after trial). To evaluate the impact that disclosures have on attorney 
behavior, we record requests for recusals made by any of the non-donor attorneys, including 
formal motions for recusal. 
 
219 We define the length of a case as the number of days it takes from the first day in the week in which we 
identified the case to the day the case is closed based on the online dockets. 
220 In Wisconsin, default is defined as follows by Wisconsin Statutes 806.02: “A default judgment may be 
rendered… if no issue of law or fact has been joined and if the time for joining issue has expired. Any 
defendant appearing in an action shall be entitled to notice of motion for judgment.” 
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vii. Estimation: Because the probability of receiving the treatment in our experiment 
may vary case by case, depending on the number of available cases presided over by the same 
judge, the data must be weighted in order to eliminate any confounding relationship between 
the assignment probability in a given week and unobserved factors that may affect outcomes. 
Following the procedures laid out in Gerber and Green,221 we reweight the data using “inverse 
probability weights” (IPW). IPW allows us to obtain unbiased estimates of the average treatment 
effect using a weighted difference-in-means. We also obtain consistent estimates of the average 
treatment effect using regression with controls for baseline covariates. 
Formally, the weighting procedure may be described as follows. Let Pi be the probability 
that case i is assigned to treatment. Let Zi be a binary variable that indicates whether a given 
case is assigned to treatment (Zi = 1) or control (Zi = 0). The weight (Wi) for each case is given by 
the formula: 
Wi = Zi / Pi + (1-Zi)/ (1-Pi). 
Applying the weights in equation (1), we obtain unbiased estimates of the average effect 
of assigned treatment (Zi) on the outcome variable (Yi) using weighted difference-in-means. In 
our application, the outcome is a binary variable scored 1 if the judge requests to be recused and 
0 otherwise. Equivalently, we can use weighted least squares (WLS) regression to estimate the 
parameters of the model. The advantage of using WLS regression is that the model may be 
extended to control for pre-treatment covariates, such as the number of months before a judge’s 
next election. 
We calculate our p-values using randomization inference. Since we know the actual 
probabilities of assignment to each treatment condition and control, we can simulate a large 
number of randomly generated treatment assignments and obtain a distribution of treatment 
effect estimates from these assignments under the sharp null assumption of no treatment 
 
221 ALAN S. GERBER & DONALD P. GREEN, FIELD EXPERIMENTS: DESIGN, ANALYSIS, AND INTERPRETATION, at 
chapters 3-4 (W. W. Norton & Company 2012). 
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effect.222 We can then see where our actual estimate falls in this simulated distribution and 
calculate a p-value to determine how likely we would be to observe this value if there were no 
true treatment effect. All of the randomization inference p-values are based on 10,000 simulated 
random assignments. We will account for the multiple comparisons problem using a Šidák 
correction. 
D. Ethical Considerations 
Because of the novelty of this field experiment—to our knowledge this is the first 
randomized experiment conducted on judges in active cases—we feel it is necessary to include a 
discussion of the ethical considerations made during the design and implementation of the 
study. Like many field experiments involving human subjects, our project raises important 
ethical and legal issues. Indeed, because the experiment took place in the court context, a 
thorough evaluation of these issues is especially paramount.223 
As a result, we have taken precautions to minimize—and likely eliminate—the possibility 
that asking a judge to recuse herself from a case could have a profound effect on any of the 
participants—a possibility that we argue is remote to begin with. First of all, we focus on 
contested civil cases224 and exclude all criminal cases. This decision to set aside criminal trials 
was made partially because of the high stakes of these matters and partially because of the faster 
speed with which they proceed through the judicial system. Second, in order to minimize the 
burden of imposing delays and complications on cases in which the substantial proceedings 
have already commenced, we intervened only in “fresh” civil cases— cases where it appears that 
the judge has taken no substantive actions. As we discuss below, we monitor cases filed in 
 
222 ALAN S. GERBER & DONALD P. GREEN, FIELD EXPERIMENTS: DESIGN, ANALYSIS, AND INTERPRETATION (W. 
W. Norton & Company 2012). 
223 For in-depth exploration of the legal and ethical concerns of conducting and evaluating field experiments 
in the courtroom, see Dane Thorley and Jacob Kopas, Experiments in the Court: The Legal and Ethical 
Challenges of Running Randomized Field Experiments in the Courtroom, Working Paper (2018), available 
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2994298. 
224 Both courts have a fairly elaborate categorization system, allowing us to eliminate whole categories of 
civil cases. 
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Wisconsin Circuit Courts and Harris County District Courts on a weekly basis to identify judges 
who have recently been assigned to a case in which one of the attorneys had previously donated 
to that judge’s political campaign. Third, we do not treat cases during the three months leading 
up to the 2015 and 2016 Wisconsin elections if the judges in those cases were running for 
reelection. 
Since the average civil case of the sort we consider before both the Wisconsin Circuit 
Court and the Harris County District Court is generally resolved within six to nine months and 
few show any evidence of substantial activity by the presiding judge until at least a month or two 
after assignment, focusing exclusively on fresh cases significantly reduces the likelihood that our 
intervention could have any impact, adverse or otherwise, on the litigants. Nonetheless, it is 
possible that the treatment letters—regardless of whether they lead to recusal—may indirectly 
influence the mentality with which the judge approaches the case. A judge who receives a 
treatment letter may, for example, not have realized that one of the attorneys had donated to her 
political campaign—a scenario that we strongly do not believe is the case, given disclosure rules 
in both Wisconsin and Texas—and subsequently favor that attorney (and by proxy, her client) in 
a way that she would not have absent the information highlighted in the letter. Conversely, a 
judge, after being informed of the donor attorney’s contributions, may choose to employ some 
sort of self-imposed counter-biasing, favoring the attorney who did not financially support her 
election campaign. Although we took these possibilities seriously, we ultimately determined that 
they were unlikely, and were no worse that the natural state of such cases, where the presiding 
judges almost certainly knew about the donation. 
The effect of the treatment letters on lawyers who have contributed to judges may be a 
bit longer lasting because they could lead a judge to recuse herself in all cases involving a 
particular attorney or attorneys. Three things are worth noting about that possibility. First, as 
we present below, we found no evidence of increased recusals in the cases assigned to the 
treatment condition, let alone among the other cases that treated judges presided over. Second, 
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cases featuring donor-judge pairs are surprisingly rare; our tracking of newly assigned cases 
since July 1, 2014 shows that only a small number of cases (less than 1 percent) feature lawyers 
who have given $200 or more to the presiding judge. In short, the vast majority of contentious 
civil cases in both Wisconsin and Harris County do not involve attorneys who have made a 
substantial donation, or any donation, to the presiding judge. Third, even if a judge were to 
refuse to preside over any case where a particular attorney represented the plaintiff or 
defendant, the remedy would simply be to transfer the case to another judge in the same or an 
adjacent county, which would have a negligible impact on proceedings given the early stages in 
which our experimental intervention takes place. 
There is also a policy-relevant aspect to our decision to focus on fresh cases, for we 
suspect that a judge would be more willing to recuse herself from a case in which her investment 
of time and energy is minimal. It is reasonable to suppose that a judge who has already heard 
some testimony, reviewed multiple filings, and issued orders would be resistant to a call for 
recusal from an outside party, if only because of the high costs to the state and litigants of 
bringing the next judge up to speed. Whether requests for recusals are an effective tactic for 
watchdog organizations remains unknown, but we suspect that such requests are likely to be 
most effective as applied to fresh cases. 
Beyond these ethical and practical considerations, we also solicited a formal legal 
opinion from a leading law firm with established practice groups specializing in election law, 
non-profits, and taxation. Their analysis confirmed that there is no legal impediment to an 
outside group writing to judges with a request that they recuse themselves in a specific case due 
to contributions made by an attorney in the case. Such information is available for public 
comment due to the public nature of court proceedings. The only potential issue comes from any 
public treatments (i.e., letters to the editors or print ads) in the context of elections, as public 
treatments could be categorized as campaign expenditures for the benefit of one of the 
candidates. Even though this particular study does not incorporate such public treatments, we 
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observe an extended blackout period of the three months leading up to the Wisconsin (April 7, 
2015) and Texas (November 8, 2016) elections for any judge who has declared for reelection. 
Judicial elections in both Texas and Wisconsin are held on a rotating basis, so just under a sixth 
of the judges (who serve six-year terms) participate in elections in any given year. This 
restriction poses no more than a minor inconvenience. 
 
V. Analysis, Results, and Limitations 
Here we present the descriptive data we collected on recusal and disclosure and analyze 
the results of the randomized experiment. As our models predicted, judicial recusal rates are 
quite low, even when judges are sent the treatment letter asking them to remove themselves 
from the cases. Disclosure rates are even lower—not one judge who received a letter disclosed 
the donation on the court record. And even though the treatment letter had a substantial impact 
on disclosure rates, attorneys in those cases were no more likely to ask the judge to recuse, 
supporting the hypothesis that attorneys are unwilling to move for recusal even when they are 
aware of a conflict that may disadvantage their clients.  
The detailed results are presented in Subpart A. In Subpart B, we highlight some 
important limitations to keep in mind when interpreting the data, focusing specifically on 
generalizability, experimental assumptions, and measurement error. 
 A Note on The Harris County, Texas Sample: In October 2016, the Judicial Integrity 
Project received a letter from a Harris County Courts senior staff attorney, writing on behalf of 
the Harris County District judges. The letter informed us that a few of judges who had received 
the treatment letters had informed the court administration. According to this letter (although 
our reading of the relevant statutes is different), judges are not allowed to consider ex-parte 
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requests for recusal such as ours, and that we “may continue to send these requests…but the 
response will be the same.”225  
 To prevent any further potential contamination, we discontinued the assignment of cases 
in Harris County. In all likelihood, at least some of the experimental results produced from the 
Harris County Sample are biased. Although there was no indication in the letter that the 
administration or the judges are aware that these letters are part of an academic study, any 
possibility that the judges have discussed the existence of the letters among themselves brings 
with it the likelihood of “spillover,” or contamination between the treatment and control groups. 
In a perfectly clean experiment, none of the judges in the control group will be aware of (directly 
or indirectly) the treatment letters because their behavior in regard to their own conflict cases 
may be indirectly influenced simply by knowing that other judges are being asked to recuse. It is 
also possible that judges who were assigned to the treatment group but became aware of 
treatment letters sent to other judges might treat their own letters differently. 
 Considering all of this, it is unclear whether the null results we see in the Harris County 
data (see below) are actually reflective of the true state of the world in each treatment condition 
or the result of this incidental spillover. As a result, we focus primarily on the analysis on the 
 
225 The letter did not specify the law or rule that imposes such a restriction, although we suspect it may be 
Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, Cannon 3:B(8):  
A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person’s 
lawyer, the right to be heard according to law. A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex 
parte communications or other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the 
parties between the judge and a party, an attorney, a guardian or attorney ad litem, an alternative 
dispute resolution neutral, or any other court appointee concerning the merits of a pending or 
impending judicial proceeding. A judge shall require compliance with this subsection by court 
personnel subject to the judge’s direction and control. 
We were familiar with this restriction before starting the Harris County arm and understood it not to 
include our treatment letter, both because we are not “a party, an attorney, a guardian or attorney ad 
litem, an alternative dispute resolution neutral, or any other court appointee” and, to a lesser extent, 
because the contents of the letter addressed a non-case relationship between the judge and an attorney—
an issue not directly related to the legal merits of the case. Our interpretation is, of course, unimportant if 
the practical interpretation of this rule by the Harris County Court encompasses our intervention. 
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Wisconsin results, although we do briefly discuss the procedural outcomes of the Harris County 
data. 
A. Analysis and Results 
i. Descriptive Data: Over the course of the two-year experiment in Wisconsin, we 
identified 270 “treatable” cases—civil cases that feature an attorney who donated $200 or more 
to the presiding judge, were recently assigned to the donee judge, and are of an appropriate case 
type. 60 of these cases were selected to be part of the randomized experiment, with 32 cases 
assigned to the control group (hereafter called control cases) and 28 cases assigned to the 
treatment group (treatment cases).226 Although the other 210 cases (non-experimental cases) 
are not featured in the experimental analysis, they are still valuable as an additional source for 
measuring baseline rates of recusal and disclosure, so we include them in our descriptive 
analysis. Of the 60 cases included in the experiment, all but one has concluded.  














Judge Gender (Male) 0.753 0.726 0.812 
Attorney Gender (Male) 0.791 0.673 0.310 
Case Type (Divorce) 0.225 0.210 0.894 
Attorney Side (Plaintiff) 0.631 0.730 0.432 
Donation Amount ($) 350.534 333.222 0.746 
Donation Proportion* 0.031 0.041 0.675 
*Donation proportion is calculated as the ratio of the donor-attorney’s contribution in dollars 
over the total amount of contributions in dollars made to the judge.  
Based on t-tests weighted by the probability of treatment, judge gender, donor-attorney 
gender, donor-attorney side (plaintiff or respondent), case type (divorce case), contribution 
 
226 See supra Subpart IV.D for a detailed description of why cases were or were not considered treatable 
and of why cases were or were not included in the randomized experiment.  
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amount, and the ratio of the attorney contribution to the total amount raised by the judge from 
attorneys are all balanced across the control and treatment groups (see Table 1, above). 
Attorney contributions in these cases ranged from $200 to $1,000, and the average 
donation was $331 in the experimental cases and $379 in the non-experimental cases. Not 
surprisingly, the proportion of donation amount to total money raised by the judge was 
sometimes quite low (.01% at the lowest), but some donations constituted a substantial portion 
of the judge’s total fundraising (66% at the highest). 
ii. Base Rates of Recusal and Disclosure: The only two existing studies that track recusal 
decisions in cases featuring campaign donors suggest that recusal rates should be quite low—
somewhere between 0227 and 4 percent.228 Our results confirm this pattern (see Figure 2, below). 
Of the 210 non-experimental cases, judicial recusals occurred in only 12 of them (5.7%). 
Similarly, in the 32 experimental cases assigned to the control group, we observed only 2 
recusals. Taken together, these results suggest that under normal circumstances, judges recuse 
in only 5.9% of cases that feature a donor attorney. 
But the raw rates of recusal only tell part of the story, as we should be able to see the 
reasons for the recusals that did occur by reading the recusal paperwork that the judges 
provided to the chief judges. Court documents show that in one of the two recusals in the control 
cases, the judge recused because the donor-attorney was retained. In the other case, however, 
recusal was due to the judge having “a close relationship with the parties.” This suggests that our 
 
227 See Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Recusal of American Judges in the Post-Caperton Era: An 
Empirical Assessment of the Risk of Actual Bias in Decisions Involving Campaign Contributors, 10 
GLOBAL JURIST (2010); Vernon Valentine Palmer & John Levendis, The Louisiana Supreme Court in 
Question: An Empirical and Statistical Study of the Effects of Campaign Money on the Judicial 
Function, 82 TULANE L. REV. 1291 (2008). 
228 See Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 
2006 (reporting that judges in the Ohio Supreme Court recused in only 9 of the 215 cases that featured 
donor parties. They also reported that "[r]ecusals in cases involving [attorney] contributors were all but 
unheard of," but did not provide a precise percentage). 
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main measurement for recusal may be overinclusive and that the true rates of recusal due to the 
campaign donation is even lower. 
 
Figure 2: Base Rates of Recusal (Wisconsin) 
 
 
Figure 3: Base-Rates of Disclosure (Wisconsin) 
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Judges rarely ever recuse in the potential conflict cases that we track in their study, but 
do they at least disclose the potential source of bias to the parties in the case? Although the 
presumption in the literature regarding the likelihood of recusal is often that it will be low, 
disclosure is much more expected than recusal and is arguably required of judges even under a 
relatively conservative interpretation of the Wisconsin Code of Judicial Conduct. Nonetheless, 
our study suggests that disclosure is even less common than recusal. In fact, of the 210 non-
experimental cases and the 32 control group cases, we did not find a single mention of the 
contribution(s) made to the judge (see Figure 3, above). This is true even when considering the 
14 recusals that occurred between the two groups—while we can assume that some of the 
recusals that occurred were done at least in part because of the relationship between the donor-
attorney and the judge, few of the recusal motions referenced the specific source of bias, 
meaning that, at least according to our measurement method, disclosure was not made.229 
Interestingly, we did identify some disclosures of potential bias, but they were unrelated to the 
campaign contributions.230 
iii. Estimated Treatment Effects on Procedural Outcomes: When designing this 
experiment, we anticipated that the treatment letters would have a noticeable, moderate effect 
on the likelihood that judges would recuse from the conflict cases. The results of the experiment 
suggest otherwise (see Table 2a, below). Judges in the treatment group are only 1.8 percentage 
points more likely to recuse than judges in the control group, and this small effect is far from 
statistically significant. Similarly, there was no significant effect of the letter on the likelihood of 
a judicial transfer or of the donor-attorney’s withdrawal. 
 
229  The fact that recusal motions regularly did not express the exact reasons for recusal was initially 
surprising to use, as we had been told that all recusal motions such include such details. Research by others, 
however, suggests that this is a common issue. See Patrick A. Woods, Reversal by Recusal: Comer v. 
Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc. and the Need for Mandatory Judicial Recusal Statements, 13 U.N.H. L. REV. 177 
(2015). 
230 For example, one judge “disclosed knowledge of plaintiff’s sister,” and gave the parties 10 days to 
determine if they would like the judge to recuse. They subsequently submitted a joint application for judicial 
recusal.  
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Table 2a: Estimated Average Treatment 






(n = 32) 
Treatment 
Group 
Weighted      
Mean 











0.032 0.035 0.018 0.253 0.053 
Judicial 
Transfers 




0 0.319 0.337 0.000 0.091 
Attorney 
Withdrawal 
0.097 0.117 0.050 0.306 0.079 
Any Action*** 0.225 0.390 0.266 0.013 0.115 
* The Šidák correction for all seven Wisconsin outcomes combined results in an alpha level of .007. 
Coefficients and p-values in bold fall below the Šidák-corrected significance level. 
** Pre-treatment covariates include: judge gender, donor attorney gender, donor attorney side 
(plaintiff or respondent) case type (binary-divorce case or not), and the combined donation amount 
given to the judge by the donor-attorney. 
***Outcome not included in pre-analysis plan. 
 
There was, however, a pronounced effect of sending judges letters asking for recusal on 
the propensity for judges to disclose the campaign contribution made by the donor attorney. 
Although no disclosures were made in the control group, just less than one-third of the judges 
(32%) in the treatment group either discussed the contribution with the parties in the case, 
mentioned it in a recusal motion, or included the treatment letter in the court record. This result 
is statistically significant at the .0003 level (which easily stands up to the increased scrutiny of a 
Šidák correction). 
In the Harris County arm of the experiment, there were also null findings for recusals (0 
in the control group, and 0 in the treatment group), transfers (1 in the control group, and 0 in 
the treatment group), and attorney withdrawal (0 in the control group, and 1 in the treatment 
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group).231 Unlike in Wisconsin, however, there was no significant effect on disclosure (0 in the 
control group, and 1 in the treatment group) (see Table 2b, below). 
 
Table 2b: Estimated Average Treatment 






(n = 53) 
Treatment 
Group 
Weighted      
Mean 











.000 .000 .000 1.0 0.000 
Judicial 
Transfers 




.000 .034 .107 .052 .052 
Attorney 
Withdrawal 
.000 .059 .024 .043 .030 
Any Action*** .000 .093 .132 .031 .058 
* The Šidák correction for all five outcomes tested in the Harris County sample results in an alpha level 
of .013. Coefficients and p-values in bold fall below the Šidák-corrected significance level. 
** Pre-treatment covariates include: judge gender, donor attorney gender, donor attorney side (plaintiff 
or respondent) case type (binary-divorce case or not), and the combined donation amount given to the 
judge by the donor-attorney. 
***Outcome not included in pre-analysis plan. 
 
Because of small sample sizes, we are unable to run robust statistical tests on 
heterogeneous treatment effects on recusal and disclosure across pre-treatment covariate 
categories, but we have nonetheless included descriptive statistics on those categorical 
differences (see Tables 4 and 5 in Appendix). Differences in the treatment effect within 
subgroups indicate that there is a positive correlation between disclosure and the amount that 
was donated, the proportion of the judge’s total campaign contribution that the donation 
constitutes, and whether the judge’s previous election was contested. Additionally, treatment 
 
231 Note that the p-values for all of these outcomes are below .05 but do not survive the Šidák correction. 
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effects on disclosure are larger for male judges and larger in cases where the judge and donor 
attorney are of the opposite gender, while the treatment effect on both disclosure and recusal is 
larger in divorce cases relative to other case types. Again, however, a larger experimental sample 
size is necessary to be confident that these heterogenous treatment effects are more than just 
chance variation.  
iv. Estimated Treatment Effects on Case Outcomes: In addition to inducing recusal, 
transfers, disclosure, and attorney withdrawal, our letter treatment may also have an effect on 
the outcomes of the cases. Because of the diversity of civil cases that we included in the 
experiment, it is difficult to define a “winner” across all case types, but we did measure the 
number of days it took for the case to conclude232 and whether the case was concluded through a 
settlement between the parties. 
 
Table 3: Estimated Average Treatment Effects  





















Length of Case 
(Days)*** 
304.853 295.787 6.368 0.463 67.738 
Case 
Settled*** 
0.241 0.342 0.030 0.403 0.135 
* The Šidák correction for all seven Wisconsin outcomes combined results in an alpha level of .007. 
Coefficients and p-values in bold fall below the Šidák-corrected significance level. 
** Pre-treatment covariates include: judge gender, donor attorney gender, donor attorney side 
(plaintiff or respondent) case type (binary-divorce case or not), and the combined donation amount 
given to the judge by the donor-attorney. 
***Outcome not included in pre-analysis plan. 
 
 
232 For the one case that had not concluded, we measured the length of days as if the case had concluded on 
10/15/2018. 
  81  
 
As we see in Table 3 (above), treatment cases concluded 6.3 days faster than control 
cases (the raw weighted means, which do not account for the pre-treatment covariates show a 
larger difference), but this difference is not statistically significant.233 This difference may be 
partly driven by the 3 percent increase in the probability that a treatment case is settled by the 
parties, although that difference is also not significant. 
v. Downstream Effect of Disclosure on Non-donor Attorney Behavior: One of the 
empirical benefits of observing such a large estimated treatment effect on disclosure rates is that 
the propensity for disclosure effectively becomes a function of the initial random assignment 
and can be treated as a downstream treatment on subsequent case outcomes. In other words, 
with some slight adjustments to out estimation strategy we can measure the causal effect of 
disclosure (specifically the causal effect of a higher probability of disclosure) as if we randomly 
assigned disclosure itself, something that would be impractical to implement in the original 
design of the experiment. This then allows us to test the position taken by many in the recusal 
literature that disclosure can function as a supplement to recusal procedure by informing the 
non-donor parties of the potential conflict, allowing them to raise the issue of recusal if they 
deem it appropriate.  
As with the other outcomes of interest, we measured requests for recusal using 
Wisconsin’s online database. We did not find any evidence that attorneys requested recusal in 
any of the experimental cases, including those in which a recusal was made by the judge. We 
were told that such requests should be included in the case documents, and based on a review of 
the non-experimental cases, we have verified that this is true in at least some cases, so not 
finding any attorney requests is a strong indication that none were made.  
With no difference between the control and treatment groups, we do not need to run the 
more complicated empirical tests for downstream effects to conclude that the increased 
 
233  For the case outcomes, we used the traditional two-tailed tests because we did not include these 
outcomes in the pre-analysis plan. 
  82  
 
disclosure rates in the treatment group had no impact on the propensity for attorneys to request 
recusal.234 Figure 4 (below) presents the rates of requests for recusal in the control and 
treatment group. We also included the number of requests made just in the cases in which the 
judge disclosed the contribution to highlight the non-effect that disclosure has.  
 




The experiment presented in this Chapter provides much needed empirical evidence 
regarding the frequency and efficacy of judicial recusal and disclosure as well as general judicial 
and attorney behavior in cases that feature potential conflicts of interest. However, as with all 
empirical studies, the data presented above must be evaluated with the limitations of our study 
in mind. 
i. Generalizability: Although we believe that Wisconsin and Texas are reasonably 
representative of the landscape of judicial elections in the U.S., they each feature unique legal 
and social landscapes that may create different incentive structures for the judges and attorneys 
 
234 Note that if we were able to conduct downstream calculations, the estimand would be the treatment 
effect of disclosure on attorney and judge behavior among only those cases in which disclosure was induced.  
Control Cases (32) Treated Cases (28)
Treated Cases w/
Disclosure (8)
No Requests for Recusal 32 28 8
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who work in them. Similarly, we collected data and ran the experiment only on cases in the 
Wisconsin and Texas trial courts. These cases are of a very different nature than appellate cases, 
in terms of the role of the courtroom participants and the scope of the conflicts stemming from 
campaign contributions. Whereas cumulative donations to state supreme court justices can 
consistently reach the millions of dollars, only a few of the judges in our sample raised more 
than $100,000, and the attorneys rarely donated more than $1,000. It is not unlikely that the 
behavioral dynamics influencing both judges and attorneys varies depending on the stage of the 
judicial process. 
The experiment also deals only with conflicts of interest stemming from direct campaign 
contributions from attorneys. Although much of the consternation regarding the effect that 
judicial campaign fundraising has on judicial behavior is concerned specifically with attorneys 
who donate to judges, many of the same threats to judicial legitimacy are at play when it is the 
parties who donate. Caperton, the most prominent U.S. case dealing with recusal for campaign 
donations features a donor party, not a donor attorney, and would therefore not have been 
included in our sample. Similarly, because our identification of cases that feature potential 
conflicts of interest relies exclusively on the publicly reported data that is provided by the judges 
themselves, this study does not analyze the disclosure and recusal behavior of judges and 
attorneys involved in cases in which attorneys contributed via indirect spending or undisclosed 
“dark money,” which a recent study by Wood has shown can limit the generalizability of studies 
dealing with campaign finance.235 
ii. Experimental Limitations: The study also has a number of potential methodological 
limitations related to the design and implementation of the experiment. First, the experimental 
sample is small—32 cases in the control group and 28 cases in the treatment group. Based on 
the number of cases featuring a conflict in a pre-experimental sample we gathered, we expected 
 
235 Abby K. Wood, Campaign Finance Disclosure, Unpublished manuscript (2018). 
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a larger number of eligible cases, but the number of cases we could include was ultimately out of 
our control. As we saw from the results, this did not prevent us from identifying some treatment 
effects, but it does lower our confidence in the null results observed and prevents a more 
statistically robust test of the downstream effects of disclosure. 
Second, we cannot verify that all of the judges in the treatment group read the recusal 
requests. It is possible that the letters were intercepted by a judicial assistant and never given to 
the judges or that the judges simply threw the letters in the trash before reading them. In either 
case, this would result in a problem called non-compliance in the experimental literature and 
would produce a biased estimate of the treatment effect. Although we cannot empirically 
dismiss the possibility of non-compliance, we are not particularly concerned about it in the 
context of this experiment. Because we tracked the packages sent to the courthouse, we know 
that the packages were delivered, and because of the 32 percentage-point treatment effect on 
disclosures, we can surmise that at least that many judges were actually treated. 
Third, there may have been experimental spillover (another term of art in the 
experimental literature) between the control and treatment groups, particularly among the 
judges in the experiment who are housed in the same courthouse. Spillover occurs when the 
treatment category of a judge impacts the outcome of interest of another judge. In the context of 
this experiment, spillover is most likely to occur if a judge in the treatment group discussed the 
recusal request sent to her with one of her colleagues who was also assigned to either the control 
or treatment group. As with non-compliance, this sort of interaction between treatment groups 
could result in biased estimates of the treatment effects, and, as with non-compliance, the extent 
to which this was a problem in our experiment is difficult (if not impossible) to empirically 
measure, although as we explained above, we have evidence to suggest that it did occur in the 
Harris County sample. 
iii. Measurement Error: Finally, the result of the study should be evaluated 
understanding that our measurements of all the experimental outcomes are potentially under-
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inclusive of the actual outcomes. This is due in large part to our reliance on online case dockets 
and formal court documents. We were assured that the online docket system in Wisconsin 
accurately reflects the totality of events in a given case (excluding any information that is not 
disclosed for legal reasons), but it is possible that an event that we recorded as a judicial transfer 
was actually a recusal or that a disclosure of the campaign donation was made in the course of a 
hearing but not recorded individually on the docket. Although we ordered copies of relevant case 
events to try and remedy this problem, it is still possible that we missed certain events. 
 
VI. Alternatives 
Having analyzed the evidence showing that judges are unlikely to recuse themselves 
from cases with campaign donors and that simply informing the outside attorneys and parties of 
that conflict does little to stimulate motions for recusal, we now turn to a discussion of 
alternative methods for dealing with conflicts of interest. As with much of the previous 
discussion in this Chapter, our arguments are tailored specifically to conflicts stemming from 
campaign finance but may be applicable to conflicts similar in nature. 
We discuss two proposals. The first, a tightly tailored procedural proposal, comprises a 
fusion of peremptory judicial challenges and automatic administrative disclosure of attorney 
donations. We argue that unlike other procedural reforms, this approach accounts for the 
incentive structure facing both judges and (importantly) attorneys. We also briefly discuss 
anonymizing judicial campaign contributions as one of the few feasible (albeit still problematic) 
institutional-level reforms. In generating these alternatives, we adopted much from the ideas 
and discussions that have been presented in the extant recusal literature, particularly those that 
do not seek simply to tweak standard self-recusal procedure or remove the system of judicial 
elections entirely.236 
 
236 In our opinion, a pair of 2007 articles by Goldberg, Sample, and Pozen provide the solutions that are the 
most aware of the sort of behavioral limitations that we have presented in our discussion. The alternatives 
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A. Procedural Reform 
Our previous analysis suggests that the most prominent procedural approaches for 
dealing with judicial conflicts of interest appear to fall short for two primary reasons: 1) they 
afford too much discretion to the judge in question, allowing for the consideration and influence 
of extra-legal factors that disincentivize self-recusal, and 2) they often rely on motions for 
recusal that are too costly for attorneys in all but the most extreme circumstances, meaning that 
transparency and disclosure do little to facilitate the removal of potentially conflicted judges.  
The most common procedural or rule-based solutions to the shortcomings of self-recusal 
either shift the recusal decision to another adjudicator or make recusal mandatory in all or a set 
of conflict cases. Both of these approaches correctly identify that for recusal to occur at a 
desirable rate, the recusal decision cannot be made by the adjudicator about whom the conflict 
is concerned. Nonetheless, neither of these approaches are likely to work when addressing 
conflicts due to campaign contributions because they either do not account for the incentives of 
the ultimate decisionmaker or do not account for the incentive structure of the attorneys in the 
case. 
A number of states have sought to avoid the problems associated with self-recusal by 
requiring third-party recusal determinations. Wisconsin, for example requires the approval of a 
district’s chief judge for any of the trial judges to be recused, although the request for such 
review has to go through the judge in question.237 However, independent review of recusal 
motions is usually conducted by other elected judges who have also received campaign 
contributions and are therefore subject to many of the same incentives preventing self-recusal. 
Additionally, if (as we argue in this Chapter) recusal is seen as an abdication of one’s duty and 
 
discussed in the subsequent literature appear to come mostly from the suggestions. See James Sample and 
David E. Pozen, Making Judicial Recusals More Rigorous, 46 The Judges’ J. (2007); Deborah Goldberg, 
James Sample, and David E. Pozen, The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, 
46 WASHBURN L. J. 503 (2007). 
237 Wisconsin Uniform Rules for Trial Court Administration, Section 3: Disqualification of Judges (2007). 
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judges dislike it when attorneys request recusal, judges are likely not going to require recusal for 
other judges except in the most egregious circumstances.  
If judicial discretion is still an issue even if the recusal determination is exported to 
outside judges, it stands to reason that we should just remove discretion altogether. Policy 
makers and scholars have repeatedly argued this point, suggesting that one of the best solutions 
simply requires including conflicts due to campaign donations into the list of circumstances that 
trigger automatic, or per se recusal.238 Such a system can make recusal mandatory for cases in 
which a donation of any amount is made or, as the ABA Model Code has suggested, make 
recusal automatic for donations that are of a certain amount or proportion of a judge’s total 
fundraising.239  
Although automatic recusal solves for the incentives of judges and outside attorneys—
behavioral incentives play no role in the recusal decision if there is no discretion involved—and 
ensures that judges will not hear cases in which a participant is a campaign donor, it creates new 
concerns. Unlike the other conflicts included in per se recusal statutes (e.g., familial 
relationships or previous professional experience with the case) the existence of conflicts 
stemming from campaign contributions is in the control of the donor, thereby allowing for the 
strategic creation of the conflict. Instead of donating to judges to support their candidacy or 
maybe garner favoritism from that judge, attorneys can instead “pay-not-to-play” by donating to 
judges they perceive as unfavorable or unfriendly.  
 
238  See Gabriel D. Serbulea, Due Process and Judicial Disqualification: The Need for Reform, 39 
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1109, at 1143 (2011). See also, Donald L. Burnett, A Cancer on the Republic: The Assault 
Upon Impartiality of State Courts and the Challenge to Judicial Selection, 34 FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 265 
(2006) (suggesting per se recusals as a solution for non-recusal in the campaign speech context). 
239 Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3E(1)(e) (1999) (Am. Bar Ass’n, amended 2011). Rule 2.11 calls 
for automatic recusal when “The judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that a party, a party’s 
lawyer, or the law firm of a party’s lawyer has within the previous [insert number] year[s] made aggregate 
contributions to the judge’s campaign in an amount that is greater than $[insert amount] for an individual 
or $[insert amount] for an entity [is reasonable and appropriate for an individual or an entity]….” 
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In Utah, for example, recusal is required if any of the parties or attorneys has donated 
more than $50 to the judge.240 This allows enterprising attorneys to avoid certain judges for a 
small one-time fee, behavior that we have been told in informal interviews is, at the very least, 
contemplated by attorneys working within these states. To combat this, the rules could increase 
the threshold at which recusal become automatic so that it is high enough to deter such strategic 
play, but this would inversely decrease the capture of conflicts of interests that the rule was 
designed to address. Similarly, others have suggested that allowing the opposing side to waive 
automatic recusal could prevent this strategic behavior,241 but that would put the burden of 
identifying gamesmanship on the non-donor party and attorney, who are the worst equipped for 
making such a determination. 
We posit that a more tenable procedural approach to campaign donors in the courtroom 
is a combination of limited, no-cause peremptory challenges paired with mandatory disclosure 
by the administrative court system. A good number of states—most prominently California—
already allow for parties to submit one no-cause peremptory challenge in each case as long as 
they do so within the first weeks of the initial case assignment.242 These challenges result in an 
automatic, no-questions-asked transfer to another judge that generally occurs so early in the 
process that the judges are unaware that the case was ever assigned to them in the first place, 
avoiding much of the potential cost of judicial retribution or bias in the attorney’s future cases in 
front of that judge.  
On its own, a proposal calling for peremptory challenges is not wholly novel—legal 
scholars have previously seen its potential as a solution for the failings of the current recusal 
 
240 Utah Supreme Court Code Rule 2011(A)(4). 
241 See Deborah Goldberg, James Sample, and David E. Pozen, The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts 
Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L. J. 503 at 529-30 (2007). 
242 In total, there are 17 states that allow peremptory challenges, although the circumstances in which the 
challenges are allowed vary. Such states are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, 
Wisconsin, Wyoming (RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF 
JUDGES at 789-822 (2d ed. 2007)). 
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regime.243 When considering such a system, some have expressed concerns that without proper 
restrictions, attorneys may make challenges in the middle of a case if they perceive the outcome 
to be developing against the interests of their client. This would result in substantial 
administrative burdens to the court system and the opposing party.244 In 2010, for example, 
government attorneys in California used the system to boycott judges who were perceived to be 
too light on crime by coordinating office-wide policies to skip those judges anytime they were 
assigned to a case.245 To allay some of these concerns, this Chapter proposes a peremptory 
challenge regime that is limited only to cases in which the conflict of interest (or potential 
conflict) exists—a certain amount of total campaign donations to the presiding judge in the case 
of this proposal—and can be exercised only by the disadvantaged side, or the side from whom 
the conflict does not stem.246 
As the empirical study in this Chapter shows, however, judges are unlikely to disclose 
campaign donation to the non-donor attorneys unless prompted to by a third-party 
intervention, so the attorneys may not know to make the challenge even if it is available. 
Additionally, even if the judges did disclose, the judge would likely realize why any subsequent 
peremptory challenges were made, re-introducing the behavioral structure that disincentivizes 
attorneys from asking for recusal. As a result, we also propose that the peremptory challenges be 
paired with mandatory non-judicial disclosure. The most feasible mechanism for this sort of 
disclosure would likely be the inclusion of attorney or party contributions in the initial court 
 
243 See Peter A. Galbraith, Disqualifying Federal District Judges Without Cause, 50 Wash. L. Rev. 109 
(1974); ALAN J. CHASET, DISQUALIFICATION OF FEDERAL JUDGES BY PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE (1981); Deborah 
Goldberg, James Sample, and David E. Pozen, The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal 
Reform, 46 WASHBURN L. J. 503 (2007). 
244 See Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1213, 
at 1251-56 (2002) (providing an exploration of the common objections to a peremptory challenge regime, 
specifically applied to the federal appellate court context). 
245  See, e.g., Michelle Quinn, “District Attorney’s Boycott of a Judge Raises Issues,” NY TIMES (March 
20,2010). 
246 If the subsequent judicial assignment also results in a donor conflict, the disadvantaged side can again 
ask for the judge to be removed. 
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documents. This system would naturally come with costs to the court administrative system, as 
it would need a database in order to identify potential conflict pairs.247 However, such 
information is, by law, publicly available and creating such a system should be well within the 
means of court administrations, something that we can attest to after independently identifying 
conflict cases using the Wisconsin and Texas courts’ own systems.  
An accurate court record of donors will ultimately rely on accurate and full disclosure of 
the campaign finance data by the judge, which brings with it some concerns and limitations. 
First, it is clear that most campaign finance disclosure laws are inadequate at identifying all of 
the financial relationships that are created by donations, as corporate contributions (including 
those made by law firms) and dark money do not produce clear connections between individuals 
and the candidates.248 Second, the administrative body will still need to rely on the judge, or at 
least the judge’s campaign committee, to be aware of and report all direct contributors. Judges 
have raised this concern as a reason against adopting both mandatory disclosure and per se 
recusal for campaign donations,249 arguing that the burden of actively knowing and being able to 
identify all donors is too onerous. However, because the system we propose puts the onus of 
disclosure in a given case on the court administration, it would only require an initial report by 
the judges, which is something they already do as part of the required election law in their state. 
B. Institutional Reform 
Many scholars and policy makers concerned with the potentially detrimental influence of 
campaign donations on judicial behavior have focused their efforts on culling conflicts at their 
genesis by reforming (or removing) judicial elections. The ongoing debates regarding the 
 
247 See Deborah Goldberg, James Sample, and David E. Pozen, The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts 
Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L. J. 503 at 527 (2007); Gabriel D. Serbulea, Due Process and 
Judicial Disqualification: The Need for Reform, 39 Pepperdine L. Rev. 1109, at 1145 (2011). 
248 See Abby K. Wood, Show Me the Money: ‘Dark Money’ and the Informational Benefit of Campaign 
Finance Disclosure, USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 17-23 (August 30, 2017); Abby K. Wood, Campaign 
Finance Disclosure, 14 Ann. Rev. L & Soc. Sci. _ (forthcoming 2018). 
249 See, e.g., Charles Geyh, et al., The State of Recusal Reform, 18 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 515 (2015). 
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respective virtues and vices of judicial elections and judicial appointments is rich and nuanced, 
and this Chapter does not provide theoretical or normative contributions on that front. We do 
stress, however, that elections as a method of judicial selection is a consistently popular 
phenomenon that is the result of institutional dynamics and public attitudes that are still at play 
in the current political milieu.250 As a practical matter, then, judicial elections are not going 
away any time soon and so an attempt to abolish them does not serve as a practically viable 
approach for addressing judicial conflicts—at least not in the short term. We instead consider 
more focused, incremental institutional solutions specifically addressing the problems 
stemming from judicial campaign finance.251 
One such approach is anonymized donations, where the identity of donors is blocked 
from the judge. The logic behind anonymization is straightforward: if judges are unable to know 
the identities of those who donated to their campaigns, they will be unable to favor (knowingly 
or unknowingly) those individuals in the courtroom. Understanding this to be the case, the 
public would no longer harbor the suspicion of quid pro quo courtroom relationships, and the 
threat to judicial legitimacy would be minimized. Anonymous donations would ideally render 
ex-post procedural solutions such as recusal largely unnecessary while still allowing the public—
particularly the legal community—to financially support individual judges. 
Many states currently have or have experimented with legal reform that is built on the 
premise of creating distance between judges and their donors. Most states with judicial 
elections, for example, restrict or ban direct solicitation by judicial candidates, including in-
 
250 See Debra Cassens Weiss, 55% of Potential Voters Support Judicial Elections for State Judges, ABA 
JOURNAL  (Oct. 21, 2008 5:08 PM), available at http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/55_of_ 
potential_voters_support_judicial_elections; Justice at Stake Campaign, Frequency Poll of American 
Voters (2001), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/JASNationalSurveyResults_ 
6F537F99272D4.pdf (finding that 54% of American favor selecting judges through popular elections over 
a system of merit selection). 
251 We agree in large part with Geyh, who believes that judicial appointments are most compatible with 
preserving an independent judiciary but argues that judicial elections are simply too popular and too 
beneficial to judicial legitimacy to be able to discard them (see Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Selection 
and the Search for Middle Ground, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 333 (2018)). 
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person requests and even personally signed letters.252 Judges in these systems are still able to 
raise money, but the actual exchanges can only occur between donors and designated non-
candidate representatives. Similarly, a few states have implemented publicly financed judicial 
campaigns, where judges are provided with set amounts of campaign funds provided by the 
state.253  
In practice, however, judges in these systems are still not fully insulated against the 
influence of donations. In states that prohibit direct solicitation, judges are generally still aware 
of who their financial supporters are and are usually able to directly communicate with donors 
about their contribution after the donation has been made.254 Furthermore, the states that have 
or have had public financing are more appropriately understood as public-private hybrids, 
where participation is either entirely optional—as in New Mexico—or judges running publicly 
funded campaigns are still allowed to raise some level of private donation. Nonetheless, these 
reforms are valuable in that they have shown that there is both a public appetite for such 
restrictions and, importantly, that the U.S. Supreme Court has been more deferential regarding 
state efforts to regulate judicial elections than similar efforts in the executive or legislative 
context.255 
 Following Ayres and Bulow,256 we suggest that for anonymization to work, the 
administrator accepting the donations should be independent of the judicial candidate or her 
 
252 Brief for the ABA as Amicus Curiae, p. 4, Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015) 
(claiming that 30 of the 39 states that elect judges have adopted restrictions on personal solicitation of 
campaign funds by judges). 
253  See American Bar Association Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, Public Financing of 
Judicial Campaigns: Report of the Commission on Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns (2002) 
(available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ 
judind/pdf/commissionreport4_03.authcheckdam.pdf). 
254 The ability for judges to send personalized thank you letters while being unable to personally solicit funds 
was an inconsistency discussed at length by the dissent in Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 
(2015). 
255 See Id. 
256 Ian Ayres and Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity to Disrupt the Market 
for Political Influence, 50 STANFORD L. REV. 837, at 870-75 (1988). See also Stuart Banner, Disqualifying 
Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign Contributors, 40 STANFORD L. REV. 449, at 474-76 (1988) 
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campaign committee, and the system should be mandatory for all candidates. Those authors 
posit that the ideal system would utilize blind trusts established by the candidates and operated 
by private trust companies, but we feel that trusts run by a centralized governmental body would 
be less complicated and equally sufficient. To help ensure anonymity, donors would be 
prohibited from discussing the donations with candidates, and the administrator would report 
only on net contributions, as opposed to individual donation amounts.  
 As with nearly all large-scale institutional reforms, this sort of system is not without 
limitations and drawbacks. If judges do not know who donated to their campaign, judicial 
contributions will probably go down in both frequency and amount. Although such a decrease 
would be illustrative of the fear that much of the money involved in judicial politics is spent with 
the express intention of signaling support to and garnering favor from judges, judicial 
candidates will naturally bemoan smaller war chests. Additionally, it would be naïve to believe 
that any system of anonymization would act as a total bar to information. Motivated donors—
potentially those that are most likely to engage in the sorts of quid pro quo relationships that are 
most concerning—will find ways to inform judges of their contribution257 or shift to less 
regulated forms of support. Additionally, any system that would credibly keep the identities of 
donors from judges would, by necessity, also keep that information from the public, reversing 
the move towards transparency that has motivated much of the recent campaign finance reform.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
This Chapter makes two principal claims regarding the recusal regime predominately 
used in U.S. courts: first, that judges will not be incentivized to recuse from cases in which they 
 
(reviewing efforts by the ABA and some states at shielding judges from donor information); Dimitry Bam, 
Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of Bias, 2011 B.Y.U L. REV. 943, at 986-88 
(2011). 
257 Ayres and Bulow argue that such communication would necessarily be “cheap talk” because without the 
ability to prove a donation was made, anyone could claim financial support, and the judges would not know 
whether any purported donor was telling the truth. See, Id at 855-56. 
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may be partial, and second, that attorneys will not be incentivized to ask them to recuse from 
these cases even if they are aware of the potential source of bias. The experimental evidence 
presented above is consistent with both claims. 
 It is clear from the data that judges almost never recuse from cases in which an attorney 
had donated to their political campaign. The rate of recusal within the 32 cases featured in the 
control group of the experiment as well as within the 210 non-experimental cases that feature 
these potential conflicts is just above five percent. Surprisingly, these rates did not increase (at 
least not in a significant amount) even when the judges were sent a somewhat obscure letter that 
identified the donation and asked the judge to recuse.258 Additionally, roughly half of the 
recusals that we did observe were purportedly done for reasons unrelated to the donation 
(relationships with the parties, generally).  
 If recusal procedures and rules are meant to lead judges to recuse in cases of with 
conflicts, the failure of judges to recuse from the cases in this study is strong evidence that the 
rules are not fulfilling their purpose. Many who have written on recusal have guessed that the 
current recusal regime does a poor job of removing judges from cases in which they might be 
biased, but it is unlikely that any except for the most skeptical would have expected such low 
levels of removal. If judges themselves are to be believed, we should expect recusal in roughly 
half the cases: over 40 percent of judges believe that campaign contributions influence their (or 
at least their colleagues’) decisions, and 60 percent of them support proposals that would make 
recusal mandatory in cases that feature parties who had financially supported the presiding 
judge’s campaign.259  
 
258 A more in-depth discussion of why the treatment letter had no discernable impact on judicial behavior 
in regard to recusals is included in a preceding, coauthored work. See Jonathan S. Krasno, Donald P. Green, 
Costas Panagopoulos, Michael Schwam-Baird, and Dane Thorley, Please Recuse Yourself: A Field 
Experiment Exploring the Relationship Between Campaign Donations and Judicial Recusal, working 
paper. 
259  Justice at Stake, State Judges Frequency Questionnaire (2002), available at 
http://www.justiceatstake.org /media/cms/JASJudgesSurveyResults_EA8838C0504A5.pdf. 
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The data also show that attorneys do not ask judges to recuse, even when they are aware 
of the donation(s) from the other attorney. Increased disclosure is one of the most common 
procedural solution suggested by both skeptics and supporters of the current recusal regime, but 
attorneys in the study were no more likely to request recusal when the judge in induced to 
disclose by the experimental treatment. This does not mean that disclosure does nothing to 
remedy judicial bias—judges who disclose may engage in higher levels of de-biasing and 
attorneys may be more likely to appeal the outcomes of cases in which they know the judge may 
have been biased—but it does indicate that increasing disclosure is not enough to lead to more 
requests for recusals, at least due to potential bias stemming from campaign contributions.260 
These results should be understood in the context of the study, which involved trial-level 
judges and campaign donations, but are still strong evidence that the current recusal regime 
employed in the United States relies on faulty assumptions regarding judicial and attorney 
behavior and needs reform. The tailored procedural solution we have proposed more fully 
accounts for the often-perverse incentives at play in making recusal determinations and should 
therefore result in more impartial judging and increase the public’s sense of judicial legitimacy. 
Alternatively, we might consider addressing conflicts at their genesis through institutional 
reform such as anonymized donations, although such an approach is practically difficult and 
may not be politically tenable. 
More broadly, this Chapter highlights the importance of accounting for the non-legal 
factors that go into adjudicative decision-making when crafting rules and procedure. It also 
demonstrates the value that randomized field experiments—an empirical methodology often 
thought to be unfeasible in the court context—can provide to the analysis of procedure and 
policy.
 
260  It is possible that attorneys do not believe that judges should recuse simply because of campaign 
contributions. Alternatively, they may have already known about the donation. In both cases, disclosure 
would have no effect on their propensity for requesting recusal for reasons unrelated to the reasons we 
outline in this Chapter. 
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I. Introduction 
In his 2010 article titled Randomness Reconsidered: Modeling Random Judicial 
Assignment in the U.S. Courts of Appeals,1 Matthew Hall challenged the long-standing 
assumption that judges in the U.S. Federal Courts of Appeals were randomly assigned to their 
cases.2 Specifically, Hall argued that earlier research claiming to identify a strong causal 
relationship between the ideologies of judges and the tenor of their decisions3 was systematically 
flawed because the investigators had assumed that all cases were assigned to circuit panels on a 
random basis. After demonstrating this assumption to be erroneous and accounting for the 
courts’ actual assignment procedures (some of which were, if fact, random), Hall found that the 
researchers had identified ideological effects where none existed and failed to identify effects for 
circumstances in which ideology did indeed make a difference. 
The mistakes highlighted by Hall are not uncommon in the courts and judicial behavior 
literature. An increasingly large number of empirical articles have utilized random assignment 
of judges to make causal claims regarding an array of legal, political, and economic outcomes. 
These studies, many of which are reviewed below, rely on the fact (or often the assumption) that 
the judges in their samples are assigned to cases on a truly random basis. This is because 
random assignment allows researchers to overcome the most important and difficult hurdle 
associated with causal identification—controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Despite the 
essential role that random case assignment plays in such studies, however, researchers often fail 
to delve into the specific mechanics of a court system’s assignment process, choosing instead to 
 
1 Matthew Hall, Randomness Reconsidered: Modeling Random Judicial Assignment in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 7 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 574 (2010). 
2 The assumption of random assignment is so embedded in legal research that the “random assignment of 
federal appellate judges to panels has become a ‘hallmark’ of the system.” Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. 
Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 216 (1999). 
3  Cass R. Sunstein, Lisa Michelle Ellman, & David Schkade, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of 
Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004). 
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rely on the assumptions of previous studies or the simple assurances of court officials.4 In 
reality, however, verifying random assignment and using the resulting data to make causal 
claims is often a complicated process and should mirror the multi-step analysis conducted in 
researcher-driven randomized studies such as field experiments. 
This Chapter adds to the growing body of methodological literature exploring the use of 
random judicial assignment by identifying a set of common assignment procedures that I call 
“de-randomizing” events.5 These events, which include non-random assignment itself, must be 
accounted for in order to make unbiased causal claims but are commonly either ignored or not 
even recognized by researchers relying on random judicial assignment. In classifying and 
illustrating these events, I also highlight the increasing need for legal empiricists to develop 
field-specific methods that integrate robust statistical techniques with the specialized procedural 
and doctrinal knowledge required to adequately study the law.6 
 
4 This is not to suggest that courts are being misleading (although some are—see infra note 100). Rather, 
the colloquial use of “random” is not equivalent to the statistical definition. See infra Subpart III.A.1 for a 
more in-depth discussion of this confusion. 
5 In addition to the Hall 2010 piece (supra note 1), see J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral 
Assignment of Judges at the Court of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037 (2000); and Burton M. Atkins & 
William Zavoina, Judicial Leadership on the Court of Appeals: A Probability Analysis of Panel Assignment 
in Race Relations Cases on the Fifth Circuit, 18 AM. J. POL. SCI. 701 (1974).  
Two recent articles also explore the panel composition procedures (as opposed to the case assignment 
procedures) in U.S. Circuit Courts in detail. See Adam S. Chilton & Marin K. Levy, Challenging the 
Randomness of Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeal, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2015); and Marin 
K. Levy, Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeal, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 65 (2017). 
It is also worth noting that the popular press has expressed concerns regarding the non-randomness of 
panel composition and case assignment in the federal courts, although for non-methodological reasons. See 
Joe Palazzolo, The Problem With Not-so-random Case Assignment, WALL ST. J., November 4, 2014; 
Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Federal Court Alters Rules on Judge Assignments, N.Y. Times, 
December 23, 2013; and Alison Frankel, Chief Judge: Rakoff Assignment to Citi Case Was “Totally 
Random”, REUTERS, November 30, 2011.  
6 I agree with Epstein and King’s proclamation that “the law is important enough to have a subfield devoted 
to methodological concerns, as does almost every other discipline that conducts empirical studies.” Lee 
Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11 (2002). They go on to say that 
“[u]nfortunately, the complete list of all law review articles devoted to improving understanding explicating 
or adapting the rules of inference is as follows: none.” Id. While this is certainly not quite as true anymore, 
the underlying sentiment is still reflective of the field. 
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Additionally, I attempt to fill in what others have noted7 to be a dearth of information on 
the assignment protocols of courts other than the U.S. Courts of Appeals by presenting original 
data from a survey of the 30 largest state-level criminal courts in the United States, outlining 
their assignment protocols, and identifying the extent to which they feature the “de-
randomizing” events highlighted in this Chapter. 
 This Chapter proceeds in four parts. In Part II, I review the basic criteria required for 
unbiased causal inference, explain the empirical advantages of random assignment, and provide 
a short review of the literature that has utilized random assignment of judges. In Part III, I 
discuss the various “de-randomizing” events that researchers should account for in order to 
make unbiased causal inferences and provide solutions—where they exist—for those events. In 
Part IV, I present original data from a survey of state-level criminal justice systems on the 
judicial assignment procedures used in their courts. I briefly conclude in Part V. 
 
II. Random Assignment and Causal Inference 
Over the last decade, the volume of legal scholarship utilizing random assignment has 
grown rapidly.8 Researchers have randomly made offers of legal representation,9 randomly 
 
7 See Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 47 (2009). 
8  While still not predominantly featured in law reviews—due in part to their quantitative nature—the 
number of articles featuring randomized experiments or naturally occurring randomizations that have 
appeared in top law journals have dramatically increased in recent years. See Figure 1 in Donald P. Green 
& Dane R. Thorley, Field Experimentation and the Study of Law and Policy, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 53, 
56 (2014). 
9 See Carroll Seron, Greg Van Ryzin, Martin Frankel, & Jean Kovath, The Impact of Legal Counsel on 
Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 
L. & SOC’Y REV. 419 (2001) (in which the authors randomly offered legal assistance to individuals involved 
in property disputes); D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal 
Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L. J. 2118 
(2012) (in which the authors randomly offered legal assistance to individuals seeking unemployment 
benefits); and D. James Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, & Jonathan Hennessy, The Limits of 
Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for 
the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901 (2013) (in which the authors randomly offered legal assistance to 
individuals involved in landlord-tenant disputes).  
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manipulated jury instructions,10 and of particular relevance to this Chapter, taken advantage of 
court systems that randomly assign judges to cases. By their nature, these studies are often 
expensive, logistically complicated, and require particular circumstances under which 
randomization is feasible and the resulting data are available.11 Why then, despite these 
difficulties and the relatively abundant availability of non-randomized data, have we seen this 
increase in the use of randomization in empirical legal studies? The answer lies in 
randomization’s ability to provide researchers with unbiased estimates of causal effects by 
mitigating what is arguably the most intractable obstacle associated with causal identification: 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. 
In this Part, I outline the problem of unobserved heterogeneity and explain how random 
assignment helps researchers overcome it. In doing so, I rely on Imbens and Rubin’s potential 
outcomes framework and accompanying notation.12 While these concepts will undoubtedly be 
familiar to many and, conversely, daunting to others, an increased understanding of the 
fundamentals of causal inference will be valuable to all who are interested in working with 
randomized data. Furthermore, the intuition and notation featured in this Part form the basis 
for exploring the “de-randomizing” events that I discuss in Part III. 
A. Unobserved Heterogeneity as a Barrier to Causal Inference 
  Most causal questions can be simplified down to a relationship (or set of relationships) 
between three elements: the causal factor or treatment, which is commonly referenced using 
“X”; an outcome of interest, “Y”; and the unit or subject being studied. As an example of a causal 
question that researchers studying courts might be interested in (an example we will return to 
 
10 See Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment with Written and 
Preliminary Instructions, 13 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 409 (1989). 
11 See ALAN S. GERBER & DONALD P. GREEN, FIELD EXPERIMENTS: DESIGN, ANALYSIS, AND INTERPRETATION 13-
15 (2012). 
12 See Donald B. Rubin, Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized and Nonrandomized 
Studies, 6 J. EDU. PSY. 688 (1974). See also Chapters 1 and 2 in GUIDO W. IMBENS & DONALD B. RUBIN, CAUSAL 
INFERENCE FOR STATISTICS, SOCIAL, AND BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES: AN INTRODUCTION (2015). 
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frequently in this Chapter), let us suppose that we want to know the impact of a criminal case 
(our subject) being assigned to either a female or male judge (our X) on the length of 
defendant’s sentence (our Y).13 As a first step in answering this question, we might gather data 
on cases—including outcomes in regard to the length of final sentences—and compare the cases 
in which the presiding judge was female to those in which the judge was male. As it turns out (in 
our hypothetical study), female judges tend to impose longer sentences than male judges. 
Should we then conclude that being assigned to a female judge results in longer criminal 
sentences?  
Many will object to this basic analysis, correctly observing that the cases assigned to 
female judges might be systematically different than the cases assigned to male judges in a 
number of important ways apart from the gender of the judge. For example, female judges in 
our hypothetical court system might be more likely to preside over sexual assault cases, which 
generally feature longer average sentences than other types of cases. Or maybe male judges tend 
to preside over geographical areas that contain wealthier residents, so defendants in their 
courtrooms will have higher quality attorneys and, consequently, shorter sentences. 
These both seem like plausible concerns, so we might attempt to account for these 
confounding relationships by “controlling” for them in our statistical analysis.14 After doing so, 
our original results stand: female judges seem to be more punitive than male judges. But what if 
it turns out that the court clerk, who is in charge of case assignment, tends to give the “toughest” 
cases to the more experienced judges, who happen to be female. Might we believe that case 
complexity has any relationship to final verdict? Probably. So we also control for case 
 
13 The role of a judge’s gender in case outcomes has been explored in a number of studies. See, e.g., Christina 
L. Boyd, Lee Epstein, & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 52 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 389 (2010); and Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in 
the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L. J. 1759 (2005). 
14 In observational (non-randomized) studies, researchers control for confounding variables by holding 
them constant when calculating the statistical association between “X” and “Y.” 
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complexity, and our subsequent results indicate that defendants still receive more lenient 
sentences under male judges.  
Have we identified the causal impact of being assigned a male judge? Maybe, but we 
cannot be sure. Despite our repeated attempts at controlling for possible sources of 
heterogeneity between judges such as case type, jurisdiction, and experience, there might be 
some other factor driving the relationship between our X and our Y that we have not considered. 
Guilty defendants may, for example, be more likely to make peremptory challenges or requests 
for judicial transfer when assigned to male judges, or maybe female judges are assigned to hear 
cases right before lunchtime and are therefore, more prone to foul moods during sentencing 
proceedings.15 Ultimately, the relationship between the gender of the judge and the length of a 
criminal sentence is deceptively complex, and controlling for all the factors in that relationship 
through post-hoc analysis is extremely difficult, if not impossible.  
The issue we keep running into is the result of two significant barriers to causal 
identification: First, the laws of nature prevent us from comparing a given case assigned to a 
male judge against that same exact case assigned to a female judge. This inherent limitation, 
titled the “fundamental problem of causal inference” by Paul Holland, intuitively posits that you 
can never simultaneously observe the effect of more than one treatment on the same subject and 
therefore, cannot ever truly identify the causal impact of a given factor.16 
In the process of doing our best to overcome the fundamental problem of causal 
inference in the discussion above, we attempted to construct two similarly balanced comparison 
groups and subsequently encountered the second crucial barrier to unbiased causal inference: 
 
15 As a good example of the problems this Chapter is attempting to highlight, the “lunch effect” that was 
identified in a 2011 paper (Shai Danzinger, Jonathan Levav, & Liora Avnaim-Pesso, Extraneous Factors in 
Judicial Decisions, 108 PNAS 6889 (2011)) has subsequently been criticized—by the court system that the 
original study evaluated—for assuming random assignment when the order of case assignment was largely 
determined by whether the prisoner was represented by an attorney. Karen Weinshall-Margel & John 
Shapard, Overlooked Factors in the Analysis of Parole Decisions, 108 PNAS (Letter) E883 (2011). 
16 Paul W. Holland, Statistics & Causal Inference, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N. 945 (1986). 
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unobserved heterogeneity. Try as we might, it is extremely difficult to create artificial 
comparison groups by controlling for variables that we believe might be interfering with our 𝑋-
causes-𝑌 inference. Even more difficult—likely impossibly difficult—is knowing whether we have 
identified all of the confounding variables influencing the outcomes in our cases. Causal 
relationships, even those with which we are familiar, are deviously complex, making it difficult 
for us to be confident in statistical methods that rely on the assumption that all the important 
variables have been correctly modeled. 
B. Random Assignment as a Solution to Unobserved Heterogeneity 
 How does random assignment help us overcome these two key problems? Clearly it does 
not solve the fundamental problem of causal inference (we still observe only one outcome for 
each case), but it does allow us to remedy the problem of unobserved heterogeneity by creating 
comparison groups that, in expectation, are statistically indistinguishable from each other in 
every way, even those ways that we are not aware of or able to observe. 
 In every cause and effect relationship, we can identify a treatment and at least one 
outcome.17 Let us use the indicator “𝑑𝑖” to designate the type of treatment that an individual is 
assigned to, where the subscript “𝑖” symbolizes any given individual in the study sample. At this 
point, the treatment mechanism can be random assignment or some natural, non-random 
assignment process. 𝑑𝑖 will take on a value of 1 if subject 𝑖 is treated and 0 if that subject is not 
treated. Continuing with the example used above—the effect of being assigned a male judge on 
sentencing lengths—𝑑𝑖 would equal 1 if the assigned judge is male and 0 if the judge is female.18  
 
17 For the sake of simplicity, this Chapter will generally use “treatment” to refer to one of the possible 
assignment groups, and “control” to refer to the other assignment group even though many research 
questions do not technically have a “control” group. 
18 Considering gender is generally a fixed characteristic, it may be odd to think of it as a “treatment.” 
However, the gender of the judge that is assigned to a given case can vary because the judicial assignment 
itself can vary. Also note that this hypothetical research question only gets to the effect of being assigned a 
male judge, which is not necessarily equivalent to the effect of the judge being male (male judges may have 
specific characteristics that are correlated only with gender as opposed to being caused by gender). 
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Now imagine that instead of outcomes being denoted simply using “𝑌”, every individual 
in the dataset has two potential outcomes, 𝑌𝑖(𝑑𝑖 = 1) and 𝑌𝑖(𝑑𝑖 = 0), where 𝑌𝑖(𝑑𝑖 = 1), or 𝑌𝑖(1) 
for the sake of simplicity, represents the outcome if an individual is treated (e.g. the length of 
sentence if an individual is assigned to a male judge) and 𝑌𝑖(0) represents the outcome if an 
individual is not treated. If it seems counterintuitive for an individual to have two outcomes, 
remember that these are potential outcomes, meaning that neither outcome has been realized. 
We cannot observe both potential outcomes at the same time, but if we could, it would follow 
that the difference between them, 𝑌𝑖(1) – 𝑌𝑖(0), would equal the treatment effect of being 
assigned a male judge (relative to a female judge) on the final verdict or outcome for individual i.  
Applying this principle to all the individual cases in the dataset, we can define the 
average or expected treated potential outcome for the entire sample as 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1)] (where 𝐸[−] is 
the expected value) and the expected untreated potential outcome as 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(0)]. Taking the 
difference between these two values, 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1)] − 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(0)], gives us the average treatment effect, or 
ATE, of the entire sample of cases. However, since we cannot observe both potential outcomes 
for any of the individuals, the best we can do is take the average outcomes for those cases that 
we observe in the treatment group and compare them to the average outcomes for those we 
observe in the control group: 
𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1)|𝑑𝑖 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(0)|𝑑𝑖 = 0] =  ATÊ.19 
As we discussed above, however, this estimator of the ATÊ is likely biased because the 
two expected values are probably different in some important way other than the treatment 
condition because the mechanism through which an individual is assigned a treatment 
condition, 𝑑𝑖, may be related to some confounding variable (observed and/or unobserved, we 
cannot know for sure). We did not see how and why a given 𝑖 received a 𝑑𝑖 = 1 or 𝑑𝑖 = 0, so 
 
19 ATÊ, or ATE-hat, is shorthand for the estimate of the ATE. 
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encountering the problem of unobserved heterogeneity is inevitable, thus preventing us from 
trusting the resulting estimate of the ATE. 
 Random assignment of treatment conditions overcomes unobserved heterogeneity by 
assigning individuals to treatment groups independent of any other factor. In other words, the 
treatment condition to which an individual is assigned is not related to type of crime, seniority 
of judge, or any other possibly important pre-treatment characteristic, including the ones we do 
not know about or are unable to measure. Importantly, this also means that an individual’s 𝑑𝑖 is 
assigned independently of an individual’s potential outcomes, so even though we cannot observe 
each group’s full set of potential outcomes, we know that, in expectation, the potential outcomes 
for each comparison group will be identical. Therefore, the expected 𝑌𝑖(1)’s for those assigned to 
the treatment group, 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1)|𝑑𝑖 = 1], will be identical to the expected 𝑌𝑖(1)’s for those in the 
control group, had they been assigned to the treatment group, 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1)|𝑑𝑖 = 0]. The same is true 
of each group’s expected 𝑌𝑖(0)’s, enabling us to identify an accurate measure of the overall 
expected value of both potential outcomes without actually observing both outcomes for a given 
individual: 
       𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1)|𝑑𝑖 = 1] = 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1)|𝑑𝑖 = 0] = 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1)] and 
𝐸[𝑌𝑖(0)|𝑑𝑖 = 1] = 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(0)|𝑑𝑖 = 0] = 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(0)].. 
This, in turn, allows us to take the difference between the actual outcomes for the two treatment 
groups and calculate an unbiased estimate of the ATE: 
𝐸[𝑌(1)] − 𝐸[𝑌(0)] =  𝐸[𝑌(1) − 𝑌(0)] = ATÊ. 
 When the assignment to treatment groups is truly random, the resulting ATÊ is an 
unbiased estimate of the effect of the treatment on the outcome of interest, overcoming the 
potential bias created by unobserved heterogeneity and circumventing the restrictions 
highlighted by the fundamental problem of causal inference. When properly utilized by 
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researchers,20 either as an implemented strategy or, in the case of randomly assigned judges, as 
an existing attribute of pre-existing, observational data, random assignment allows researchers 
to answer important causal questions in a reliable manner. 
C. How Researchers Have Utilized Random Assignment of Judges 
Realizing the potential of random assignment to answer important causal questions, 
scientists have long seen randomized experiments as the gold standard in research design. 
While research harnessing random assignment is not as common in legal studies (including law-
oriented political science and economics) as it is in the “hard” sciences or even the social 
sciences generally,21 randomization’s use as a tool for studying legal questions has seen marked 
growth in the last decade.22 Studies utilizing the random assignment of judges are no exception 
to this trend. The researchers authoring these pieces have addressed a range of interesting and 
important topics, and while many them do not address the methodological concerns highlighted 
in this Chapter, their analyses nonetheless provide us with valuable examples of what can be 
accomplished.  
Not surprisingly, a large number of these researchers are interested in exploring the role 
of a judge’s gender, race, and ethnicity in their legal decisions.23 In Abrams et al.’s substantial 
 
20 There are a number of additional and important assumptions that are required when utilizing random 
assignment that are not discussed in this Chapter, including excludability (often called the exclusion 
restriction) and non-interference (often called the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption, or SUTVA). 
For an in-depth analysis of why these assumptions are required and how they should be addressed, see 
IMBENS & RUBIN, supra note 12; and GERBER & GREEN, supra note 11. 
21 For a review of the growth of randomized experiments in political science, see James N. Druckman, 
Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, & Arthur Lupia, Experimentation in Political Science in CAMBRIDGE 
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL POLITICAL SCIENCE 3-14 (James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. 
Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia, eds., 2010). For the same in economics, see Steven D. Levitt & John A. List, 
Field Experiments in Economics: The Past, Present, and Future, 53 EURO. ECON. REV. 1 (2009). 
22 See Figure 1 in Green & Thorley, supra note 8. 
23 It is important to note that the appropriate estimand (that which is estimated) in these studies is the effect 
of being assigned a judge with a particular characteristic (race/gender/ideology) as opposed to the effect of 
that characteristic. Each judge has a bundle of characteristics, and without randomly assigning those 
individual characteristics (unfeasible for race, gender, and ideology), we are unable to identify the source 
of a causal effect. By randomly assigning the judge, however, we are able to identify the causal impact of 
assignment to a judge with a particular characteristic.  
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analysis of the Cook County (Chicago) Criminal Court, the authors provide evidence of 
significant racial disparities in the rates that black and white judges incarcerate black and white 
defendants, although these disparities disappear in regard to the sentence lengths that 
incarcerated defendants receive.24 Similarly, Gazal-Ayal and Sulitzeanu-Kenan find that Arab 
and Jewish judges in Israeli bail hearings hand down more lenient detention decisions to 
defendants in their ethnic in-group.25 Gender also appears to be an important factor in judicial 
decision-making. Eisenberg et al.’s 2012 study on Israeli courts finds that female judges are as 
much as 15% more likely to cast a judicial vote in favor of defendants.26 More recent research 
indicates the influence of gender may extend beyond just the decision in a given case. Farhang et 
al. utilize random panel assignment in the U.S. Courts of Appeals to show that female-majority 
panels are more likely to write opinions in sexual harassment cases, thereby being more likely to 
have substantial influence on the overall jurisprudence in that area.27  
Studies have also looked at the causal effects of being assigned to a judge with a 
particular political ideology or set of beliefs. Focusing almost exclusively on U.S. federal 
courts,28 authors have compared the impact of being assigned to conservative and liberal judges 
(generally defined using the political party of the president who appointed them) on an array of 
judicial outcomes. The results have been mixed.29 Beim and Kastellec test the effect of the 
 
24 David S. Abrams, Marianne Bertrand, & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Judges Vary In Their Treatment of 
Race?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 347 (2012). 
25  Oren Gazal-Ayal & Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan, Let My People Go: Ethnic In-group Bias in Judicial 
Decisions—Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment, 7 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 403 (2010). 
26  Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher, & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Does the Judge Matter? Exploiting Random 
Assignment on a Court of Last Resort to Assess Judge and Case Selection Effects, 9 J. OF EMP. LEGAL STUD. 
246 (2012). 
27 Sean Farhang, Jonathan P. Kastellec, & Gregory J. Wawro, The Politics of Opinion Assignment and 
Authorship on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Evidence from Sexual Harassment Cases, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 59 
(2015). 
28 As I discuss at the end of this Part, there are a number of explanations for the exclusive focus on federal 
courts of appeals, but the research focused on identifying the impact of ideology on judicial decision-making 
can—and, in fact, should—be expanded to state-level court systems. 
29 This may be due to a difference in outcome measures but is also possibly due to similar mistakes that Hall 
addressed in his 2010 article (see supra note 1) and that I am highlighting in this Chapter. 
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ideological composition of three-judge panels in the U.S. Courts of Appeals on decisions 
regarding death penalty and find that the ideologies of the judges has a significant impact on the 
outcome of the case.30 Going further, they also show that ideological composition partially 
determines the propensity for dissent, which, as a result, affects the likelihood that a case will be 
heard en banc. Likewise, Niblett and Yoon’s study on U.S. Courts of Appeals suggests that 
ideology has a significant relationship with the way in which legal precedent is used.31 For a 
number of case types, conservative panels are much more likely to cite conservative precedent 
and overturn liberal precedent, with the opposite being true for liberal panels. Conversely, 
Ashenfelter et al. find no ideological effect on case outcomes,32 and, as was mentioned at the 
beginning of this Chapter, Hall’s research has suggested that the effect of ideological 
composition depends on the particular court and the content of the case.33 
Researchers have also discovered ways to combine the benefits of randomly assigned 
judges with other empirical methods to expand the realm of issues that can be explored. For 
example, a number of recent studies have used instrumental variable design34 to identify the 
downstream impacts that incarceration has on the lives of criminal defendants and their 
families. While it would be impractical—not to mention possibly unethical35—to intentionally 
randomize the amount of time that an individual spends in jail, these researchers have taken 
 
30  Deborah Beim & Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Interplay of Ideological Diversity, Dissents, and 
Discretionary Review in the Judicial Hierarchy: Evidence from Death Penalty Cases, 76 J. POL. 1074 
(2014).  
31 Anthony Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, Friendly Precedent, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789 (2016). 
32 Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg, & Stuart J. Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of 
Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1995). 
33 Hall, supra note 1. 
34 For a more in-depth explanation of how these models can be used to identify downstream effects, see 
Chapter 6 in GERBER & GREEN, supra note 11. 
35 While it may initially seem unethical to randomly assign something as serious as sentence lengths, many 
(including the author of this Chapter) argue that laws and legal procedures are no more immune to 
randomization than medical treatments and pharmaceuticals. For a particularly sophisticated discussion 
of this topic, see, e.g., Michael Abramowitz, Ian Ayres, & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 929 (2011). 
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advantage of the natural disparities in punitiveness that exists between judges36 combined with 
the random assignment of those judges to find an unbiased estimate of the effects of 
incarceration on a number of important outcomes. Green and Winik find that increased time 
spent in jail has no distinguishable impact on the likelihood that an individual will recidivate,37 
although a similar study by Loeffler comes to the opposite result.38 That same study by Loeffler 
also suggests that increased prison time leads to higher post-sentence unemployment, a finding 
that is supported by Kling’s 2006 study on the same topic.39 These approaches have recently 
been expanded upon to measure the impact that incarceration has on juvenile offenders40 and 
the broader labor market and economy.41 A group of recent papers have similarly used random 
or as-if random judicial assignment as an instrument for the assignment of bail and pretrial 
detainment in criminal cases, providing novel empirical estimations for the effect of detainment 
on recidivism, case outcomes, and future employment.42 
 
36 While identifying inter-judge disparity is not necessarily a causal question, it is a question that can only 
reliably be answered by analyzing a system with random assignment because otherwise, difference between 
judges may be the result of unobserved heterogeneity resulting from the assignment process. See James M. 
Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling, & Kate Stith, Measuring Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity Before and After 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J. L. & ECON. 271, (1999). 
37  Donald P. Green & Daniel Winik, Using Random Judge Assignments to Estimate the Effects of 
Incarceration and Probation on Recidivism Among Drug Offenders, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 357 (2010). 
38 Charles E. Loeffler, Does Imprisonment Alter the Life Course? Evidence on Crime and Unemployment 
from a Natural Experiment, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 137 (2013). 
39 Jeffrey R. Kling, Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 863 (2006). 
40 See Anna Aizer & Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Juvenile Incarceration, Human Capital and Future Crime: 
Evidence from Randomly-Assigned Judges, 130 Q. J. ECON. 759 (2015). 
41 See Michael Mueller-Smith, The Criminal and Labor Market Impacts of Incarceration, Working Paper 
(2015) (which also identifies the individual impact of incarceration on recidivism, future employment, and 
the likelihood of marriage). 
42 Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman, & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from 
Judge Randomization, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 471 (2016); Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended Impact 
of Pretrial Detention on Case Outcomes: Evidence from New York City Arraignments, 60 J. L. & ECON. 
529 (2017); Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin, & Crystal S. Yang, The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, 
Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201 
(2018); and Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes, 
34 J. L. Econ. & Org. 511 (2018). 
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In a particularly novel utilization of this methodology, Dahl et al. conducted a study that 
uses random judicial assignment to gauge the existence and extent of “welfare cultures,” or the 
propensity for a parent’s participation in welfare programs to increase the likelihood that 
children will do so as well.43 Because applicants for Norwegian disability insurance appeal their 
decisions to judges who are randomly assigned, Dahl et al. were able to show that parental 
participation in welfare leads to a 6-12 percentage point increase in the probability that children 
will also be participants as adults. Leibovitch also provided a fresh example of this 
methodological approach by exploiting random assignment to identify the impact that the cases 
a judge presides over early in her career has on her future decisions, finding that judges who are 
initially exposed to less serious criminal cases are more punitive later in their careers.44  
While these studies provide an illustration of the diversity of issues that can be 
investigated using randomly assigned judges, the methodological strategy is relatively young 
and is almost certainly underutilized by researchers interested in making causal inferences in 
the court context. It is notable, for example, that nearly half of the articles listed above take 
place in the context of the U.S. Federal Courts of Appeals—a court venue that features only a 
small percentage of all the legal cases in the United States.45 Going forward, researchers are sure 
to find more ways to utilize its benefits, although the extent to which these studies will 
accurately inform our understandings of law, policy, and economics will be largely dependent on 
whether researchers understand and account for the large number of ways in which a seemingly 
random assignment protocol is, in fact, not random.  
 
 
43 Gordon B. Dahl, Andreas Ravndal, & Magne Mogstad, Family Welfare Cultures, Q. J. ECON. 1 (2014). 
44 Adi Leibovitch, Relative Judgments, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 281 (2016). 
45 There are a number of possible reasons for this imbalance: Empirical legal scholars, especially political 
scientists, tend to be more substantively interested in the federal courts of appeals than with federal district 
courts and state courts. Additionally, and of particular relevance to this Chapter, researchers may perceive 
state and district courts as less procedurally amenable to the assumptions required to utilize random 
judicial assignment. 
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III. “De-Randomizing” Events in Judicial Assignment Procedure 
 The articles reviewed above make the same assumption regarding the assignment of 
judges in their datasets—that it was random, ostensibly allowing researchers to overcome the 
problem of unobserved heterogeneity. It is not clear, however, that all of them investigated the 
assignment procedures closely enough to warrant such conclusions. Over the life of a case, the 
process involved in determining who will be the presiding judicial authority is deceptively 
nuanced. Some of this nuance is not problematic in regard to making unbiased causal claims, 
but much of it is a threat to random assignment and must therefore be accounted for in order to 
determine whether a dataset can yield reliable estimates of treatment effects. 
 Although studies utilizing random judicial assignment are relying on the same basic 
estimation strategy as researcher-driven randomized studies such as field and lab experiments, 
they often do not meet (or at least demonstrate or discuss) the same basic assumptions that any 
researcher-driven experiment would be expected to address. A methodological review of any 
formal experiment would, for example, look for instances of assignment error, non-compliance 
to treatment conditions, stable unit treatment value violations (i.e. spillover), and attrition. 
Researchers should assume that naturally-occurring randomization is just a messy as 
researcher-driven experimentation. In fact, given that the randomization schemes used in courts 
are generally not designed to facilitate empirical studies but instead to equitably assign cases 
and avoid the appearance of impropriety, it is reasonable to expect even more systematic threats 
to inference. 
 Conversely (and more positively), properly understanding the interaction between court 
procedure and causal identification will open the door to studying venues and substantive topics 
that would otherwise be overlooked. As researchers in law, economics, political science, and 
other related fields begin to exploit the advantages of random judicial assignment with greater 
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frequency, some may conclude—generally through statistical balance tests46—that datasets are 
seemingly non-random and therefore unusable when they are actually ripe for meaningful 
empirical analysis. As I explain below, however, many of the non-random elements in and 
otherwise random judicial assignment scheme can be accounted for in ways that allow unbiased 
causal inference. 
 In this Part, I explore the various ways in which a jurisdiction’s assignment procedure 
may violate the assumption of random assignment by outlining four key “de-randomizing” 
events:47 1) the initial assignment procedure, 2) differing probability of assignment, 3) post-
assignment judicial changes, and 4) missing outcomes. While each of these general events 
should be familiar to those versed in experimental analysis, diagnosing the specific 
manifestations of them in the judicial assignment context requires a solid understanding of 
assignment procedure. I begin each subpart with an explanation of the threat the event poses to 
unbiased causal inference, after which I provide examples of the most common ways in which 
these events occur within judicial assignment procedure and outline how they might be 
addressed. I also provide a brief overview of how researchers can verify that they have accurately 
modeled these events using quantitative and qualitative tests. 
While these events are explicated in the context of trial courts, they are generally 
applicable to appellate level assignment procedures as well. It should also be noted that this list 
of events should serve only as a starting point for researchers and readers working with random 





46 See infra Subpart III.E for a detailed discussion of these tests and their limitations. 
47 It does not appear that “de-randomizing” is a term of art in any discipline. However, it is a helpful term 
for encompassing all of the events that are potential threats to the benefits provided by random judicial 
assignment. 
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A. The Initial Assignment Procedure 
The Problem: The first and most obvious way in which a court’s assignment procedure 
might introduce bias is if the basic assignment procedure is not random. The idea that the 
utilization of randomly assigned judges requires random assignment may seem tautological, but 
the distinctions between random and “not-quite-random” procedure are not always clear. 
Additionally, even in a system that normally assigns judges to cases in a truly random way, 
institutionalized exceptions may introduce significant levels of bias by essentially “de-
randomizing” a portion of the available cases. In this Subpart I categorize three types of judicial 
assignment procedures, discuss their usability as mechanisms for making unbiased causal 
inferences, and highlight three common non-random exceptions to the regular (often random) 
assignment process: case specialization, administrative discretion, and assignment based on a 
party’s previous interaction with the court.  
i. Different Types of Judicial Assignment: The procedures through which courts assign 
cases to judges can be broadly categorized into three varieties: random assignment, in which 
assignment is done according to a statistically random process; as-if random assignment, in 
which assignment is not done randomly but is done in a way that, under a number of 
assumptions, can still allow for unbiased causal identification; and non-random assignment, in 
which cases are assigned in a way that prevents researchers from estimating unbiased treatment 
effects. Understanding the differences between these three categories is vital, although 
recognizing them is often problematic; many court systems have a mixed set of procedures (part 
random and part non-random), and court administrators may even state that the procedures 
they use are random, when they are in fact as-if random or even completely non-random.48 
 
48 This occurred a large number of times over the course of the court survey I discuss in Part IV, infra. Upon 
asking them to describe the basic assignment procedures used in their court, administrators (judges, clerks, 
etc.) would often respond by telling me that judges were assigned to cases on a “random basis,” or by 
“completely random selection.” After asking a number of follow up questions, however, it became clear that 
what they meant by “random” would more accurately be described as “arbitrary.” Cases were not, for 
example, assigned by a random-number generator or by pulling names out of a hat (both viable random  
  114  
 
 Statistically random judicial assignment can be defined as an assignment procedure in 
which cases are allocated independently of any value, characteristic, or variable other than an 
exogenous assignment mechanism. Using the potential outcome notation presented above, this 
means that a case’s treatment category (𝑑𝑖 = 1 or 𝑑𝑖 = 0) should be completely unrelated to any 
of that case’s pre-treatment characteristics such as case type, complexity, or the types of 
individuals involved in the case. The specific assignment mechanism used by a court can be any 
process under which the probability of assignment is known by the court (or the researcher) and 
is greater than 0 and less than 1 (meaning that any given case has at least some chance of being 
assigned to each treatment category). Such assignment mechanisms are most commonly 
computer-generated random numbers but may be as rudimentary as sequentially drawing 
judges’ names from an envelope (the method for assigning homicide cases in the Nassau County 
Criminal Court) or a hat. 
 As-if random assignment, on the other hand, occurs when a case’s treatment category 
(𝑑𝑖) is based on one or more of that case’s pre-treatment characteristics (i.e. assignment is not 
random) but, importantly, pre-treatment characteristics that are unrelated to that individual’s 
potential outcomes (𝑌𝑖(1 or 0)). If those pre-treatment characteristics are truly exogenous (a 
strong assumption), then the as-if random assignment mechanism functions in the same way as 
a set of random numbers, allowing the researcher to derive an unbiased estimate of the ATE for 
the outcome measure she is interested in. As with random assignment, as-if random assignment 
must feature a probability of assignment that is both between 0 and 1 and knowable by the 
researchers, which will require the researchers to collect data on whatever pre-treatment 
characteristic the assignment procedure is based on. Common as-if random assignment 
mechanisms include cycling lists (commonly referred to as “wheels”) and schedules, which 
assign cases based on the order in which they come in. Despite the added assumptions that 
 
assignment procedures), but instead according to the day of the week, the last name of the defendant, or a 
reoccurring list. 
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these types of systems necessitate, studies utilizing as-if random assignment are common, likely 
because as-if random assignment is used in many courts. 
 The final category of assignment procedure, non-random assignment, occurs when an 
individual’s treatment category is based on one or more pre-treatment characteristics that are 
related to an individual’s potential outcomes. Common examples of clearly non-random 
assignment might include assignments based off of the type of crime committed, the criminal 
history of the defendant, or the geographic area in which the crime was committed. These types 
of systems cannot reliably be used to derive unbiased causal effects without running into the 
unknown heterogeneity bias that was discussed above.  
The distinctions between non-random and as-if random assignment are not always well 
defined. Each of the non-random assignment protocols listed above (assignment based on 
crime, defendant, or area) may, under strong assumptions and with certain outcomes of 
interest, be considered as-if random assignment (e.g. if we believe that the type of crime 
committed has no impact on the length of the criminal sentence). Likewise, protocols that use 
seemingly exogenous variables to make assignments, such as the last name of the defendant or 
the day the case files are submitted, may actually be non-random (e.g. the last name of the 
defendant might somehow have a relationship to that defendant’s sentence length).49 
ii. Specialization: In nearly every court surveyed for this Chapter (even those in which 
the general assignment process is random), a number of judges specialize in certain types of 
criminal cases. In some courts, this specialization is formalized and built into the regular 
protocol—the Nassau County Criminal court, for example, has specific “sections” (each with one 
or more judges) for sex offences, domestic violence, certain drug violations, and DWI cases. All 
 
49 On an anecdotal note, I remember sitting in a courthouse foyer with an attorney I worked for as we 
watched the assignment board (a screen that displayed which judge the cases were assigned to), waiting for 
the right moment to jump in line so our case would be assigned to a judge my boss perceived to be 
particularly favorable—a practice I have heard is not uncommon. Whether such efforts are successful in 
“gaming” the assignment process or not, the experience serves as a reminder that enterprising attorneys 
often find ways to “de-randomize” seemingly random assignment procedures.  
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the cases that fall into one of those categories bypass the regular random assignment protocol 
and go straight to the corresponding section. In other courts, the specialization process is more 
unofficial, as with capital cases going to the “more experienced” judges, a decision that is usually 
up to the chief judge or an upper-level clerk.  
Many courts, particularly federal district courts, employ an institutionalized form of 
specialization known as the “related case rule.” This practice—while not a rule, per se—
encourages judges or judge panels to take many or all cases that deal with a particular 
substantive legal issue if they have previously ruled on a case with that issue. Macfarlane 
chronicles, for example, the repeated use of the related case rule in the Southern District of New 
York and its subsequent impact on the jurisprudence relating to stop-and-frisk policies.50  
 These divergences from the general assignment process are not necessarily threats to 
unbiased causal inference as long as the assignments within specialized groups are also random 
(although this conditional assignment procedure and any impacts it has on assignment 
probability should be accurately modeled—see the solutions subpart below and the discussion 
on probabilities of assignment in Subpart III.B). Conditional assignment that is non-random, 
however, can be problematic in a number of ways. First, because case specialization inherently 
assigns judges according to a characteristic of the case, it violates the primary assumption of 
random assignment, which requires that treatment assignment be independent from all pre-
treatment characteristics. Additionally, the characteristic in question is almost certainly related 
to an individual case’s potential outcomes, meaning that these assignments likely fall within the 
“non-random” category described above.  
iii. Administrative Discretion: Administrative discretion functions similarly to 
specialization, except deviations from the normal assignment procedure are generally done on a 
case-by-case basis. A presiding judge may, for example, choose to override the normal 
 
50 See Katherine A. Macfarlane, How the Southern District of New York’s ‘Related Cases’ Rule Shaped Stop-
and-Frisk Rulings, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 199 (2014). 
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procedure by assigning a particularly prominent or complicated case to a more experienced 
judge. Or a judge who is dealing with stressful personal matters might temporarily not be 
assigned complex and long-lasting cases, such as those dealing with capital crimes. In any case, 
it is highly probable that the reasons the administrative exception is made are related in 
important ways to the potential outcomes for the cases. 
 Unlike case specialization, which is generally a formalized policy, administrative 
discretion is utilized on an ad hoc basis, which makes it more difficult to properly account for. 
Exceptions to the normal assignment procedure due to administrative oversight are not always 
recorded in the court records, and when they are, the records may be kept in a different location 
than the rest of the data. This potential for bias is mitigated to some degree by the fact that these 
types of administrative interference do not seem to be common (infrequent deviations have 
smaller relative impacts on the point estimate of the ATE) but is nonetheless potentially 
significant and should be identified and accounted for in any study that utilizes random judicial 
assignment. 
iv. Party’s Past Participation in Court Proceedings (Repeat and Probationary 
Offenders and Appeals After Remand): In a surprisingly high number of criminal cases at the 
state level, the defendant has previously been convicted of a crime in the jurisdiction in which 
her or his new case is being processed.51 Similarly, the individual accused of the crime may 
currently be a defendant in another, ongoing criminal case in that jurisdiction. In either 
circumstance, it is common for courts to re-assign these defendants’ cases to the judges who 
previously oversaw or who are currently presiding over previous cases. This assignment may 
happen as a part of the initial assignment procedure or, possibly because this connection was 
initially overlooked, after assignment to another judge has been made (the latter of which may 
 
51 A 2002 report by the U.S. Bureau of Justice indicates that recidivism rates for certain type of crimes is as 
high as 78.8% (motor vehicle thieves), 74.6% (larcenists), and 74.0% (burglars). Patrick Langan & David J. 
Levin, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report NCJ 193427 
(2002). 
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have implications for the probability of assignment and post-assignment changes, see Subpart 
III.B).  
The civil parallel to these assignment protocols is re-assigning extensions or re-
submissions of past civil cases to the judge or judges that oversaw the previous cases. The 
assignment clerk in federal circuit courts, for example, often offers to re-assign cases that have 
come back to the court on remand back to the panel of judges who heard the original case.52 
While one court archivist interviewed for this study53 believed that most panels decline re-
assignment (they suggested this was because the individuals who truly knew the details of the 
case—the law clerks who worked on the original case—are gone), he suggested that there is often 
pressure to take back particularly messy cases.54 
 At first glance, this type of assignment procedure may not seem problematic from a 
causal inference perspective. If the assignment procedure for the original case was random, then 
the subsequent cases returning to that same judge can be seen as extensions of that original 
assignment process. This conclusion, however, makes an important assumption. In order to 
include repeat offenders who are re-assigned to their original judges in an analysis, we have to 
assume that each judge in the analysis group creates the same number and type of repeat 
offenders. Unfortunately, research has shown that the type of judge that an individual is 
assigned to may have a significant impact on whether that individual will show up in court 
again.55 More punitive judges, for example, tend to generate defendants with higher recidivism 
rates, which—unless those defendants are always committing their secondary crimes in other 
jurisdictions—means that some judges will see repeat offenders or probation violators at higher 
 
52 This is in addition to the instances where the remanding court has explicitly specified that it retains 
jurisdiction post-remand. 
53 For confidentiality, I am not disclosing the name of this archivist or the circuit in which they worked. 
54 Apparently, one circuit judge “rails against the refusal to take ‘come-backers’” because “we helped create 
this mess, so we need to clean it up.” 
55  See Green & Winik, supra note 37 (who use the variation in judicial punitiveness to measure the 
downstream effect of judicial assignment on recidivism rates).  
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rates than others. If we believe that the potential outcomes of cases featuring repeat offenders 
may differ in an important way from those featuring first-time offenders, then reassignment of 
repeat offenders is a likely source of bias. 
 The Possible Solutions to Non-Random Assignment: The first step that a 
researcher should take in order to avoid the pitfalls of non-random assignment is to ensure that 
the venue of the study is one in which cases are randomly or as-if randomly assigned. This is 
best done by speaking with—or even better, visiting with—the individual or individuals who are 
in charge of the case assignment process in the court system of interest. In Subpart IV.C of this 
Chapter, I provide some insights into this process of inquiry gained after speaking with 30 state-
level criminal courts about their assignment procedures. While previous studies (including this 
one) can be used to identify potentially workable court venues, researchers should personally 
confirm such conclusions before beginning the often-arduous data-collection process. 
 When the researcher is reasonably confident that she has identified a randomized or as-
if randomized assignment scheme, she should begin the process of modeling the assignment 
procedures to the dataset of cases. By doing this, not only can the researcher verify the 
information that was communicated by the court representatives, she can lay the groundwork 
for identifying and addressing the additional and more complex “de-randomization” events 
described below. Additionally, a correctly modeled assignment process opens the door for more 
prognostic significance tests such as Fisher’s Exact Test.56  
Even for a court system that randomly assigns cases, this modeling process will almost 
certainly involve a series of conditional assignments based on a case’s pre-treatment covariates, 
 
56  Also known as randomization inference, Fisher’s Exact Test makes no distributional assumptions 
regarding the outcome data. By simulating all possible random assignments (a process that is not possible 
unless the underlying assignment process is accurately modeled), Fisher’s Exact test creates an exact 
representation of the sampling distribution of the estimated ATE—or any other estimand—and derives a p-
value based on the observed outcome’s relative location in that distribution. See R.A. FISHER, THE DESIGN 
OF EXPERIMENTS (1935) (for Fisher’s original use of this technique); and Jake Bowers & Costas 
Panagopoulos, Fisher’s Randomization Mode of Statistical Inference, Working Paper (2011) (for a more 
modern application).  
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including specialization based on case type, re-assignment of repeat and probationary offenders, 
and occasional administrative discretion. While many of these conditional assignments will be 
easy to identify and accurately model (specialization, for example should be a formal part of the 
court’s assignment process and can be modeled conditional on case type), there will likely be 
some idiosyncratic conditionality such as administrative discretion that can only be identified 
through court records.  
If the cases in any of these conditional categories are assigned non-randomly, the most 
prudent approach is to omit such cases from the final statistical analysis. Doing so will naturally 
limit the applicability of a researcher’s findings (the estimated ATE may, for example, apply only 
to non-drug and non-sexual violence cases), but those findings will maintain the non-biased 
benefits of random assignment. If, on the other hand, judges within specialized sections 
(assuming there is more than one judge in a section) are also randomly assigned,57 researchers 
can still derive unbiased ATE’s, but those cases must be analyzed separately from the normally 
assigned cases. In any case, researchers must be aware of the existence of specialized 
assignment and the court must have kept accurate records of such exceptions.  
B. Differing Probability of Assignment 
The Problem: As was discussed above, the basic model for computing an estimate of 
the ATE is the average outcome of interest of the treated subjects minus the average outcome of 
the non-treated subjects (𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1)|𝑑1 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(0)|𝑑1 = 0]). This model assumes that the 
probability of being randomly assigned into the treatment group (often equal across groups, 
although it could be any value greater than 0 and less than 1) is constant for each of the subjects 
across the duration of the study. As a result, if the probability of being assigned into one or more 
of the treatment groups changes over the course of the study, this simple model generates a 
 
57 This process can be analogized to block random assignment, discussed in Chapter 4 of GERBER & GREEN, 
supra note 11. 
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potentially biased estimate for the ATE because the two groups that we are comparing, 𝑌𝑖(1) and 
𝑌𝑖(0), are no longer identical in expectation. 
An example using judicial assignment may be informative. Continuing on with our 
hypothetical study on the effect of being assigned to a male judge on the length of the 
defendant’s criminal sentence, let us assume that the court system we are working in has 10 
judges, 7 of whom are female and 3 of whom are male. Furthermore, let us assume that every 
new criminal case has a 10% chance of being assigned to each of the 10 judges. This means that 
any given case has a 30% chance of being assigned to a male judge and a 70% chance of being 
assigned to a female judge. If these probabilities remain constant over the course of the study, 
we can estimate the unbiased ATE of being assigned to a male judge simply by calculating the 
average sentence for all defendants assigned to male judges and subtracting the average 
sentence for all defendants assigned to female judges.  
Now imagine that 2 of the male judges decide to escape the August heat by taking a 
vacation, so that during the month of August, there are only 8 judges—7 females and 1 male. 
With equal probability of assignment among the remaining 8 judges available to be assigned 
cases, the probability that any given criminal case is assigned to a male judge in August has now 
dropped from 30% to just 12.5%. Is this necessarily a problem? No, but only if we are willing to 
assume that the types of cases that come into the court during August are identical in every way 
to cases from the rest of the calendar year. If, however, August cases tend to be more complex, 
concern more serious crimes, or feature poorer defendants (any of which are likely related to our 
potential outcomes of interest), we might expect an increase (or decrease) in the expected 
sentencing lengths during that month, and because these August cases are more likely to be 
assigned to female judges, the resulting estimate of the ATE would be biased downwards. 
i. Scheduling: The most common way in which the probability of judicial assignment is 
non-identical across time is in regard to scheduling. While most jurisdictions make a concerted 
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effort to keep each judge’s docket running on schedule,58 a number of issues can arise that may 
force the court to either lower the number of new cases being assigned to a particular judge (a 
decrease in the probability of being assigned) or take that judge off of the assignment schedule 
altogether (a probability of assignment of 0).59  
 While differences in assignment probability due to scheduling issues may seem like an 
innocuous occurrence, they become threats to unbiased causal inference when the change in 
probability is due to some factor related to potential outcomes. The vacationing judges discussed 
above is a potential example of this potential problem. If the cases assigned during time in 
which a judge is absent (and is not assigned cases) are different than cases assigned during the 
rest of the study period, an unbalanced estimate that includes that time period may be biased. 
Outside of vacations, scheduling can also alter assignment probabilities through sick-days, 
docket-backups, or changes in judicial responsibilities (e.g. a judge is assigned to take care of 
preliminary hearings for a week). Again, these alterations may not pose a threat to unbiased 
inference, but only if we assume that a judge’s propensity for illness, inability to keep up with 
her docket, or likelihood of special assignments are unrelated to whatever potential outcomes 
we are concerned with.  
ii. Consolidation of Codefendants: In many jurisdictions (at least 85% of the courts 
surveyed for this Chapter), codefendants’ individual cases are consolidated to just one judge, 
generally to the judge assigned to the first defendant that comes up in the court system. Similar 
to scheduling effects, the impact of consolidating these cases can lead to changes in the 
probability of assignment, but only under specific circumstances.  
 
58  Not surprisingly, the most effective way of maintaining balance across judges is through random 
assignment itself. This scheduling utility and egalitarianism/fairness are the two primary reasons I was told 
that courts instituted random assignment procedures.  
59 This may result in the court reassigning some of a judge’s already assigned cases to less-busy colleagues. 
This also poses a problem for causal inference, although it is different in nature than the differences in 
probability problem that I discuss in this Part. For a full discussion of this other problem, see infra Subpart 
III.C.i. 
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In courts systems that utilize a complete or rolling randomization, consolidation of a 
large number of codefendants can remove a judge from the assignment process for a substantial 
period of time. For example, the Harris County (Texas) Criminal Court randomly assigns judges 
to cases according to a type of complete random assignment where when a case comes in, their 
computer program identifies how many cases have been assigned to each of their criminal 
judges and the judge with the lowest number of assignments is assigned the case. If there are 
multiple judges with the lowest number of assignments, the computer randomly assigns the case 
to one of those judges with equal probability. In this system, each codefendant in a case counts 
as a single case, so a judge who is assigned a consolidated case with five codefendants, will jump 
up five spots in the assignment chart. Assuming the rest of the fourteen judges have a roughly 
equal number of assigned cases, this procedure means that the judge with the consolidated case 
will not be assigned any cases for five rounds, or 70 cases.  
The Possible Solutions to Differences in Probability of Assignment: Much 
like the process of ensuring cases are randomly assigned, the first step in addressing differing 
probabilities of assignment is learning the probabilities themselves. Court representatives will, 
again, be the best source of information required to determine probability of assignment over 
the course of the time-period studied, but it may take substantial sleuthing to identify deviations 
from normal procedure. Researchers should ask whether caseloads are ever lightened when 
judge is behind on her docket, whether assignments continue to accumulate while judges are 
away for a sick-day or on holiday (and if so, whether there is a record of when specific judges 
were away from chambers) and should also attempt to reverse-engineer the exact probabilities 
at a given time using case-loads in the datasets. Alternatively (or additionally, if the researcher 
wants to verify the procedural descriptions of court personnel), researchers can “reverse-
engineer” the actual probabilities of assignment for each case using the dataset itself. By 
comparing the number and type of cases that each judge has in a given period and across 
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periods, researchers can identify variations in assignment probability across individual judges 
and across time. 
Once the probability of assignment for each case in the dataset is known, there is 
fortunately a simple solution to differences in probability of assignment that makes no sacrifices 
in regard to causal identification, even if such differences are associated with changes in 
potential outcomes. Through a technique called inverse probability weighting (IPW), the impact 
that each individual outcome of interest has on the estimated ATE can be re-weighted to reflect 
the likelihood of that unit being assigned to a particular judge or type of judge.  
Using the above example of the vacationing judges, we can see how this is done in 
practice. We begin by dividing the dataset into time periods that have internally consistent 
probabilities across judges. These periods could be as short as a day (or shorter if probabilities of 
assignment shift mid-day), but to keep things simple, we will create two periods: the “normal” 
period (January to July and September to December), in which all 10 judges are in court and 
there is 30% chance of a given case being assigned to a male judge; and the “vacation” period, in 
which 2 of the male judges are on vacation, and there is only a 12.5% chance of being assigned a 
male judge. Instead of calculating the estimated ATE simply by subtracting 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(0)] from 
𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1)], we re-weight the outcome of each case assigned to a male judge by 1/P (where “P” 
equals the probability of being assigned to a male judge for that case—.125 for cases assigned in 
August and .3 for cases assigned in any other month) and the outcome of each case assigned to a 
female judge by 1/(1-P) (1-P being the probability of being assigned to a female judge). We then 
derive the estimated ATE using the same approach as we did in Part II.60 Notice that if the 
probability of being assigned to a particular judge or type of judge is zero at a given time, this 
would imply that cases assigned at that time will be re-weighted out of the calculation of the 
 
60 For a more comprehensive explanation of how IPW is done, see GERBER & GREEN, supra note 11, at 74-
77. 
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estimated ATE (P would be equal to 1 or 0), which is the appropriate course given that 
assignment is non-random with such probabilities. 
C. Post-Assignment Changes 
 The Problem: Generally, the judge assigned to manage a case remains the presiding 
authority over that case until it has concluded,61 but complications and unforeseen 
circumstances can arise that lead to a change in the original judicial assignment. For example, 
the judge who has presided over the pre-trial portions of a case may be behind schedule and 
unable to run the trial itself, or a savvy attorney might seek a change in presiding authority after 
they see the initial judicial assignment. If we can assume that the propensity for post-
assignment judicial changes are orthogonal to the potential outcomes of interest, these changes 
will not threaten the unbiased estimates of the ATE. However, under the many circumstances in 
which post-assignment changes are related to potential outcomes—using the male/female 
judges example, if guilty defendants are more likely than innocent defendants to seek 
reassignment from female judges—the resulting ATE estimate will be biased, even if the 
secondary assignment procedure is also done on a random basis.62  
 The experimental literature often refers to this sort of post-treatment change as 
crossover or non-compliance. The latter term is particularly helpful because it highlights the 
potential for post-assignment changes to reflect a sort of non-random self-selection out of the 
original treatment by one of the individuals involved with the case, generally the judge, the 
parties, or the attorneys. Building off of the notation used in previous parts, we can see why non-
 
61 There are, of course, formal exceptions to this. Many courts have a special division or section that takes 
care of the arraignment portion of a case, and some, like Alameda County, assign out the multiple stages of 
a case (arraignment, pre-trial, trial) to different judges. Neither of these approaches prevent researchers 
from taking advantage of random assignment, although they make it more difficult to accurately model the 
entire assignment process and likely change the definition of the treatment. 
62 This result is not intuitive and has been missed by researchers in the past. While a random reassignment 
will ensure that the number and types of cases that a judge gains is orthogonal to pretreatment covariates, 
bias is nonetheless induced because the propensity for a judge to lose cases is likely a result of some 
important characteristic of the judge.   
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compliance might introduce bias. Remember that 𝑌𝑖(1) and 𝑌𝑖(0) represent the potential 
outcome when i is treated (𝑑𝑖 = 1) and untreated (𝑑𝑖 = 0), respectively. This basic notation 
assumes that assigned treatment and actual treatment are the same. Under a notation expanded 
to accommodate the possibility of non-compliance, however, the treatment received is 
potentially distinct from the treatment assigned, with the latter concept represented by 𝑧𝑖, 
where 𝑧𝑖 = 1 when i is assigned to treatment, and 𝑧𝑖 = 0 when i is assigned to control.  
To combine the notation for treatment received and treatment assigned in a simple way 
(and because treatment received is ostensibly a function of treatment assignment), 𝑑𝑖(𝑧𝑖) will 
refer to a subject’s treatment, given a particular assignment that the subject received. In a 
framework with only two treatment groups, there are four possible configurations of treatment 
and assignment: 𝑑𝑖(𝑧𝑖 = 0) = 0, or simply 𝑑𝑖(0) = 0, where a subject is assigned to control and is 
untreated; 𝑑𝑖(0) = 1, where a subject is assigned to control but is treated (one form of non-
compliance); 𝑑𝑖(1) = 1, where a subject is assigned to treatment and is treated; and 𝑑𝑖(1) = 0, 
where a subject is assigned to treatment but is not treated (the second form of non-compliance). 
Remember that because we are talking about potential outcomes, each subject is either 
compliant or non-compliant for each treatment group. A subject may, for example, comply with 
treatment if assigned to control (𝑑𝑖(0) = 0) but be non-compliant if assigned to the treatment 
group (𝑑𝑖(1) = 0). This, in turn, results in four possible “types” of subjects: Compliers,63 who 
always comply with assignment (𝑑𝑖(1) = 1 and 𝑑𝑖(0) = 0); Never-Takers, who are never treated, 
regardless of assignment (𝑑𝑖(1) = 0 and 𝑑𝑖(0) = 0); Always-Takers, who are always treated 
 
63  The terminology used to refer to these four types of subjects varies, but the Complier/Never-
Taker/Always-Taker/Defier labels are common and fairly intuitive. See Alexander Balke & Judea Pearl, 
Nonparametric Bounds on Causal Effects from Partial Compliance Data, Technical Report R-199, 
University of California, Los Angeles (1993); and Joshua D. Angrist, Guido W. Imbens, & Donald B. Rubin, 
Identification and Estimation of Local Average Treatment Effects, 62 ECONOMETRICA 467 (1996) (referring 
to the estimand as the LATE). 
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(𝑑𝑖(1) = 1 and 𝑑𝑖(0) = 1); and Defiers, who are treated when assigned to control and are 
untreated when assigned to treatment (𝑑𝑖(1) = 0 and 𝑑𝑖(0) = 1).  
In the court context, non-compliance occurs when a case ends up before a judge of a type 
other than the type of judge the case was originally assigned to.64 In a study looking at the causal 
impact of having a female judge preside over a case, a case that was originally assigned to a male 
judge but was transferred to a female judge or assigned to a female judge but subsequently 
transferred to a male judge would be non-compliant, and a case that either retains the same 
judge throughout all proceedings or is transferred to a judge of the same type is referred to as 
compliant. If our dataset includes non-compliance in both the treatment and control groups, it 
suffers from two-sided non-compliance.65 
Even with a dataset that features non-compliance, it may be tempting to estimate an ATE 
based off of the difference between those cases that ended up before female judges and those 
that ended up before male judges (𝐸[𝑌𝑖|𝑑𝑖 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌𝑖|𝑑𝑖 = 0])—we are, after all, interested in 
identifying the impact of having a male or female judge on case outcomes. This would be unwise, 
however, because the distribution of subjects among male or female judges is likely no longer a 
function of random assignment. Expanded to incorporate non-compliance, the group of cases 
that were presided over by a male judge (𝐸[𝑌𝑖|𝑑𝑖 = 1]) include both those cases that were 
presided over by a male judge and were initially assigned to a male judge (𝑑𝑖(1) = 1) and those 
cases that were presided over by a male judge but were originally assigned to a female judge 
(𝑑𝑖(0) = 1). The converse is true, of course, for the group of cases presided over by a female 
judge, which includes (𝑑𝑖(0) = 0) and (𝑑𝑖(1) = 0).  
 
64 Researchers may want to use a more restrictive definition of non-compliance where any deviation from 
the original assignment is non-compliance, even if the reassignment is to a judge of the same “type” (from 
one male judge to another, for example). As we see below, this would make the estimated treatment effects 
more difficult to calculate but may be necessary given specific research questions. 
65 Given the nature of the examples of post-assignment judicial changes outlined below, two-sided non-
compliance is likely to exists in most in most court datasets. 
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In order to meet the requirement that the expected potential outcomes of cases 
eventually presided over by male judges equals the expected potential outcomes of cases 
presided over by female judges, the potential outcomes of the subjects who were not compliant 
with their random assignments to a female judge (likely a compilation of never-takers and 
defiers) must be the same as those of the subjects who were not compliant with their random 
assignment to a male judge (likely a compilation of always-takers and defiers).66 As we will see 
from the examples of post-assignment changes below, this is unlikely. 
 i. Administrative Discretion: Often, the court administrators or the judge herself will 
identify some reason to make a change in judicial assignment after the initial assignment 
process has concluded. For example, if a judge feels that she is unfit to preside over a case, most 
commonly because of a conflict-of-interest, she may request to be removed from the case 
(recusal can also be prompted by party discretion). Alternatively, after a case has developed, a 
court may decide that it would be better handled by a different judge, possibly due to some 
attribute of the judge (bias or specialty), an attribute of the case (type or complexity), or a 
combination of both.  
Administrative discretion can also be manifest in scheduling or experiential concerns. A 
court may choose to move some of the cases away from a judge who is having a hard time 
keeping up with her docket, or a chief judge might remove exceptionally complex or important 
cases from new and inexperienced judges. In either case, because the decision to make a post-
assignment change is based in part on the characteristics of the judge or the case, such decisions 
are likely to create uneven sets of non-compliers, resulting in inferential bias.  
ii. Party Discretion: While the original assignment process is always under the 
discretion of the court system, rules and procedures sometimes give opportunities for the parties 
 
66 By implication, the subjects who were compliant with their random assignment to a female judge must 
also have the same expected potential outcomes as those who were compliant with assignments to male 
judges.  
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involved in the case to ask for post-assignment changes in judicial oversight. In some states, 
parties to a case can request a judicial transfer via a peremptory challenge, in which a party asks 
for a new judge, often without needing to cite a particular reason for the request.67 Most states 
allowing peremptory challenges restrict each party to one such request over the life of the case, 
although a few allow multiple challenges for specific types of cases.68 Similarly, attorneys may 
make substantive pleas, which are normally used to move a case to a judge with a particular 
expertise but may strategically be used when the original judge is perceived to be unfavorable to 
a client’s case.  
Additionally, every state allows parties to request a judicial recusal if the judge is unable 
to adjudicate the case in an unbiased manner. Recusal, as was noted above, is often up to the 
judge’s or administration’s discretion, but these decisions may ultimately be impacted by the 
recusal requests of attorneys or third parties.   
More nefariously, attorneys may seek to circumvent random and as-if random 
assignment processes by strategically submitting cases in a manner or at a time that will 
increase the probability that a favorable judge will be assigned to the case. In a particularly 
interesting example of this, a prestigious Chicago law firm was caught judge-shopping by filing 
multiple, identical lawsuits and hoping that the random assignment process used by the 
Chancery Court would yield at least one friendly judicial assignment. They would then drop the 
remaining cases assigned to less-desirable judges. 69 
The Possible Solutions to Post-Assignment Changes: There are two primary 
approaches to addressing non-compliance due to post-assignment judicial changes, both of 
 
67 For a general discussion of peremptory challenge (and recusal) procedure and constitutionality, see 
Chapter 26 in RICHARD FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES (2d 
ed. 2006); and Nancy J. King, Bastion for the Bench – Regulating the Peremptory Challenges of Judges, 
73 CHI-KENT L. REV. 509 (1998). 
68 For a fairly recent examination of which states feature these judicial peremptory challenges, see Chapter 
27 in id. 
69 Andrew Fegelman, Law Firm is Fined, Scolded, CHI. TRIB., April 5, 1994. 
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which come with methodological costs. Under the first option, the researcher may essentially 
choose to define away non-compliance by changing the causal effect of interest from the ATE of 
a case being presided over by a male judge (𝐸[𝑌𝑖|𝑑𝑖 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌𝑖|𝑑𝑖 = 0]) to the ATE of the case 
being assigned to a male judge (𝐸[𝑌𝑖|𝑑𝑖(1)] − 𝐸[𝑌𝑖|𝑑𝑖(0)])—a treatment effect often called the 
intent to treat effect, or ITT. The ITT “avoids” non-compliance because it is concerned only with 
the original case assignment, which cannot be changed, regardless of how many times the case is 
re-assigned. The downside to using the ITT is, of course, that the treatment effect of assignment 
itself is rarely of primary interest to researchers. However, the extent to which an estimated ITT 
differs from an estimated ATE depends on the frequency of non-compliance due to post-
assignment changes, so circumstances in which such changes are ostensibly rare and will 
consequentially produce minimally divergent ITT estimates.70  
The alternative to the ITT, the complier average causal effect (CACE),71 does provide 
researchers with an estimate of the treatment effect, albeit only for cases that are compliers 
(𝐸[{𝑌𝑖(𝑑𝑖 = 1) − 𝑌𝑖(𝑑𝑖 = 0)}|𝑑𝑖(1) = 1]) and only under a number of important assumptions. 
While this approach makes analytic sense in a number of research contexts, it is likely to provide 
only moderate value for researchers studying the impact of case assignment, as such studies are 
generally concerned with outcomes for all types of cases or subjects, not just those who do not 
move between judges. For this reason (and because the process of estimating the CACE is fairly 
involved), this procedure is not explained in detail here. In short, it requires the researcher to 
assume that none of the cases in the dataset are “defiers” (𝑧𝑖 ≠ 𝑑𝑖, regardless of initial 
assignment—an assumption also called monotonicity), after which the ITT is divided by the 
 
70 Non-compliance can presumably be identified by comparing original assignments to the assignments at 
the conclusion of the case, although such information may be available only through specific court records 
as opposed to the general docket data. 
71 The complier average causal effect is also referred to as the local average treatment effect, or LATE. See 
Angrist, Imbens, & Rubin, supra note 63 (referring to the estimand as the LATE). 
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average 𝑑𝑖 = 1 minus the average 𝑑𝑖 = 0. Researchers hoping to address non-compliance using 
the ITT or the CACE should refer to the number of particularly helpful guides on the topic.72  
D. Missing Outcomes (Attrition) 
The Problem: The most statistically troubling problem that researchers will likely 
encounter when utilizing random judicial assignment is missing outcomes. Also referred to as 
attrition (the term used in this Chapter), missing outcome data can have devastating 
consequences for unbiased causal analysis when missingness is correlated with potential 
outcomes. Making matters worse, missing outcome data in the court context is unavoidably 
common, meaning that it is essential for researchers to understand the implications of attrition 
and be able to identify when and to what extent it exists in a given dataset. 
Remember that the inferential power of random judicial assignment comes from its 
ability to create sets of cases that are statistically equivalent in expectation, thus allowing us to 
compare the outcomes of those cases as a function of the treatment. Or, using the earlier 
notation:  
𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1)|𝑑1 = 1] = 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1)|𝑑1 = 0],73 
meaning the expected treated outcome for cases in the treatment group is equal to the expected 
treated outcome for cases in the control group (the same would be true for expected non-treated 
outcomes in both groups).  
When considering the role that attrition plays in our dataset, it can be helpful to think of 
missingness as a potential outcome itself. Just like 𝑌𝑖(1) and 𝑌𝑖(0) represent the potential 
outcomes of our outcome of interest given assignment to treatment and control, 𝑟𝑖(1) and 𝑟𝑖(0) 
represent whether a given data point or case will be missing or not given assignment to 
 
72 For a more comprehensive discussion on deriving the ITT and CACE, see Chapters 5 and 6 in GERBER & 
GREEN, supra note 11; and Chapters 23 and 24 in in IMBENS & RUBIN, supra note 12. 
73 In the interest of simplicity, this equation assumes that assignment (𝑧𝑖) always matches treatment (𝑑𝑖). 
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treatment or control, where 𝑟𝑖(1 or 0) = 0 means that the outcome of interest (𝑌𝑖) will be missing 
and 𝑟𝑖(1 or 0) = 1 means it will be non-missing, or observed.  
Going back to the equation above, it then follows that the expected outcome of interest 
for subjects assigned to the treatment group is a combination of those subjects who have 
missing outcomes under treatment and those who have observable outcomes under treatment: 
𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1)] = 𝐸[𝑟𝑖(1)] ∗ 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1)|𝑟𝑖(1) =  1] + {1 − 𝐸[𝑟𝑖(1)]} ∗ 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1)|𝑟𝑖(1) =  0], 
where the 𝐸[𝑟𝑖(1)] and {1 − 𝐸[𝑟𝑖(1)]} act as switching mechanisms since only one outcome 
(missing or not) is observed. The same can be done for the control groups, 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(0)], and 
replacing both groups with the expanded notation results in 
   𝐸[𝑟𝑖(1)] ∗ 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1)|𝑟𝑖(1) =  1] + {1 − 𝐸[𝑟𝑖(1)]} ∗ 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1)|𝑟𝑖(1) =  0] = 
𝐸[𝑟𝑖(0)] ∗ 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(0)|𝑟𝑖(0) =  1] + {1 − 𝐸[𝑟𝑖(0)]} ∗ 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(0)|𝑟𝑖(0) =  0]. 
In a dataset or study with no attrition, this equation would simplify back down to our 
original ATE equation because the potential for missing data on both sides would be 0. 
However, if attrition does exist (and as we will see, it almost always does in the context of court 
data) we are required to make the strong assumption that the expected value of the missing data 
on each side of the equation is exactly the same, which is difficult to do because such outcomes 
are, by definition, not observable.  
 To illustrate this using a slight variation of our ongoing example, imagine that we are 
looking to identify the impact of being assigned to a male judge on the outcomes of divorce cases 
but have noticed that many cases that started in court are resolved through private dispute 
settlements, the outcomes of which we do not have access to. Attrition clearly exists here, but 
because the outcomes of the missing cases are, by definition, unobserved, we are left with only 
the observed cases and are obliged to assume that the missing outcomes of cases that are 
assigned to male judges are the same in expectation to the observed outcomes of cases assigned 
to male judges, or that:  
𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1)|𝑟𝑖(1) =  0] = 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1)|𝑟𝑖(1) =  1]. 
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The same must also be true, of course, for observed and missing cases assigned to female judges. 
These assumptions might be true. It is possible that the propensity for a case to be 
resolved through settlement is completely independent of potential outcomes of that case. But 
suppose that outcomes are correlated with the propensity for attrition and that attrition is more 
common for cases assigned to female judges (possibly because attorneys in our sample feel that 
male judges are relatively more favorable towards their clients than female judges). This would 
mean that the set of observable cases before male judges would have more (and by extension, 
different) cases than the set of observable cases before female judges, and because the missing 
cases are unobservable, we cannot know whether the resulting estimate of the ATE is the 
product of the gender of the judge the cases were assigned to or the difference in case 
composition. 
As we will see below, settlements are not the only source of attrition-based bias. 
Alternative forms of strategic lawyering such as plea-bargaining and re-filing as well as 
administrative error, selective publication of case outcomes, and data corruption are all 
potential hazards for researchers hoping to utilize random judicial assignment.74 
 i. Plea Bargains, Settlements, and Strategic Behavior: A large number of criminal cases 
never make it to a judicial or jury determination because the defendants choose to plead guilty 
for a reduced punishment (90-95% by some measures).75 Likewise, an increasing proportion of 
civil cases are resolved through non-judicial means, despite starting out as judicially managed 
cases in the courts.76 While plea bargains and settlements do not inherently lead to attrition 
 
74 It may be more intuitive to understand the potential bias introduced by attrition in the medical trials, 
where outcomes of interest generally relate to health and attrition takes the form of death. For a short but 
elucidating discussion of this, see Samuel L. Brilleman, Nancy A. Pachana, & Anette J. Dobson, The Impact 
of Attrition on the Representativeness of Cohort Studies of Older People, 10 BMC MED. RES. METHODOLOGY 
71 (2010). 
75  See Lindsey Devers, Plea and Charge Bargaining, Bureau of Justice Assistance: US Department of 
Justice, Order No. 2008_F08151 (2011). 
76 Settlement rates seem to vary quite widely depending on the case type. Eisenberg and Lanvers found that 
in two Federal District courts (Eastern District of Pennsylvania and Northern District of Georgia) the rates 
were as low as 27.3% for constitutional tort cases and as high as 87.2% for regular tort cases. See Theodore 
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(some outcomes of interest are available regardless), many of the questions that scholars are 
interested in answering rely on outcomes that are dependent on case data or court records 
which are not available for cases that are resolved out of the courtroom. In these cases, 
estimated treatment effects will be biased if the attrition is related to the potential outcomes in 
any way.  
For example, sophisticated lawyers may have certain perceptions (accurate or not) 
regarding how punitive or difficult certain judges are and consequentially advise their clients to 
take a plea deal more often under some judges than under others. Over time, the “tough” judges 
would have a set of measurable outcomes that are made up of relatively fewer defendants with 
sophisticated lawyers than the “easy” judges, and if we believe that sophisticated lawyering is 
related to outcomes, then this selection effect will induce significant bias in a study’s results. In 
addition to avoiding a final determination by the courts through plea bargains or settlements, 
attrition might also result from civil plaintiffs strategically dropping their cases altogether.  
 When attrition is the result of strategic behavior on the part of parties or attorneys, 
researchers might consider using attrition itself as the outcome of interest. Whether or not a 
criminal defendant pleads guilty, for example, is an interesting outcome to measure, and given 
the effect that judicial characteristics such as gender and race seem to have on more traditional 
outcomes such as sentencing, we might imagine that those same characteristics impact the 
propensity for plea bargaining. This outcome may not be exactly what the researcher wished to 
measure, but it will be valuable as an unbiased measure of the treatment effect. 
ii. Selective Publication of Data, Decisions, and Opinions: Most court adjudicated case 
outcomes are legally required to be publicly available.77 However, certain case data are 
 
Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate, and Why Do We Care, 6 J. of Emp. Legal Stud. 
111 (2009). 
77  Each state has different rules regarding public records, but all of them make the majority of cases 
available. For a full list of public record laws, see FOIA Advocates, “State Public Record Laws,” available at 
http://www.foiadvocates.com/records.html. 
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selectively kept off record. A court may have privacy concerns about cases that involve minors or 
cases dealing with classified information and choose not to make dockets, documents, 
procedural decisions, or—less frequently—case outcomes publicly available. Similarly, some 
courts (generally courts of appeals) write case opinions that outline the reasoning behind the 
judicial disposition, which are used by researchers to measure legal reasoning or policy 
influence. Because judges generally have full dockets, they do not write—or at least do not 
publish—opinions for many of the cases assigned to them, presumably spending their time on 
cases that deal with novel questions or have particularly high precedential value. Some have 
even suggested that judges take advantage of publication to push certain political or legal 
ideologies, in which case, attrition due to non-publication is highly likely to relate to potential 
outcomes.78  
The Possible Solutions to Missing Data (Attrition): Before addressing attrition, 
the researcher must be able to identify whether and to what extent her dataset features missing 
data. This process can be difficult because court data, particularly state court data, is often 
unreliable, and even previously analyzed datasets may have undocumented attrition. As a first 
step, researchers should talk with a court's data-specialist about whether a given dataset 
includes all cases assigned during that time period.79 Assuming that courts have a systematic 
method for assigning case numbers (something that can be confirmed with the court 
representative), missing cases should be identifiable based on numerical gaps in an ordered list 
of those case numbers. The researcher might also run a balance check on a number of pre-
treatment variables that, under random assignment, should be equal across treatment groups. 
Caution should be used when interpreting these results, however, because imbalances might be 
 
78 See David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum Law in the Ninth 
Circuit, 73 U. Cin. L. Rev. 817 (2012). 
79 It is key to be specific with these questions. See infra Subpart IV.C for thoughts on how to approach these 
discussions. 
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due to other de-randomizing effects such as post-assignment judicial changes (see Subpart III.E 
for more on balance checks).  
 There is no simple way to deal with attrition once it is identified. Under ideal 
circumstances, the attrition is not related in any way to the outcomes of interest, resulting in a 
condition sometimes referred to as missing independent of potential outcomes (or MIPO). 
While MIPO cannot be empirically verified,80 certain procedural events—particularly those that 
are non-deliberate or haphazard (lost or missing data are common examples)—are ostensibly 
less likely to feature a connection between the propensity for attrition and the potential 
outcomes of interest, allowing for more reasonable assumption-making. Similarly, the attrition 
might be independent of potential outcomes given a known pre-treatment covariate 
(appropriately called MIPO|𝑋), in which case, the propensity for missingness is unrelated to 
potential outcomes for a subgroup of the subjects. If researchers have good reason to believe this 
is true (again, it cannot be empirically verified), they can use the average observed outcomes of 
interest in each subgroup as a proxy for the missing data (making sure to re-weight the data 
using IPW), resulting in an unbiased estimate of the ATE.81 
More often, however, attrition cannot be assumed to be independent of outcomes of 
interest. Under these circumstances, there is a limited set of approaches that the researcher can 
take. She may, of course, choose to just estimate the treatment effect despite missing outcomes, 
hoping that the bias resulting from attrition is not significant, but this will ultimately render the 
probative value of the results largely undeterminable. More appropriately, the researcher can fill 
 
80 Because identifying the source of attrition is a causal question, researchers hoping to verify MIPO or 
MIPO|X will run into the same inferential problems as we discussed in Subpart II.A, supra. However, 
researchers willing to make a number of assumptions can test for obvious signs of attrition by comparing 
rates of attrition between the treatment groups (difference in rates suggest that attrition may be a function 
of assignment) or calculating the rates of attrition within a series of pre-treatment covariates. See Subpart 
III.E for a discussion on balance tests. 
81 For a more detailed discussion of MIPO and MIPO|X, see GERBER & GREEN, supra note 11, at 219. 
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in the missing outcomes with estimated values, either by drawing bounds around such estimates 
or, preferably, by ascertaining accurate estimates with additional data collection.  
Filling in missing outcomes with educated estimates, may seem to be an unsuitable 
methodological approach to dealing with attrition, but a number of estimation tactics require 
only minimal assumptions. The most conservative approach to estimating missing data is to use 
extreme value bounds, in which a researcher assigns each missing outcome to the lowest and 
highest possible outcome values. For example, if the outcome of interest is length of sentence, 
each missing outcome will be assigned both the minimum (presumably 0) and maximum (some 
value above 0) possible sentence lengths for a given crime, creating a set of bounds within which 
all possible estimated ATEs will exist. If the outcome of interest is binary, such as guilty or not 
guilty, all missing values will be assigned both a 0 and a 1. A more moderate approach to 
bounded outcomes would be to assign missing outcome values to the lowest and highest values 
observed in the non-missing set, and a more liberal approach (one that relies on an assumption 
of monotonicity) would be to use a trimming technique on the observed data.82 How 
conservative the researcher wants to be regarding these bounds will likely have a substantial 
impact on the estimated standard errors of the estimated ATE and the size of the bounds 
themselves, often increasing them enough to preclude any statistically significant findings.  
If additional resources are available, researchers should consider expending an extra 
effort in gathering a random sample of the missing outcomes. Commonly utilized in survey 
research as a solution to non-responses, double sampling can provide researchers with a 
representative sub-sample of outcome measures that can then be applied to the missing data as 
a whole. While this approach is likely more appropriate for researcher-controlled randomized 
experiments, in which the temporal and analytical distance between treatment and empirical 
 
82  See Peter M. Aronow, Donald P. Green, & Donald K. K. Lee, Sharp Bounds on the Variance in 
Randomized Experiments, 42 ANNALS STAT. 850 (2014); and David Lee, Training, Wages, and Sample 
Selection: Estimating Sharp Bounds on Treatment Effects, 76 REV. ECON. STUD. 1071 (2005).  
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assessment is small, it should be considered by researchers utilizing random judicial assignment 
as well and may be combined with other methods such as bounded outcomes.83 
E. Verifying the Model of Assignment Procedures  
Once a researcher is confident that she has identified all of the various de-randomizing 
events that might be featured in a particular dataset, she should verify the randomness in her 
model using a mixture of statistical tests and qualitative indicators. As I explain in Part IV, it 
became clear while surveying administrators and judges that many courts are hesitant to 
disclose informal deviations from the regular assignment process for fear of perceptions of 
impropriety,84 even when evidence of non-randomness in purportedly randomized systems 
exists.85 Alternatively, the administrators or the researchers may have simply overlooked certain 
procedures during the initial data collection. As a result, researchers interested in utilizing 
random judicial assignment should not rely solely on the list of procedures provided by the court 
system. 
In this Subpart, I briefly outline two approaches that researcher can take to verify the 
assignment procedures featured in their court data: statistical balance tests and informal “tells” 
of non-random deviation.  
i. Formal Statistical Tests: As we discussed above, random assignment produces 
comparison groups that are equal in expectation, or: 
                   𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1)|𝑑𝑖 = 1] = 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1)|𝑑𝑖 = 0] = 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(1)] and 
𝐸[𝑌𝑖(0)|𝑑𝑖 = 1] = 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(0)|𝑑𝑖 = 0] = 𝐸[𝑌𝑖(0)].. 
 
83 See Peter M. Aronow, Alexander Coppock, Alan Gerber, Donald P. Green, & Holger L. Kern, Combining 
Double Sampling and Bounds to Address Non-Ignorable Missing Outcomes in Randomized Experiments, 
25 POL. ANALYSIS 188 (2015). 
84 See press articles in supra note 5 for examples of the public’s concern with seemingly non-random 
judicial assignment. 
85 Chilton and Levy provide evidence of non-randomness in a number of U.S. Circuit Courts, even against 
the insistence of those courts that the process is random (Chilton & Levy, supra note 5; and Levy, supra 
note 5). 
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This expected equality, or balance, between treatment groups extends to all pre-treatment 
covariates, even those that are unrecognized by researchers or altogether unobservable or 
undocumented in the dataset. Statistical balance tests (also called randomization tests) can 
provide researchers with evidence that a particular court dataset features randomly assigned 
cases by comparing the covariate distributions in the various treatment groups. Under the 
assumption that these two groups are equivalent, their covariate distributions should be 
statistically indistinguishable.  
These types of tests generally take one of two forms in the literature: a t-test or a 
bootstrapping method. A t-test (more formally known as a Student’s t-test) uses the treatment 
groups’ means, standard deviations, and sizes to measure the overlap in the distributions of a 
particular covariate (presumably one that is prognostic of the outcome of interest). Statistically 
“balanced” distributions will overlap to a substantial degree, while non-overlapping 
distributions may be indicative of a non-random process. These tests, while simple, are limited 
by the distributional assumptions built into them—most importantly that the underlying 
distributions are normal. Bootstrapping methods, on the other hand, do not make any such 
distributional assumptions, relying instead on actual data produced by repeated simulations of 
the case assignment protocols. A number of recent papers showcase the value of such an 
approach while simultaneously highlighting the modeling and computational difficulties 
inherent in them.86  
Running these statistical tests come with three important caveats. First, they are truly 
prognostic only inasmuch as the assignment models that they are based on are correct—an 
incorrectly modeled assignment protocol could produce test results that indicate non-
randomness when the actual cases were randomly assigned or, conversely, produce results that 
are supportive of random assignment but miss some important source of non-random bias. 
 
86 See, e.g., id. 
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Second, both methods described above rely on the assumption that the distributions of the pre-
treatment covariates tested are reflective of all the possible sources of bias. Bias-inducing 
attrition caused by strategic attorney behavior, for example, may not be related to the gender of 
the defendant and would be missed by a balance test that looks only at the gender distribution in 
the treatment groups. Third, an imbalance in the distribution of a covariate is not necessarily an 
indication of non-randomness. Random assignment only ensures that the treatment groups will 
be equal in expectation, so imbalances may merely be the result of random chance, particularly 
if the researcher is using a small sample size or testing a large number of covariates.87 
Statistically significant imbalances on a large number of prognostic covariates constitutes 
stronger evidence of non-randomness, which should be addressed by digging deeper into the 
details of the assignment process.88 
In any case, just as it would be unwise for a researcher to rely entirely on the assignment 
protocols outlined by court administrators or earlier studies, attempting to identify the various 
de-randomizing events described above using just a balance test would potentially miss the 
nuanced—and occasionally significant—sources of statistical bias that are featured in nearly all 
court systems and, in some cases, may prompt researchers to prematurely abandon an empirical 
pursuit because of seemingly non-random data. Instead, these tests should be understood as 
supplements to the sort of pre-considerations suggested in this Chapter.  
 
87 Researchers should remember to account for the multiple comparison problem by appropriately 
adjusting the resulting standard errors. For a discussion of this problem and how it can be addressed, see 
M. Aickin & H. Gensler, Adjusting for Multiple Testing when Reporting Research Results: The 
Bonferroni vs Holm Methods, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 726 (1996). Alternatively, researchers may 
implement procedures that combine multiple balance tests into one single procedure. See Ben B. Hansen 
& Jake Bowers, Covariate Balance in Simple, Stratified, and Clustered Comparative Studies, 23 STAT. 
SCI. 219 (2008). 
88 Many suggest that the results of balance tests can also be used to re-calibrate the data on the offending 
covariates (e.g. through post-stratification), although the efficacy of such an approach is questionable. See 
Diana Mutz & Robin Pemantle, The Perils of Randomization Checks in the Analysis of Experiments, 
University of Pennsylvania Working Paper (2011); and Stephen Senn, Testing for Baseline Balance in 
Randomized Clinical Trials, 13 STAT. MED. 1715 (1994). 
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ii. Informal Indicators of Non-Randomness: In addition to the formal statistical tests 
described above, researchers might also consider a more qualitative approach to verifying that 
the assignment procedures described to them by court administrators are truly reflective of the 
day-to-day workings of the court. For example, an initial assignment procedure that divvies up 
cases based on simple randomization (each case has an X% probability of going to each of the 
judges) should, somewhat counter intuitively,89 result in a number of “runs,” or consecutive 
cases being assigned to the same judge. The likelihood of these runs depends of course, on the 
length of the run, the number of available judges, and the probability of being assigned to each 
of those judges, but one would expect, for example to see five, six, or even seven cases 
consecutively assigned to the same judge in large trial court datasets. Conversely, if the 
assignment protocol purportedly follows a complete- or “wheel”-based system, in which cases 
are assigned based off of a recurring list of judges or assigned to judges one-by-one until each 
judge has a case, one would not expect to see any runs at all (or at least no runs greater than 
two). Other seemingly non-random events such as all-minority judicial panels, long periods of 
non-assignment to some judges, and temporary imbalances between judges on salient pre-
treatment covariates can also serve as “tells” for truly random assignment procedures. 
F. “De-Randomizing” Events Checklist  
While the above recommendations do not represent a comprehensive collection of all the 
considerations that should be made when using random judicial assignment to make causal 
claims, they focus the most common events that may introduce non-random bias into an 
otherwise workable dataset. Assuming that the researcher has verified that the general 
 
89 When one understands how random assignment works, of course, these “runs” are not counterintuitive 
at all, but for many (possibly including the court staff who makes the assignments), they may seem 
indicative of a problem in the assignment process and be cause for administrative discretion. The “Hot-
hand Fallacy,” named after the traditional belief among basketball fans that making a basket increases the 
likelihood that the next shot will go in, provides an interesting example of how random consecutive runs 
can seem legitimately non-random. See Thomas Giovich, Robert Valonne, & Amos Tversky, The Hot Hand 
in Basketball: On the Misperception of Random Sequences, 17 COGNITIVE PSY. 295 (1985). 
  142  
 
assignment process is random, the following checklist summarizes the basic steps that 
researchers and readers engaging in such an enterprise can take: 
Figure 1: De-randomizing Events Checklist 
A. Ensure That General Assignment Process is Random or As-if Random 
 Balance Check: After conducting a randomization check (t-test or Fisher’s Exact Test, see 
Subpart III.E), do treatment groups appear balanced on pre-treatment variables? 
 Non-random “Tells”: Probabilistically, random assignment should naturally produce certain 
assignment patterns, such as runs of cases successively assigned to the same judge or all-
minority panels. The absence of these “tells” may be an indication of non-random discretion 
by court administrators. 
B. Identify Deviations from Initial Process: Are there any institutionalized, non-random 
exceptions to the generally random assignment procedures? 
 Specialization: Do some judges specialize in certain case types? 
 Administrative Discretion: Do the chief judges or administrators ever have discretion in the 
assignment of individual cases? (e.g. because of case complexity or length) 
 Party's Past Participation: Are case assignments based on a party's past participation in 
criminal or civil trials? (e.g. repeat offenders, pending cases, or case extensions) 
➢ Possible Solutions: 
• Ensure that the initial assignment process is accurately mapped. 
• Exclude cases that were assigned using non-random procedures from analysis. 
C. Account for Changes in Probability of Assignment: Are there any variations in the 
probability of assignment over the period that the study is concerned with? 
 Is the probability of assignment not recorded by the court system? 
 Are some cases assigned in groups (“block” randomized)? 
 Scheduling: Are caseloads adjusted based on a judge’s schedule? (e.g. vacations) 
 Party Consolidation: Does party consolidation impact probability of future assignments? 
➢ Possible Solutions:  
• Use the assignments in the dataset to “reverse-engineer” (see Subpart III.B) estimated 
probability of assignment (but be wary of post-assignment changes and attrition). 
• Implement IPW (inverse probability weights) in statistical tests. 
D. Account for Non-compliance: Are there any post-assignment changes to the initial 
assignment? 
 Administrative Discretion: Does the court or the judge ever change the assignment? 
 Party Discretion: Does the party have any influence on re-assignment? (e.g. preemptory 
challenge) 
➢ Possible Solutions: 
• Ensure that the court records include original assignments, before deviations occur. 
• If non-compliance is minimal, estimate the ITT (intent to treat effect) 
• If assuming monotonicity is plausible, estimate the CACE (complier average causal 
effect). 
E. Account for Attrition: Does the dataset have missing outcomes or missing data? 
 Is the missing data an outcome of interest? 
 Strategic Resolutions: How often are cases resolved out of court? (e.g. plea or settlement) 
 Selective Publication: Does the court or judge have discretion regarding the publication of 
data? (e.g. selective writing/publication of opinions)  
➢ Possible Solutions: 
• Check whether attrition is independent of potential outcomes by testing on prognostic 
pre-treatment variables. 
• Fill in missing outcomes and draw bounds around point estimates. 
• Gather missing data through random double sampling.  
• Treat missingness as an outcome of interest. 
F. Re-Conduct Balance Checks While Accounting for Checked Events: After mapping 
initial assignment process and accounting for “de-randomizing” events, do cases appear to be 
randomly assigned based on empirical balance tests? 
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IV. A Survey of Assignment Procedures Used in U.S. Criminal Courts 
 To supplement the methodological assertions outlined above, I conducted a 
comprehensive survey of the judicial assignment procedures of the 30 largest state criminal 
courts in the United States. The results of this survey are valuable in at least three distinct ways. 
First, the questions court officials were asked correlate with most of the “de-randomizing” 
elements discussed in Part III, and the resulting data demonstrates the extent to which those 
events exist and should be taken seriously by researchers. Second, at the time this Chapter was 
written, there was no database of state court procedures comprehensive enough to address the 
needs of scholars hoping to utilize random assignment of cases. This data, therefore, should 
serve as a practical starting point for researchers looking for venues with assignment procedures 
amenable to unbiased causal inference.90 Finally, the survey results should be useful to readers 
and reviewers who want to confirm the existence or non-existence of certain assignment 
procedures in courts that are featured in other empirical analyses that purport to utilize random 
assignment.  
 In this Part, I describe the sample of courts featured in the survey and outline the survey 
methods and questions. I then describe the results of the survey, apply them to the analysis in 





90  While this data constitutes the most comprehensive and accurate collection of state-level judicial 
assignment procedures that I am aware of, all the information was collected via phone conversations and 
emails and, as a result, should not be relied on to asses court data. In addition, this data only reflects 
assignment procedure at the time of the survey (May 2014 to May 2015), not past procedure—knowledge of 
which is necessary when using data from that period—or the procedure used at the time this is read—which 
may be different than the procedure reported in this Chapter. Researchers interested in analyzing data in 
any of these courts should confirm the data in this Chapter themselves. Not only will this ensure that any 
causal claims are empirically sound, personally learning about the assignment procedures is an excellent 
way to get to know the court structure and staff, an essential component in the data collection and analysis 
stages of these research endeavors.   
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A. The Sample 
 The survey sample presented below includes the criminal courts of the 30 most populous 
U.S. counties. 91 Criminal court size was determined using county-level population statistics92 
based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2013 estimates.93 Not surprisingly, the majority of these 
courts are located in the larger states—California (8 counties), New York (6), Texas (4), and 
Florida (4)—or larger cities—Mesa/Phoenix, Boston, Detroit, Las Vegas, Cleveland, 
Philadelphia, and Seattle. The average population of the counties is 2,451,488, with the largest 
being Los Angeles County (population 10,017,068; 431 judges94) and the smallest being 
Cuyahoga County, OH (population 1,263,154; 34 judges95).  
The data resulting from this sample will likely be the most valuable for researchers 
interested in utilizing random judge assignment in their studies because the largest courts have 
the highest number of judges (increasing the likelihood of observing diversity in judicial 
characteristics and behavior), and the most cases (data points). As a result of their size, however, 
these court systems also tend to be more administratively complex, increasing the number of 
problematic procedures that were outlined above in Part III.  
 
 
91 The list of counties in the large sample are: Los Angeles, CA; Maricopa, AZ; Orange, CA; Riverside, CA; 
San Bernardino, CA; Sacramento, CA; Miami-Dade, FL; Broward, FL; Middlesex, MA; Wayne, MI; Clark, 
NV; Kings, NY; New York, NY; Suffolk, NY; Nassau, NY; Cuyahoga, OH; Philadelphia, PA; Tarrant, TX; 
King, WA; Bexar, TX; San Diego, CA; Harris, TX; Santa Clara, CA; Hillsborough, FL;  Bronx, NY; Cook, IL; 
Alameda, CA; Palm Beach, FL; Queens, NY; and Dallas, TX.  
92 Because the vast majority of state trial court jurisdictions are defined according to county lines, I used 
county-level population as a rough measurement for criminal court “size.” Defining court size using 
geographical area, number of judges, or number of cases would also have been equally plausible 
alternatives.  
93 U.S. Census Bureau: Population Division, March 2014, "Annual Estimates of the Resident Population 
for Counties: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2013," 2013 Population Estimates, retrieved April 17, 2014 
(http://www.census.gov/popest/data/counties/totals/2013/CO-EST2013-01.html). 
94  Based on numbers reported on the official California Courts website, retrieved April 17, 2014 
(http://www.courts.ca.gov/2948.htm). 
95  Based on numbers reported on the official Cuyahoga County website, retrieved April 17, 2014 
(http://cp.cuyahogacounty.us/internet/Judges.aspx). 
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B. Survey Method and Questions 
 All surveyed counties were contacted from May 2014 to April 2015. Three counties—
Palm Beach County, Los Angeles County, and Queens County— either declined to participate in 
the survey or were unable to find a representative who could answer the survey questions.96 
While all counties were originally contacted over the phone, some answered the survey 
questions through email or post. The individuals who answered the questions were generally the 
supervising/chief judge, the lead clerk, or the department coordinator, although a number of 
courts using complex computer algorithms to make assignments referred me to their 
information technology specialist. In order to ensure accurate information on the courts’ 
assignment procedures, I always asked to speak with the individual who “directly handles the 
case assignment procedure.”  
 The survey itself was a semi-structured questionnaire focused on three main inquiries.97 
First, I determined whether the initial assignment process was random. While this may seem to 
be a simple question, the exact method of assignment turned out to be quite difficult to 
establish. Most court representatives, while eager to help, were oblivious to the technical details 
of the assignment process, and even those specifically tasked with this responsibility were often 
not fully aware of how exactly cases were divided amongst the judges (referring to “the 
computer” as an explanation was common). Second, I asked the subjects about any additional 
events that occur during and after judicial assignment, including most of the de-randomizing 
elements discussed above. Because the questions associated with these events were relatively 
straightforward (e.g. “are repeat offenders assigned to their previous judge?”), subjects generally 
knew the necessary details. Finally, I asked how thoroughly the probability of assignment and 
post-assignment procedures were recorded.  
 
96 This is generally because none of the staff with public phone numbers nor the individuals they referred 
us to knew who was in charge of case assignment.  
97 While all subjects were given the same general questions, the exact wording and order changed depending 
on whom the subject was and how familiar they were with the technicalities of the case assignment process. 
  146  
 
C. Survey Results 
Below I present and discuss the aggregate data from the court survey, focusing 
specifically on the extent to which the events discussed above play out in the largest criminal 
courts. I find that two-thirds of the surveyed courts utilize random or as-if random initial 
assignment, but also that nearly all of the “de-randomizing” events discussed in Part III are 
commonplace. I also share some additional, non-empirical insights gained through the survey 
process, including suggestions for researchers who wish to verify this survey data themselves or 
classify the assignment protocols in additional courts. The tables in this Part contain only basic 
data (generally binary indicators) on the judicial assignment protocols.  
i. Types of Assignment: The data from the survey show that the distribution among 
assignment types in the largest criminal courts is roughly equal, with 11, 7, and 9 courts utilizing 
random, as-if random, and non-random procedures, respectively (see Tables 1a-1c, below). Of 
course, the distinction between these assignment procedures depends on the assumptions that 
the researcher is willing to make and the outcomes of interest she is studying, but for 
organizational purposes, I have categorized any procedures that assign based on the schedule of 
the judge or the geographic area in which the crime was committed as non-random and 
procedures that assign according to a reoccurring, non-random list (often called a “wheel”) as 
as-if random. Among the 11 courts that use random assignment, all but one (Nassau County, 
which physically pulls names from an envelope) performs the random assignment using 
computer-generated numbers. These numbers are manifest either as stand-alone identifiers or 
are incorporated into the official case number itself.  
Every one of the courts that employ either random or as-if random assignment features 
at least one of the non-random procedures discussed in Subpart III.A. All of the courts that use 
random assignment have some judges who specialize in certain types of cases, as do all but two 
of the courts that use as-if random assignment. While assignment based on case type or 
geography are normally dispositive of truly random assignment, some courts randomly assign 
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Table 1a: Courts with Random Assignment Protocols 
Random Assignment: Cases are allocated independently of any value, 











Clark (NV) Computer and 
Geographic Area 




Cool (IL) Computer Yes (Multiple) No Protocol No Protocol 
Cuyahoga (OH) Computer Yes (Multiple) NA No Protocol 
Dallas (TX) Computer Yes (Multiple) No Protocol No Protocol 
Harris (TX) Computer and 
List 
Yes (Multiple) No Protocol No Protocol 
Hillsborough (FL) NA Yes (Multiple) No Protocol No Protocol 
Maricopa (AZ) Computer Yes (Multiple) No Protocol No Protocol 
Nassau (NY) Envelope Yes (Multiple) NA No Protocol 
Philadelphia (PA) Computer and 
Geographic Area 
Yes (Multiple) No Protocol Assigned to 
Previous Judge 
Tarrant (TX) Computer Yes (Domestic 
Violence) 
NA No Protocol 
Wayne (MI) Computer Yes (Multiple) Assigned to 
Previous Judge 
No Protocol 
*Assignment Mechanisms: The means by which the assignments are made. Computer means assignments 
are randomly generated by a computer program. Envelope means that judge names are pulled from an 
envelope for each case. Geographic Area means assignments are based on the region of the case. List 
means assignments are based on a rotating list. 
**Case-type Specialization: Whether the assignment depend in part on the case type? (Case type) 
***Repeat Offenders: How are repeat offenders (and probation violators) treated in the procedure? 
 
Table 1b: Courts with As-if Random Assignment Protocols 
As-if Random Assignment: Cases are allocated based on one or more of a case’s 











Bexar (TX) Cycled List Yes (Multiple) No Protocol No Protocol 
Broward (FL) Cycled List Yes (Drug) No Protocol Assigned to 
Previous Judge 
Middlesex (MA) Cycled List No NA NA 
New York (NY) Multi-level List  Yes (Multiple) No Protocol Assigned to 
Previous Judge 









Suffolk (NJ) Cycled List Yes (DUI) Assigned to 
Previous Judge 
NA 
*Assignment Mechanisms: The means by which the assignments are made. List means assignments are 
based on a rotating list. Alpha means assignments are based on the defendant’s last name. Numeric 
means the assignments are based on the case number.  
**Case-type Specialization: Whether the assignment depend in part on the case type? (Case type) 
***Repeat Offenders: How are repeat offenders (and probation violators) treated in the procedure? Are 
they assigned to the previous judge? 
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Table 1c: Courts with Non-random Assignment Protocols 
Cases are allocated based on one or more of a case’s pre-treatment 











Alameda (CA) Calendar      Yes (Multiple) NA NA 
Bronx (NY) Calendar Yes (Multiple) No Protocol Assigned to 
Previous Judge 
King (WA) Geographic Area 
& Calendar 
Yes (Judicial 
Experience)   
No Protocol No Protocol 








Riverside (CA) Calendar Yes (Multiple) No Protocol No Protocol 
Sacramento (CA) Calendar Yes (Domestic 
Violence) 
No Protocol NA 
San Diego (CA) Geographic Area 
& Calendar 
Yes (Judicial 
Experience)   





Yes (Multiple) No Protocol Assigned to 
Previous Judge 
*Assignment Mechanisms: The means by which the assignments are made. Calendar means assignments 
are based off of a rotating or set calendar. Geographic Area means assignments are based on the region 
of the case. 
**Case-type Specialization: Whether the assignment depend in part on the case type? (Case type) 
***Repeat Offenders: How are repeat offenders (and probation violators) treated in the procedure? 
 
among the multiple specialized or area-specific judges, allowing for researchers to derive 
unbiased ATE’s for those respective groups. For example, the Philadelphia courthouse has four 
geographical divisions, each of which has four or five judges. Once a case is assigned into one of 
those divisions based on the jurisdiction in which the crime was committed, the case is 
randomly assigned to one of those divisional judges, generally with equal probability.98 
Additionally, most courts do not alter the assignment process for repeat defendants, although a 
number of them will re-assignment them if they have a pending case or are on probation.  
 
98 Philadelphia adjusts the probability at which judges are assigned cases based on whether the judge is 
keeping up with her docket. 
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ii. Differing Probabilities of Assignment: As was discussed in Subpart III.B, any 
procedure or event that changes the probability that a given judge or group of judges will be 
assigned cases requires the researcher to calculate an estimate of the ATE using a re-balanced 
model (inverse probability weights being the example provided above). The extent to which 
courts in this study’s sample employ procedures that require this rebalancing is mixed (see 
Table 2, below). Every court consolidates defendants when they are accused of committing the 
same crime, but only 15 of the 27 courts assign defendants on probation back to their previous 
judges, and only 4 courts send repeat offenders back to the original judge. 
 












Alameda (CA) --- No NA NA 
Bexar (TX) --- No Yes No 
Bronx (NY) --- Yes (Daily) Yes No 
Broward (FL) --- No Yes Yes 
Clark (NV) Simple No Yes No 
Cook (IL) Simple Yes (Daily) Yes Yes 
Cuyahoga (OH) Simple No Yes Yes 
Dallas (TX) Simple Yes (Varies) Yes No 
Harris (TX) Complete No Yes No 
Hillsborough (FL) Complete No Yes No 
King (WA) --- No Yes No 
Kings (NY) --- No Yes Yes 
Maricopa (AZ) Simple No Yes No 
Miami-Dade (FL) --- No Yes Yes 
Middlesex (MA) --- No NA No 
Nassau (NY) Complete No Yes Yes 
New York (NY) --- No NA Yes 
Orange (CA) --- No Yes No 
Philadelphia (PA) Simple No Yes Yes 
Riverside (CA) --- No Yes No 
Sacramento (CA) --- Yes (Bi-Daily) Yes No 
San Bernardino (CA) --- No No Yes 
San Diego (CA) --- No Yes No 
Santa Clara (CA) --- No Yes No 
Suffolk (NY) --- No Yes Yes 
Tarrant (TX) Simple No Yes NA 
Wayne (MI) Complex No Yes Yes 
*Blocking: Whether cases are assigned in blocks. (On what are the blocks based?) 
**Codefendants Consolidated: Whether multiple defendants charged with the same crime combined into 
one case 
***Changes When Overscheduled: Whether cases ever reassigned due to scheduling conflicts. 
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Roughly half of the courts regularly make changes to the probability of assignment when 
a judge or group of judges is overscheduled. Some courts merely lower the probability of 
assignment to a more manageable level, while others take busy judges out of the assignment 
system entirely. Whether scheduling results in differing probabilities of assignment likely 
depends on the individual in charge of scheduling and the business judge, meaning that 
researchers will need to confirm changes in probability using court records and notes. 
iii. Post-Assignment Changes: In Subpart III.C we explored the potential for 
unidentifiable bias due to the ability for judges, administrators, and even parties to seek a 
change in the original judicial assignment. Every court in the survey has some procedure that 
allows for post-assignment changes in judicial oversight. These types of changes are most often 
due to recusal, peremptory challenges or scheduling adjustments, although some courts do 
make post-assignment changes due to judicial specialization or experience.  
iv. Missing Outcomes: Although accounting for attrition is vital to estimating an 
unbiased ATE, most of the de-randomizing events leading to attrition (particularly missing or 
lost case data) do not lend themselves to survey-based questions and, as a result, are not 
represented in the survey data. As was mentioned earlier, however, previous studies have shown 
substantial potential for attrition due to plea bargains and out-of-court settlements.99  
v. Additional Insights: While the majority of information gathered from the courts is 
included in the information above, occasionally a court official or judge would share a thought 
or say something interesting that fell outside the purview of the survey questions. Additionally, 
there were a number of general trends that may be informative for researchers hoping to 
identify courts with usable assignment procedures.  
 It was clear, for example, that courts are highly concerned with maintaining a perception 
of unbiased judicial assignment. Before they knew the intentions behind my interest in 
 
99 See supra notes 75 and 76 and accompanying text. 
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assignment procedures (statistical utilization), nearly every individual I spoke with would start 
off the discussion by saying something such as, “I can’t tell you exactly how assignments are 
made, but I can assure you that they are definitely random, and have nothing to do with the 
individuals or issues involved in the case itself.” Court officials were initially wary of the survey 
questions, later divulging that they were worried that I was media looking to write a story on 
judicial corruption. One individual even told me “we always tell people that these assignments 
are random all the time, even though there are things that regularly come up that change things 
around.”100 
 While this concern with judicial bias is comforting from an institutional perspective, it 
poses some difficulty for researchers who are attempting to verify certain assignment 
procedures. Individuals’ insistence on using the word “random” to describe judicial assignment 
made it tricky to parse out exactly how the assignments were made. Often, surveyors had to ask 
extremely specific questions or explain the statistical definition for randomness in order to 
identify the type of system the court used. This confusion is, of course, understandable given the 




 Utilizing procedures that randomly assign judges to cases allows researchers to 
legitimately address causal questions that would otherwise be intractable. Realizing this, studies 
taking advantage of this methodology are becoming more and more common. However, these 
studies often rely on erroneously assumed random assignment and fail to account for all of the 
de-randomizing events that occur over the life of a case, namely: exceptions to the general 
assignment procedure, changes in the probability of assignment over the course of the study, 
 
100 For obvious reasons, this individual asked that I not attribute this quote to him/her or the specific court. 
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post-assignment changes in judicial oversight, and missing data. Data on 30 state-level criminal 
courts show that these events are common and should be taken seriously by researchers hoping 
to harness the advantages of randomly assigned cases.  
 The conclusions in this Chapter, however, are not meant to dissuade researchers from 
answering their causal questions using random judicial assignment. Nor do they imply that 
every study that uses random judicial assignment has to perfectly meet each empirical 
assumption: researcher-driven experiments, particularly field studies, often feature problems 
such as imperfect or complicated randomization, non-compliance, spillover, and attrition. But if 
a study is relying on random assignment it should, at the very least, explore the potential for 
these issues and, ideally, attempt to account for them using the methodological techniques 
developed in the experimental literature. Naturally, a more demanding expectation for these 
studies will mean that some questions cannot be answered using data from certain courts. 
However, greater methodological rigor will produce more reliable, and therefore, more valuable 
empirical data.  
Finally, this Chapter highlights the importance of both a sound understanding of the 
methodological specifics of a given empirical technique and a clear comprehension of the rules, 
procedures, and practices of the court system and the legal institutions more broadly. As a 
subfield, legal empirical studies are perfectly suited to lead this charge. 
 
 






Testing Williams-Yulee: A Survey Experiment on Judicial Elections,  
Institutional Trust, and Tenuous Empirical Claims in the Supreme Court  
 
 The experimental study in this Chapter has received IRB approval and was funded by a grant from the 
Columbia University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, which is not responsible for the content of this 
Chapter. 
A pre-analysis plan for the experimental design and analysis featured in this Chapter is registered with 
Evidence in Governance and Politics and can be found at http://egap.org/registration/4706. Any 
deviations from that pre-analysis plan are noted in the accompanying text. 
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I. Introduction 
  In the U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent case addressing judicial elections, Williams-
Yulee v. The Florida Bar,1 the Court evaluated the constitutionality of a Florida state ban on 
direct campaign finance solicitations by elected judges. At issue in the case was whether the ban, 
which stipulated that judicial candidates cannot personally solicit campaign funds but may 
indirectly secure such funding through their campaign committee, was a violation of the First 
Amendment.  
  In ruling on the case, the Supreme Court determined that because the Florida ban was a 
restriction of the First Amendment’s right to free, content-based speech, proper constitutional 
analysis of the issue required strict scrutiny, the court’s most demanding standard of judicial 
review. In applying this test, the Court found that the ban addressed Florida’s “compelling state 
interest” in “preserving public confidence in the integrity of its judiciary.”2 More contentious, 
however, was the five-justice majority’s conclusion that the restriction was sufficiently “narrowly 
tailored” to the state’s interest. The majority accepted Florida’s assertion that a blanket 
prohibition on direct solicitation was sufficiently tailored because “solicitation by the candidate 
personally creates a categorically different and more severe risk of undermining public 
confidence than does solicitation by a campaign committee,”3 in addition to other testable but 
empirically unsupported claims. The various dissenting opinions, particularly that of Justice 
Scalia, highlighted the lack of evidence for this conclusion, while also making a number of 
similarly unsupported empirical arguments.  
  With the Supreme Court’s stamp of approval, the conclusions regarding public 
perceptions of judicial legitimacy have subsequently been applied by lower courts in several 
similar cases. Recently, for example, the 6th Circuit Court upheld Ohio’s bans on personal 
 
1 Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). 
2 Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1660. 
3 Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1670. 
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solicitation by judicial candidates4 and fundraising 120 days before the primary election or 120 
days after the general election. In doing so, the Circuit Court posited that these rules met the 
narrowly tailored component of strict scrutiny, even though the empirical assumptions required 
to make that legal conclusion were made “without considering documentary evidence.”5  
  In addition to the constitutional questions at play in Williams-Yulee, the decision and 
broader subject matter of the case highlights important and interesting questions about judicial 
elections and legitimacy that have long been studied by political scientists and legal scholars. 
How do elected judges balance the opposing responsibilities of judges-as-judges and judges-as-
politicians, especially when embedded in a context in which they must—or at least are compelled 
to—raise campaign funds? And to what extent does this seemingly paradoxical system negatively 
impact the public’s perception of the individual judges, their decisions, and the judiciary as an 
institution?  
  This Chapter features a nationally-representative online survey experiment that 
addresses these broader questions while evaluating the specific empirical arguments made and 
relied upon in the Williams-Yulee opinions, of which only one has been tested using 
experimental methods.6 The survey presents subjects with a randomly-assigned hypothetical 
vignette in which an individual runs for a state trial-level judicial seat and utilizes various 
 
4 There are three exceptions to Ohio’s solicitation rules: 1) A candidate may directly ask for donations when 
speaking to a crowd of 20 or more individuals, 2) A judge may send personally signed letters asking for 
donations as long as the donations are directed towards his or her campaign committee, and 3) A judge may 
send emails asking for donations as long as the donations are directed towards his or her campaign 
committee (Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, Cannon 4, Rule 4.4(A). 
5 Platt, et al. v. Bd. of Commissioners of the Ohio Supreme Court, 894 F.3d 235, 243 (6th Cir. 2018) United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit No. 17-3461 (2018) (ruling that “[t]he district court committed 
no clear error of judgment in granting the Board’s protective order. It determined that fact discovery was 
unnecessary because such discovery would not aid the court in determining whether Ohio had a compelling 
interest in maintaining judicial integrity.”). 
6 At one point, the majority (the dissent agreed) stated that “judges who personally ask for money may 
diminish their integrity…” compared to those who do not ask for donations at all (Williams-Yulee, 135 S. 
Ct. at 1660). Gibson’s previous work has demonstrated this using survey experiments (see James Gibson et 
al., The Effects of Judicial Campaign Activity on the Legitimacy of Courts: A Survey-based Experiment, 
64 POL. RES. Q. 545 (2011)). 
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campaign fundraising tactics. The survey then presents the subjects with questions relating to 
the trust and legitimacy they associate with the judge and judicial system presented in the 
vignette. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s assumptions in Williams-Yulee, the results of the 
survey suggest that the U.S. public does not discern a significant difference between direct and 
indirect judicial solicitation. However, the results indicate that other judicial campaign features 
(whether the judge has a policy of recusal in cases featuring donors and the amount fundraised) 
are salient in regard to trust and legitimacy. 
  This Chapter proceeds in five parts. Part II provides a more detailed factual and legal 
overview of the Williams-Yulee case, investigates the majority and dissenting opinions, and 
identifies the specific empirical claims that were made and relied upon by the Justices in those 
opinions. Part III describes the design and implementation of the survey experiment. Part IV 
analyzes the experimental results as they relate to the Williams-Yulee empirical claims, applies 
the results to several more general hypotheses about judicial elections and public trust, and 
highlights the inherent limitations of online survey experiments in this context. Part V 
concludes by briefly discussing what the results mean for Williams-Yulee specifically, and might 
mean for judicial campaign activities more generally, and why it is important for political 
scientists and legal scholars to test the often-tenuous empirical claims relied upon by the 
Supreme Court. 
 
II. The Case 
A. Factual and Legal Background 
 The factual background of Williams-Yulee is fairly simple.7 In 2009, Lanell Williams-
Yulee, a long-time Florida attorney, decided to run for one of the Hillsborough County Court 
judicial candidacies that would be filled by popular vote in the 2010 election. As with most 
 
7 See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1662-64 for case facts. 
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individuals who run for elected judicial office, Williams-Yulee required funding, and in order to 
procure donations, she wrote a personal letter announcing her candidacy, highlighting her 
service and experience, outlining her vision for the office, and asking for financial 
contributions.8 The letter was indiscriminately mass-mailed to local voters but, importantly, 
included her personal salutations and signature and was featured on her campaign website.  
 Despite her efforts, Williams-Yulee lost the primary election to the incumbent judge. 
Although she did not take office, she was soon charged with violating Rule 4-8.2(b) of the Rules 
Regulating the Florida Bar for the manner in which she solicited campaign funds.9 The 
prohibition at issue is included in Florida’s Code of Judicial Conduct, which was adopted in the 
1970’s as a response to a number of public judicial scandals involving the Florida Supreme 
Court.10 Although the rule prohibited a number of activities related to judicial campaigning and 
elections, Williams-Yulee was cited specifically for a violation of the ban on direct financial 
solicitation, which reads:  
A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is filled by 
public election between competing candidates shall not personally solicit 
campaign funds, or solicit attorneys for publicly stated support, but may establish 
committees of responsible persons to secure and manage the expenditure of funds 
for the candidate’s campaign and to obtain public statements of support for his or 
her candidacy. Such committees are not prohibited from soliciting campaign 
contributions and public support from any person or corporation authorized by 
law.11 
 
Williams-Yulee disputed the constitutionality of the law and correctly noted that it 
prohibited a candidate from sending out letters with her personal signature at the bottom while 
ostensibly permitting the same exact letter “signed” by her campaign committee, even though 
 
8 For a full text of the letter, see Figure 1: Williams-Yulee Original Letter Text in the appendix for this 
Chapter. 
9 Fl. St. Bar. Rule 4-8.2(b). 
10 See Scott G. Hawkins, Perspective on Judicial Merit Retention in Florida, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1421, 1423–
1428 (2012). 
11 Code of Judicial Conduct for the State of Florida 6 (2014). 
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the committee worked for and directly with the candidate. Similarly, under this law, a candidate 
could not personally approach a friend at a fundraiser and ask for donations, but the candidate’s 
treasurer could make such a direct request, potentially with the candidate standing across the 
room. Additionally, the Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee had officially interpreted the 
Code to allow a judicial candidate to serve as the treasurer of her own campaign committee, 
although the ban disallowed direct solicitation through such a capacity.12 These observations 
notwithstanding, the Florida Supreme Court determined that the law was constitutional, and 
since a violation had occurred, they charged Williams-Yulee for the cost of the Supreme Court 
proceeding ($1,860) and ordered her to be publicly reprimanded for her actions.13 Williams-
Yulee appealed the Florida Supreme Court ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted 
certiorari and eventually heard the case in 2015. 
 Florida’s ban—and its focus specifically on “direct” solicitation—was (and is) far from 
unique in the United States. At the time that Williams-Yulee was heard by the Supreme Court, 
39 states held judicial elections at some level, and “nearly every [such] state ha[d] adopted a rule 
prohibiting judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions.”14 Many such 
rules mirror the broad prohibition against personal financial requests implemented in Florida, 
although some are slightly more or less stringent. Georgia’s Canon 7(B)(2),15 for example, states 
that candidates for judicial office “shall not themselves solicit campaign funds, or solicit publicly 
stated support,” while allowing the candidate’s campaign committee to do so.16 Similarly, a 
 
12 Florida State Bar Association, An Aid to Understanding Canon 7, pp. 51–58 (2014). 
13 The Fla. Bar v. Williams-Yulee, 138 So. 3d 379 (Fla. 2014), aff'd, Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 
1656 (2015). 
14 Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015), Petition for Cert, at 2. According to a recent 
Brennan Center report, 30 of the states that have judicial elections have some sort of ban on solicitation. 
See Alicia Bannon, Soliciting Donations Discredits the Judiciary, The Brennan Center (January 26, 2015) 
at https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/soliciting-donations-discredits-judiciary). 
15 Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 7(B).  
16 As discussed below, this law was deemed unconstitutional by the 11th Circuit in Weaver v. Bonner, 309 
F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002). 
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judge in Kentucky will be deemed to be engaged in “inappropriate political activity” if he or she 
directly solicited funding (again, indirect solicitation through campaign committees is 
appropriate).17 Punishments for violating these laws vary, with some statutes mandating simple 
fines, as with the Williams-Yulee case, and some allowing for political removal and 
disbarment.18 
 The question as to whether these bans are constitutionally valid, let alone efficacious, is 
complex, and no academic or jurisprudential consensus had emerged previous to Williams-
Yulee.19 Many saw the laws as an appropriate bulwark against the rising cost and politicization 
of judicial elections in the United States, arguing that judges, even those who are elected, are 
tasked with interpreting and following the law and not with directly representing the 
preferences of their constituents.20 Consequentially, any interaction between candidate judges 
and citizen constituents (particularly attorneys that might argue cases in that judges’ court) is a 
serious threat to the “the integrity and independence of the judiciary,”21 which has been 
recognized by the Supreme Court as a “vital state interest.”22 The proponents of these bans often 
have similar reservations regarding any sort of campaign financing by judges—direct or 
indirect—but cite the increased potential for under-the-table quid pro quo transactions between 
donors and judges and the inherent pressure to avoid retaliation against non-donors as uniquely 
damaging consequences of a judge personally requesting campaign moneys from individuals.  
 
17 Rules of Supreme Court of Kentucky 3.130(8.2); 4.300, Canon 5.  The full clause states, “A judge or a 
candidate for judicial office shall not solicit campaign funds, but may establish committees of responsible 
persons to secure and manage the expenditure of funds for the campaign and to obtain public statements 
of support for the candidacy.” 
18 See, e.g. Rules of Supreme Court of Kentucky 4.020. 
19 For a recent and particularly thoughtful breakdown of the current debates surrounding elected judges, 
see CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHO IS TO JUDGE? 85-98 (2019). 
20 See David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUMBIA L. REV. (2008). 
21 Code of Judicial Conduct for the State of Florida 6 (2014), Canon 1. 
22 Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U. S. 868, 889 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 In contrast, the Supreme Court has long held that the First Amendment provision 
preventing Congress from creating laws that abridge the freedom of speech extends to the 
financing of government elections, and while governments can enact constitutionally sound 
bans if they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest, such bans are “rare case(s).”23 
Opponents cede that the protection of the court’s legitimacy clearly stands as valid interest 
under such a calculation, but they argue that any law that equates the distribution of mass 
mailers signed by the candidate with verbal, face-to-face solicitation is either serving some 
other, non-compelling interest, or has not been sufficiently tailored to be valid under the 
Constitution.  
 Although the issue in this case has now been officially resolved by the Supreme Court, 
the lower courts were starkly divided on whether direct solicitation bans such as Florida’s Canon 
7C(1) were an unjustified violation of the First Amendment. Of the six circuit courts that had 
reviewed such laws previous to Williams-Yulee, four determined that they did not pass 
constitutional muster. The Eleventh Circuit invalidated the Georgia ban discussed above on two 
fronts, finding that such a broad ban is over inclusive by “completely chill[ing] a candidate’s 
speech” while “hardly advancing the state’s interest in judicial impartiality at all.”24 Similarly, 
the Eighth Circuit did not believe that the distinction between a letter signed by a candidate and 
one sent from that candidate’s campaign constituted narrow tailoring,25 and the Ninth Circuit 
suggested that such behavior “presents little to no risk of corruption or bias towards future 
litigants….”26  
  The Third and Seventh Circuits, on the other hand (along with the Supreme Courts of 
 
23 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U. S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
24 Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1323 (11th Cir. 2002). 
25 See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (White II). 
26 Wolfson v. Concannon, 750 F. 3d 1145, 1157 (9th Cir. 2014). 
  161  
 
Arkansas,27 Florida,28 and Oregon29) found that nearly identical bans did indeed meet the 
compelling interest requirement while not being so overly broad that they were not narrowly 
tailored. In Stretton v. Disciplinary Board of Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,30 a judicial 
candidate in Pennsylvania was barred from sending campaign letters bearing his signature, and 
the Seventh Circuit upheld direct solicitation bans in both Wisconsin and Indiana that had been 
challenged by a pair of sitting judges.31 These conclusions—that the bans were in service of a 
compelling interest and narrowly tailored to effectuate such an interest—were ultimately 
portents for the determination that the Supreme Court would make in Williams-Yulee. 
B. The Supreme Court Decision 
 In an opinion penned by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, 
Kagan, and Ginsburg (Ginsburg did not join in Section II of this opinion, writing her own 
opinion), the majority upheld the Florida ban on the grounds that it was narrowly tailored to 
Florida’s interest in “protecting the integrity of the judiciary” and “maintaining the public’s 
confidence in an impartial judiciary.”32 Specifically, Roberts relied on a determination made in 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.33 (arguably the Court’s most prominent case dealing with 
judicial campaign finance) that the public’s perception of the judicial institution is of paramount 
concern to state legislators and citizens. 
 The dissent agreed with the majority that states do have a valid interest in maintaining 
legitimacy, and they endorsed the strict—more specifically, exacting—scrutiny that the majority 
used in determining whether the law was an appropriate means for achieving such an interest, 
 
27 See Simes v. Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, 247 S.W.3d 876 (Ark. 2007). 
28 Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1663. 
29 In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31 (Or. 1990) (per curiam). 
30 Stretton v. Disciplinary Board of Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991). 
31 See Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704 (7th Cir.2010) (the Wisconsin case) and Siefert v. Alexander, 608 
F.3d 974 (7th Cir.2010) (the Indiana case). 
32 The Fla. Bar v. Williams-Yulee, 138 So. 3d at 385. 
33 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868. 
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but they did not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Florida ban on direct solicitation 
was narrowly tailored to serve that end. Williams-Yulee had argued this point based on two 
divergent assertions. First, that the ban was too narrow. Because the law failed to prohibit other, 
equally problematic campaign behavior such as direct solicitation by campaign committees and 
the writing of personal (and direct, under the definitions adopted by the majority) thank you 
letters, it appeared insincere on its face and may be detrimental to the state’s interest in 
legitimacy. Second, Williams-Yulee claimed that the law was too broad, banning a set of 
activities that are essential to the election process and not threats to judicial legitimacy.  
 In addressing the underinclusiveness claim, the majority cited a number of cases where 
the Court had upheld laws under strict scrutiny even when they did “not address all aspects of a 
problem in one fell swoop.”34 In making a distinction between the case at hand and the cases in 
which underinclusiveness did preclude narrow tailoring,35 Roberts argued that the Florida ban 
was focused “squarely at the conduct most likely to undermine public confidence in the integrity 
of the judiciary: personal requests for money by judges and judicial candidates,”36 and that 
direct solicitation by campaign committees is categorically different, thereby creating less risk of 
delegitimizing the judicial institution. Similarly, the majority concludes that thank you letters 
“may be” detrimental to the state’s interests, but that the risk that such behavior imposes is less 
than the risk of direct solicitation. 
C. Empirical Claims 
In supporting their legal conclusions, both the majority and the dissent presented a 
number of claims that were not empirically supported in the opinions or the materials provided 
 
34 Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1668 (citing as examples, Burson, 504 U. S., at 207; see McConnell, 540 U. 
S., at 207–208; Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S. 490, 511–512 (1981) (plurality opinion); Buckley, 
424 U. S., at 105). 
35 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 543– 547 (1993); Smith v. Daily Mail 
Publishing Co., 443 U. S. 97, 104–105 (1979). 
36 Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1668. 
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to the courts by the parties.37 While making claims without providing substantial proof is 
certainly not a novel practice for the court38—indeed, it is often a necessity given the fact that 
they must make determinations using the evidence provided to them—the assumptions relied on 
in Williams-Yulee played a particularly pivotal role in the legal conclusions that the justices 
drew and ultimately shaped the outcome and jurisprudential effect of the case. As a result, the 
legal foundation of the case depends on the empirical validity of the claims. 
Empirical Claim 1: Candidates for judicial office who are actively raising campaign 
funds will diminish their own integrity and produce a lower sense of institutional trust and 
legitimacy than candidates who are not actively raising campaign funds. 
 
While this claim is not explicitly key to the decision in Williams-Yulee (the majority and 
dissent agree that solicitating campaign funds is detrimental to public trust and legitimacy 
relative to non-solicitation) and has been verified by previous research,39 the claim is important 
to explore because it presupposes the conclusions drawn by the majority. If the active pursuit of 
campaign financing by judicial candidates does nothing to impact the public’s perception of 
those individuals, or the judicial office more broadly, any prohibitions on solicitation (whether 
direct or indirect) should not pass strict scrutiny, as the banned activities would be unrelated to 
the state’s stated interest in maintaining judicial legitimacy. Additionally, in providing support 
against the dissent’s claims of underexclusiveness, the majority suggested that direct solicitation 
is the campaign behavior most likely to damage the institutional reputation of the courts. 
 
37 While some of the amici filed in the case cited survey research touching on the public perception of 
judicial solicitation, none of the data directly addressed the relative comparisons the Justices made and 
relied upon in the case. See, e.g., Amicus Brief of The Brennan Center in Support of Appellees, Williams-
Yulee v. The Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). 
38 See e.g., Adam Liptak, Did the Supreme Court Base a Ruling on a Myth?, N.Y. Times, March 6, 2017. 
39 See James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy Theory and 
“New-Style” Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 59-75 (2008); James L. Gibson & Gregory A. 
Caldiera, Campaign Support, Conflicts of Interest, and Judicial Impartiality: Can Recusals Rescue the 
Legitimacy of Courts?, 74 J. OF POL. 18-34 (2012); James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldiera, Judicial 
Impartiality, Campaign Contributions, and Recusals: Results from a National Survey, 10 J. EMP. LEGAL 
STUD. 76-103 (2013); James L. Gibson, et al., The Effects of Judicial Campaign Activity on the Legitimacy 
of Courts: A Survey-based Experiment, 64 POL. RES. Q. 545-558 (2011). 
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Empirical Claim 2: Candidates for judicial office who directly solicit campaign funds 
will diminish their own integrity and produce a lower sense of institutional trust and 
legitimacy than candidates who raise campaign funds indirectly through campaign 
committees.  
 
This is the crucial empirical claim in the case, with the majority accepting Florida’s 
contention that “solicitation by the candidate personally creates a categorically different and 
more severe risk of undermining public confidence than does solicitation by a campaign 
committee,”40 and the dissent arguing that this “intuition”41 does not meet the necessary burden 
required to pass the second half of the strict scrutiny test. 
Empirical Claim 3: Candidates for judicial office who send thank you notes to 
campaign donors will not diminish their own integrity more or produce a lower sense of 
institutional trust and legitimacy than candidates who do not send thank you letters. 
 
Williams-Yulee also argued that a sufficiently tailored state action would also ban 
personal thank you letters to donors (which the Florida law does not do), because doing so 
would ostensibly weaken the public’s trust in the judiciary by furthering the financial connection 
between the candidate and donor through direct communication. The majority disagreed, 
positing that “[p]ermitting a judicial candidate to write thank you notes to campaign donors 
likewise does not detract from the State's interest in preserving public confidence in the integrity 
of the judiciary.42 Evidence supporting this argument would invalidate Florida’s ban under the 
underinclusivity prong of the narrowly tailored test, which recognizes that underinclusive laws 
may raise “doubts about whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, 
rather than disfavoring a particular speaker or viewpoint.”43 
Empirical Claim 4: Attorneys (and citizens generally) are more pressured by and 
therefore more likely to “donate” to a judicial candidate when that candidate directly solicits 
campaign funds than if the candidate solicited campaign funds indirectly through her 
campaign committee. 
 
40 Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1669. 
41 Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015), Dissent (Scalia) at 1678 (quotations omitted). 
42 Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1660. 
43 Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1668 (quoting Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 at 
2740 (2011). 
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The majority also argued that direct solicitation “inevitably creates pressure for the 
recipient to comply, in a way that solicitation by a third party does not,”44 focusing specifically 
on the fact that a significant portion of campaign donations come from and are solicited toward 
attorneys. While this claim does not serve as the lynchpin for the majority’s conclusion, 
disproving it empirically would weaken its overall argument. 
 
III. The Survey Experiment  
A. Methodology and Venue 
This Chapter utilizes an online survey experiment to measure public response to the 
various campaign fundraising approaches scrutinized by the Supreme Court Justices in 
Williams-Yulee. As with standard public opinion surveys, survey experiments present subjects 
with information and ask a number of related questions in hopes of gauging the subjects’ 
opinions, cognitive ability, or behavior. Unlike regular surveys, however, survey experiments 
randomly vary either the information provided to the subjects or vary the questions asked in 
order to identify the causal effect of such variations.  
 The methodological value of randomized experiments is well known.45 When designed 
and conducted properly, randomized experiments—and survey experiments by extension—allow 
researchers to overcome the fundamental problem of causal inference by creating two or more 
comparison groups that are, in expectation, statistically equivalent except for the existence or 
nature of the randomly-assigned treatment.46 The researcher can then compare the average 
outcomes of the groups, knowing that any difference between them is due to the causal effect of 
 
44 Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1669. 
45 See Donald B. Rubin, Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized and Nonrandomized 
Studies, 6(5) J. EDU. PSY. 688-701 (1974). 
46 This problem states that you can never truly know the effect of a treatment on a specific object because 
you can never see two outcomes for one given case. See Paul W. Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference, 
81(396) J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 945-60 (1986). 
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the treatment.47 In the survey featured in this Chapter, the experimental treatments are 
embedded in a hypothetical vignette based closely on the letter used by Williams-Yulee in her 
campaign. 
The surveys were distributed using Lucid’s Fulcrum Exchange. Lucid is a global online 
sampling company that provides demographic-specific survey populations for market research 
and academic studies. A recent, independent study showed that Lucid’s survey respondents are 
nearly as demographically representative as traditional national probability samples and 
produce equivalent political, psychological, and experimental results.48 This same study also 
compared the experimental results of the Lucid sample against one collected through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk and found that it provides a more externally valid (albeit more expensive) set 
of respondents. For the survey in this Chapter, Lucid provided 1,038 respondents who were 
quota-sampled to reflect national U.S. demographics, and pulled from Florida (33% of the 
sample) and the other 38 states that feature judicial elections (67% of the sample). The 
descriptive statistics of this sample are discussed in infra Subpart IV.A. 
B. Survey Design and Treatments 
The survey is comprised of three main sections. The first section includes demographic 
questions asking the subjects’ age, sex, education, income, race, state of residence, political 
ideology, political party affiliation, and previous presidential vote. This section also includes two 
background questions asking whether the subjects have been personally involved in a court case 
and whether the subjects personally know any judge or former judge.49 The second section 
presents the subjects with a three-part hypothetical vignette in which the reader is given a short 
 
47 See Donald B. Rubin, Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized and Nonrandomized 
Studies, 6(5) J. EDU. PSY. 688-701 (1974). 
48 Alexander Coppock and Oliver A. McClellan, Validating the Demographic, Political, Psychological, and 
Experimental Results Obtained from a New Source of Online Survey Respondents, 6 RESEARCH & POL. 1-
14 (2019). 
49 See infra Appendix: Survey Text and Logic, Blocks 2-3. 
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description of an individual named George Anderson who is running for an open trial-level 
judicial seat in Fairview County (a fictional county), Florida.50 The third section then asks the 
subjects questions about the vignette to gauge how much the circumstances surrounding 
Anderson’s campaign affected their perceptions of Anderson as a fair and impartial judge, and 
the legitimacy they afford to his future judicial decisions and the court in which he sits(the 
specific outcome measures used in the survey are outlined and justified in infra Subpart III.D).51 
 The hypothetical vignette contains the experimental treatments, and by extension, is the 
mechanism through which the effect of various judicial fundraising and election tactics can be 
estimated. Part 1 of the vignette introduces George Anderson and details the actions he took 
leading up to the election. Part 1 varies on the following experimental factors: 
 i. Active Fundraising v. No Fundraising:52 One of the foundational empirical 
assumptions made by both the majority and dissenting Justices in Williams-Yulee is that an 
electoral system in which judicial candidates actively solicit campaign funds result in less trust 
and institutional legitimacy. To test this claim, one of the variations of the vignette (the “control” 
condition) describes Anderson’s entry into the judicial race, and recognizes the necessity of 
raising campaign funds, but explains that Anderson did not directly solicit donations. This 
variation begins as follows:  
Last year, Fairview County (a fictional county in Florida) held elections for the 
judges in their trial courts. A citizen and attorney of Fairview County named 
George Anderson decided that he would like to run for one of the judicial positions. 
Like most of the judicial candidates running in the election, George Anderson 
needed to raise money for his campaign. 
 
In order to do this, Anderson included his name on the official election registry. 
While he did not solicit or ask for any donations, he was willing to take donations 
 
50 See infra Appendix: Survey Text and Logic, Blocks 4-7. 
51 See infra Appendix: Survey Text and Logic, Blocks 8-14. 
52 The active fundraising treatment was embedded into versions B-J of the vignette, and the no-fundraising 
treatment was embedded into version A of the vignette (see infra Appendix B: Survey Text and Logic, Blocks 
4-7). 
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from individuals who knew he was running for office and wanted to support his 
campaign.  
 
This text is followed by a statement by Anderson that the subjects were told appeared on his 
website. The statement is a slightly altered version of the campaign letter used by Williams-
Yulee in her bid for judicial office,53 and reads as follows:  
Dear Friends: 
 
I have served as a public servant for this community as public defender as well 
as a prosecutor for the past 18 years. Having been involved in various civic 
activities such as “The Great American Teach In”, Inns of Court, pro bono legal 
assistance, Metropolitan Ministries outreach program, as well as a mentor for 
various young men and women residing within Fairview, I have long worked for 
positive change in this county and in Florida broadly. 
 
With the support of my family, I now feel that the time has come for me to seek 
elected office. I want to bring fresh ideas and positive solutions to the Fairview 
County judicial branch. I am certain that I can uphold the laws, statutes, and 
ordinances as prescribed by the Constitution of The State of Florida as well as the 
Constitution of the United States Of America. 
 




The other nine variations on the vignette have a similar introduction and message, but 
subjects are told that Anderson (or his campaign) either sent letters explicitly asking for 
donations or organized a campaign donation event. The campaign letter in the solicitation 
vignettes also concluded with the following appeal: 
To succeed in this effort, I need to mount an aggressive campaign. I’m inviting 
the people that know me best to join my campaign and help make a real difference. 
An early contribution of $25, $50, $100, $250, or $500, made payable to the 
“George Anderson Campaign for County Judge” will help raise the initial funds 
needed to launch the campaign and get out our message to the public. 
 
 
53 To compare to Williams-Yulee’s original letter, see infra Appendix B: Text of Original Williams-Yulee 
Letter. 
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ii. Direct Solicitation v. Indirect Solicitation:54 The key empirical claim in Williams-
Yulee was that judges directly asking for funding (whether in person or through letters) posed a 
greater threat to Florida’s interest in judicial trust and legitimacy than judges who fundraised 
indirectly through their campaigns. To test this claim, subjects who received the direct 
solicitation vignettes were either told that Anderson himself sent and signed the campaign 
letters asking for donations (“Anderson sent the following letter . . .”) or that he organized and 
attended a campaign donation event, where he personally asked for funding (“Anderson 
organized a campaign donation event, at which he personally asked guests . . . to donate to his 
campaign . . .”). Conversely, those assigned to the indirect vignettes, were told that the 
Anderson’s campaign sent and signed the letters (“Anderson had his campaign committee send 
the following letter . . .”) or that it was his campaign committee that asked for donations at the 
campaign event (“Anderson organized a campaign donation event (Anderson was not in 
attendance), at which his campaign committee asked guests . . . to donate to his 
campaign . . .”). 
iii. Citizen Donors v. Attorney Donors:55 In their opinions, the Justices also highlighted 
the particularly worrisome relationship between judicial candidates and attorney donors who 
would potentially argue cases in the judge’s courtroom. In some of the vignettes, subjects were 
told that Anderson’s campaign efforts were focused on the citizens of Fairview County, while 
other vignettes described Anderson or his campaign reaching out to attorneys. 
iv. Letter Solicitation v. Face-to-face Solicitation:56 The dissent in Williams-Yulee 
argued that Florida’s ban on direct solicitation was not narrowly tailored because it did not draw 
 
54 The direct solicitation treatment was embedded into versions B, C, F, and G of the vignette, and the 
indirect solicitation treatment was embedded into versions D, E, H, and I of the vignette (see infra Appendix 
B: Survey Text and Logic, Blocks 4-7). 
55 The citizen treatment was embedded into versions C, E, G, I of the vignette, and the attorney treatment 
was embedded into versions B, D, F, H of the vignette (see infra Appendix B: Survey Text and Logic, Blocks 
4-7). 
56 The letter treatment was embedded into versions B-E of the vignette, and the attorney treatment was 
embedded into versions F-I of the vignette (see infra Appendix B: Survey Text and Logic, Blocks 4-7). 
  170  
 
a distinction between writing mass mailings and making face-to-face solicitations, the latter of 
which they argued is more detrimental to judicial trust and legitimacy. To test this, some 
subjects were told that in order to raise funds, Anderson or his committee sent a campaign 
letter, while others were told that Anderson organized a campaign donation event, where either 
he or his campaign committee asked for donations. 
Parts 2 and 3 of the vignette provide some additional information regarding the outcome 
of Anderson’s fundraising efforts and how he planned to approach the potential conflicts of 
interest that stem from the procured donations.57 Some of the treatment variations included in 
these final parts do not directly address arguments raised in Williams-Yulee but, as is briefly 
discussed in Subpart IV.D, these treatments are valuable in addressing other questions relating 
to judicial elections more broadly 
v. Varying Success in Fundraising:58 The amount of trust and legitimacy that subjects 
attribute to a given campaign strategy could depend on the amount of money that results from 
that strategy. In a short paragraph in part 2 of the vignette, subjects were given either an average 
or total amount raised and were told that the average/total amount was either high, medium, or 
low. “The average/total donation amount resulting from these efforts was $1,010 per 
donor/$480 per donor/ $45 per donor//$4,500 / $48,000/$101,000.” [Bold sections 
were randomized]. 
vi. Thank You Letter v. No Thank You Letter:59 In her brief, Williams-Yulee argued that 
the ban was not narrowly tailored because it allowed judges to send personal thank you letters to 
 
57 These final two sections were functionally distinct from the main body of the vignette in the survey 
software, so they could be randomly assigned independently of the 10 treatment variations in part 1 (see 
infra Appendix B: Survey Text and Logic, Blocks 6-7). 
58 The average treatment was embedded into versions K-M of part 2 of the vignette, the total treatment was 
embedded into versions N-P. The low amount treatment was embedded into versions M and P of the 
vignette, the medium amount treatment was embedded into versions L and O of the vignette, and the high 
amount treatment was embedded into versions K and N of the vignette (see infra Appendix B: Survey Text 
and Logic, Block 6). 
59 The thank you letter treatment was embedded into versions T-V of part 3 of the vignette, the no thank 
you letter treatment was embedded into versions Q-S of part 3 of the vignette (see infra Appendix B: Survey 
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donors, which she argued is just as determinantal to trust and legitimacy as direct solicitation. 
The majority did not agree. To test this, some subjects were told in part 2 of the vignette that “To 
express his gratitude for those who helped him win his election, Anderson sent personally-
signed thank you letters to every individual who donated to his campaign.” 
vii. Recusal v. Non-recusal:60 The negative impact that campaign financing has on 
perceptions of trust and legitimacy could be tied to whether donations will lead to potential 
conflicts of interest in the courtroom.61 In the final section of the vignette, subjects were told that 
Anderson ended up winning the election and that “[w]hen he later realized that some of those 
that donated to his campaign would end up as parties or attorneys in his court,” he either 
“decided to remove himself from any cases involving a donor (the cases were reassigned to 
other judges)” or “decided not to remove himself from any cases involving a donor (the cases 
were not reassigned to other judges).” To test whether the explicit discussion of recusal alone 
impacts levels of trust and legitimacy, some subjects were simply told that Anderson ended up 
winning the election, without any reference to recusal. 
C. Randomization 
 Subjects were randomly assigned within a given treatment category independently of 
their assignment to the other categories. As described above, each subject was presented with a 
three-part vignette: the first section included one of ten variations of the campaign strategy used 
by the judge; the second section included one of six variations of the donation results; and the 
third section included one of six variations of the post-election behavior (recusal and thank you 
letters). The probability of assignment to the variations of the campaign strategy were a 2/11 
 
Text and Logic, Block 7). 
60 The recusal treatment was embedded into versions Q and T of part 3 of the vignette, the no recusal 
treatment was embedded into versions R and U of part 3 of the vignette, and the non-discussion treatment 
was embedded into versions S and V of the vignette (see infra Appendix B: Survey Text and Logic, Block 7). 
61 See Chapter 1 of this dissertation for a detailed discussion of judicial recusal as it relates to campaign 
finance. 
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chance of being assigned to the control (no fundraising) condition and a 1/11 chance of being 
assigned to the remaining nine conditions. The probability of assignment for the second and 
third sections of the vignette were equal for all variations (1/6).  
 When all three parts are combined, the result is 10 x 6 x 6 = 360 unique vignettes. While 
this creates a number of unique treatments that is over 33 percent of the total subjects in the 
study, which would normally be statistically underpowered (to say the least), by using a factorial 
randomization scheme where the probability of being assigned one aspect of the treatment is 
independent of being assigned another aspect of the treatment, the survey responses to distinct 
vignettes can be averaged to create groups that allow for sufficiently powered testing.  
D. Outcomes 
 The survey features three primary outcomes that measure levels of judicial trust, judicial 
fairness, and institutional legitimacy.62 While the outcomes are not perfect measures of each 
concept, they are each adopted from the measures used by the leading political scientists and 
legal scholars in the field of judicial legitimacy.63 After the survey presented them with the 
randomized vignette, each survey subject was presented with the following three questions. The 
order of the first two were randomized, and the third question contains a randomized element 
that was included as part of a separate study recusal. Although answer selections to the judicial 
bias question indicate increasingly positive perceptions,64 the numerical values of these answers 
were recoded to reflect the increasingly negative answer options in the fairness and legitimacy 
questions.  
 
62 In addition to these three outcome measures, the survey also included an additional outcome measure 
on legitimacy that is used as a measure for survey consistency. This outcome is not reported as part of the 
experimental analysis, pursuant to this Chapter’s pre-analysis plan. 
63 See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANNUAL 
REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY 375-400 (2006); TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING 
PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002). For examples of research focused on 
determining the perceived fairness and impartiality of judges and their decisions, see the works of Gibson 
and Caldeira, supra note 39. 
64 This was done to vary the answer selections across outcome measures to help ensure more thoughtful 
responses by the subjects. 
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i. Judicial Fairness and Impartiality: 
Do you believe Judge Anderson can serve as a fair and impartial judge for Fairview County? 
o I strongly believe Anderson can be fair and impartial 
o I somewhat believe Anderson can be fair and impartial 
o I somewhat believe Anderson cannot be fair and impartial 
o I strongly believe Anderson cannot be fair and impartial 
 
ii. Institutional Legitimacy of the Court System: 
Assume for the moment that all elected judges in the Fairview County Court used the same 
campaigning strategies as Judge Anderson. How legitimate would you consider the Fairview 
County Court? 
o I would consider it a very legitimate institution 
o I would consider it a somewhat legitimate institution 
o I would not consider it a very legitimate institution 
o I would not consider it a very legitimate institution at all 
 
iii. Judicial Bias: 
Assume for a moment that one of the individuals who donated to Judge Anderson is now [an 
attorney who is arguing / a party in] a case in Judge Anderson’s Court. Do you think 
that the relationship between the donor and Judge Anderson will bias Judge Anderson’s 
judicial behavior? [Bolded section is randomly assigned] 
o It will definitely bias the judge’s behavior 
o It will probably bias the judge’s behavior 
o It will probably not bias the judge’s behavior 
o It will definitely not bias the judge’s behavior 
 
Additionally, the survey also asked the subjects how willing they would be to donate to 
Anderson’s campaign. The specific wording of this question was dependent on the treatments 
assigned to the subject. The donation outcome is used to test Empirical Claim 4. 
iv. Likelihood of Donating:65 
Imagine that you were an attorney in Fairview County during the judicial election. You receive 
the letter from Anderson asking for donations. How likely would you be to donate to his 
campaign? 
o Extremely likely  
o Moderately likely  





65  This version of the donation question appeared for subjects who were assigned to the treatment 
conditions in which Anderson sent letters asking for support. 
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o Neither likely nor unlikely  
o Slightly unlikely  
o Moderately unlikely  
o Extremely unlikely  
 
 
IV. Analysis and Results 
A. Survey Sample: 
An initial sample of 100 subjects were surveyed on June 18, 2018. After verifying that the 
survey was functioning correctly, the remaining 938 subjects were surveyed from June 20 to 
June 22. The resulting final sample consisted of 1,038 subjects recruited from the 33 states in 
Table 1a: Sample Demographics 
Respondent 
Characteristic 




Age (Years) 43.19 41 18 92 
79/1,038 
(7.6%) 













$56,898 $49,999 $0 $350,000 
64/1,038 
(6.2%) 













0.39 Republican NA NA 
2/1,038 
(0%) 
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which elections are used for the initial selection of trial or appellate judges.66 To independently 
test the claims in Williams-Yulee from the state in which the case originated, Lucid oversampled 
from Florida (33% of the sample). The remaining subjects were sampled from the remaining 
judicial election states according to the proportional size of each state’s population. Sample 
demographics generally reflect the demographic distribution of the United States, although the 
sample is slightly over-educated, white, and wealthy (see Table 1a, below). 
B. Survey Robustness Checks: 
 Using hypothetical vignettes as a mechanism for testing empirical claims is common 
practice within social science disciplines, and the details of the vignette used in this survey 
closely match the circumstances at issue in Williams-Yulee. But the campaign strategies 
embedded in the survey treatments will almost certainly be less salient than they would be if 
subjects interacted with them in the real world (i.e. they were residents of Florida and had heard 
about Williams-Yulee’s real campaign). Thus, a null finding for any of the hypotheses tested may 
be due to either the incorrectness of the empirical assumptions made by the Justices in 
Williams-Yulee being, or simply due to limitations in the experimental design.  
To strengthen the validity of the study, a “extreme” treatment variation was introduced 
that described clearly inappropriate quid pro quo campaign behavior that would almost 
certainly impact how a judge and the judiciary as a whole was viewed by the public. Roughly ten 
percent of the subjects were given a vignette in which the campaign behavior of Anderson was 
the following: 
In order to do this, Anderson directly asked a number of prominent attorneys in 
Fairview County for campaign money, promising to “make it up to them” when 
 
66 These states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, 
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin. States that do not hold any judicial 
elections (Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Virginia), 
only hold retention elections (Alaska, Colorado, Iowa, Nebraska, Utah, and Wyoming), or only hold 
elections for probate court judges or magistrate judges (Connecticut, Maine, South Carolina, and Vermont) 
were not included in this sampling.   
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they argued cases in his courtroom. While he did not guarantee that they would 
win those cases, he did promise to give extra considerations to their arguments 
if they made significant donations to his campaign.67 
A null finding for this treatment will thus indicate that either the treatment variations are not 
salient in the structure of the survey vignette, or that the survey respondents are simply not 
reading the vignette carefully. 
Table 2a shows that the quid pro quo treatment caused large and statistically significant 
differences in all three of the primary outcomes of interest. Subjects who were presented with a 
vignette that included the judge explicitly promising better case outcomes for donors are more 
than 1.1 points less likely to see the judge as fair and impartial compared to subjects presented 
with a hypothetical judge who solicited contributions through more the more proper tactics 
discussed previously. The differences also apply to perceptions of institutional legitimacy (1.1 
points) and to a lesser extent, perceptions of bias (.47 points). On a four-point scale, in which 
the maximum movement is three points, these differences provide strong evidence that the 
structure of the experiment and the attentiveness of the subjects allow the subjects to be 
“treated” by the vignettes.  
Interestingly, the quid pro quo treatment did not produce a significant effect on the 
likelihood that a subject would donate to Anderson’s campaign, although the direction of the 
estimate is in the expected direction. This suggests that the donation measurement may not be 







67 The quid pro quo treatment was embedded into versions J of the vignette (see infra Appendix B: 
Survey Text and Logic, Blocks 2-4). 
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1.975 3.011 1.115 0.000 1.018 1.213 
Legitimate 
Court 








3.739 3.702 -0.26 0.860 -0.172 0.121 
* When accounting for the ten separate tests run on each of the three outcome measurements, the Šidák 
correction results in an alpha level of .005. Coefficients and p-values in bold fall below the 
Šidák-corrected significance level. 
** Pre-treatment covariates include: age, sex, education, income, race, state of residence, political 
ideology, political party affiliation, previous presidential vote, whether the subjects have been personally 
involved in a court case, and whether the subjects personally know any judge or former judge. 
 
To further test the extent to which subjects were engaging with the survey language, one 
additional outcome measure for impartiality not in the experimental analysis was provided in 
the survey:68  
As a citizen, how likely would you be to accept decisions made by Judge Anderson as 
impartial, fair, and legitimate? 
o Extremely likely 
o Moderately likely 
o Slightly likely 
o Neither likely nor unlikely 
o Slightly unlikely 
o Moderately unlikely 
o Extremely unlikely 
 
This question was presented on a separate page from the impartiality question included 
in the experimental analysis but should be highly correlated if the subjects are reading the 
 
68 This additional outcome was designated as a consistency-check variable in this Chapter’s pre-analysis 
plan and was not designated for experimental analysis. 
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survey and answering questions consistently. The Chronbach’s Alpha between these two 
impartiality measures was 0.88, suggesting strong consistency across questions in the survey. 
C. Testing the Empirical Claims in Williams-Yulee: 
 To test each of the empirical claims asserted by the Supreme Court Justices in Williams-
Yulee, the survey responses were compared to three outcome measures—fairness and 
impartiality, institutional legitimacy, and likelihood of bias (e.g., willingness to donate for the 
donation claim). The comparison across treatment groups employs multivariate regression 
analysis that includes each of the demographic variables collected in the first part of the survey, 
with the exclusion of state of residence.69 P-values from the regression were subjected to a Šidák 
Correction for multiple comparisons.70 
Empirical Claim 1 posited that candidates for judicial office who are actively raising 
campaign funds will diminish their own integrity and produce a lower sense of institutional trust 
and legitimacy than candidates who are not actively raising campaign funds. The claim was 
tested by comparing the outcome responses of subjects who were presented with the no-
solicitation control vignette with those who were presented with the vignettes in which 
Anderson did activity seek donations, either personally or through his committee. The results of 
the multivariate regression of solicitation on the outcome measures (see Table 3a) suggest that 
solicitation does have a slight negative impact on perceptions of impartiality, legitimacy, and 
bias (higher values in each outcome measure indicate more “negative” perceptions), but the 




69 The categorical demographic variables were re-coded to binary variables as follows: Sex (1 = Female), 
Education (1 = College graduate or higher), Race (1 = White), Party affiliation (1 = Democrat), Presidential 
vote (1 = Trump). 
70  Zbyněk Šidák, Rectangular Confidence Regions for the Means of Multivariate Normal 
Distributions, 62 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 626-633 (1967). 
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(n = 187) 
Mean of 
Solicitation 



















1.886 1.997 0.118 0.447 -0.018 0.135 
Legitimate 
Court 




2.716 2.776 0.086 0.221 0.016 0.156 
* When accounting for the ten separate tests run on each of the three outcome measurements, the Šidák 
correction results in an alpha level of .005. Coefficients and p-values in bold fall below the 
Šidák-corrected significance level. 
** Pre-treatment covariates include: age, sex, education, income, race, state of residence, political 
ideology, political party affiliation, previous presidential vote, whether the subjects have been personally 
involved in a court case, and whether the subjects personally know any judge or former judge. 
 
Empirical Claim 2 posited that candidates for judicial office who directly solicit 
campaign funds will diminish their own integrity and produce a lower sense of institutional trust 
and legitimacy than candidates who is raise campaign funds indirectly through their campaign 
committees. This was the primary empirical claim in Williams-Yulee and a major source of 
dispute between the majority and dissent. The claim is tested in Table 4 by comparing the 
outcome responses of subjects who were presented with vignettes in which Anderson personally 
solicited funds (direct solicitation) with subjects who were given vignettes in which Anderson’s 
campaign committee was soliciting funds (indirect solicitation). Surprisingly, the estimated 
treatment effect of a judge directly asking for contributions on the impartiality and legitimacy 
measures is negative, although the size of the effect is small in both cases. On average, subjects 
believed that judges who have their campaign committees ask for money are less impartial and 
their court systems less legitimate than judges who do so themselves. Although these estimated 
effects are not significant, even the upper range of estimates within the 95% confidence interval 
suggest that the effect is negligible at best. Direct solicitation apparently does increase the 
perception of bias resulting from donations, but the effect is also not significant.  
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2.008 1.986 -0.029 0.652 -0.094 0.035 
Legitimate 
Court 




2.727 2.825 0.100 0.107 0.038 0.162 
* When accounting for the ten separate tests run on each of the three outcome measurements, the Šidák 
correction results in an alpha level of .005. Coefficients and p-values in bold fall below the 
Šidák-corrected significance level. 
** Pre-treatment covariates include: age, sex, education, income, race (white), political ideology, political 
party affiliation (Democrat), previous presidential vote (Trump), whether the subjects have been 
personally involved in a court case, and whether the subjects personally know any judge or former judge. 
 
Empirical Claim 3 posited that candidates for judicial office who send thank you notes to 
campaign donors will not diminish their own integrity and produce a lower sense of institutional 
trust and legitimacy than candidates who do not send thank you letters. Specifically, if thank you 
letters are as detrimental to legitimacy and impartiality as direct solicitation, then the law in 
question in Williams-Yulee would be under-inclusive. This claim is tested by comparing the 
outcome responses of subjects who were presented with vignettes that had Anderson sending 
thank you letters, with subjects who were given vignettes in which Anderson’s did not send 
thank you letters. As with the results for empirical claim 2, the presence of purportedly 
detrimental campaign activities—thank you notes in this case—result in slightly higher 
perceptions of legitimacy and impartiality. This suggests that if there is an effect of thank you 
letters, it is positive, at least in regard to judicial perception. However, the substantive size of the 
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2.045 1.948 -0.090 0.167 -0.155 -0.025 
Legitimate 
Court 
2.111 2.069 -0.055 0.423 -0.123 0.014 
Bias Due To 
Donation 
2.815 2.734 -0.060 0.333 -0.122 0.002 
* When accounting for the ten separate tests run on each of the three outcome measurements, the Šidák 
correction results in an alpha level of .005. Coefficients and p-values in bold fall below the 
Šidák-corrected significance level. 
** Pre-treatment covariates include: age, sex, education, income, race (white), political ideology, political 
party affiliation (Democrat), previous presidential vote (Trump), whether the subjects have been 
personally involved in a court case, and whether the subjects personally know any judge or former judge. 
 
In addition to the impact that judicial campaigns have on public perceptions of the 
judiciary, the majority in in Williams-Yulee was also convinced by Florida’s argument that direct 
solicitation likely puts an undue burden on attorneys to donate to judges, for fear of being 
disadvantaged in the courtroom. Specifically, Empirical Claim 4 posits that attorneys are more 
pressured and therefore more likely to “donate” to a judicial candidate when that candidate 
directly solicits campaign funds than if that candidate solicited campaign funds indirectly 
through his campaign committee. 
Of the four claims discussed in this Chapter, this claim is the least amenable to survey 
experiments, particularly when the survey respondents are not attorneys. While the primary 
outcome for the other hypotheses are individual perceptions, which can be captured in a survey, 
accurately testing the effect of campaign activities on the amount of “pressure” that attorneys 
feel, would ideally involve measuring the donation behavior of actual attorneys. However, to 
provide preliminary information on this relationship, the subjects’ willingness to donate to 
Anderson’s campaign was measured when he, as opposed to his committee, directly asked for 
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donations. As shown in Table 6a, the difference in the willingness to donate between the two 
conditions is negligible (.03 points on a 7-point scale) and not statistically significant.  





(n = 382) 
Mean of 
Solicitation 





















3.739 3.702 -0.026 0.860 -0.173 0.121 
* Pre-treatment covariates include: age, sex, education, income, race (white), state of residence, political 
ideology, political party affiliation (Democrat), previous presidential vote (Trump), whether the subjects 
have been personally involved in a court case, and whether the subjects personally know any judge or 
former judge. 
 
D. Additional Hypotheses: 
As described above, the survey vignette also included experimental elements relating to 
judicial elections and campaign finance that were not explicitly discussed in the Williams-Yulee 
opinions. These elements allow for tests of additional empirical hypotheses that build off of 
previous research and lay a groundwork for future studies on judicial elections. As with the 
empirical claims tested above, estimated treatment effects are calculated for the three primary 
outcomes of interest using multivariate regression analysis that controls for the pre-treatment 
covariates collected at the beginning of the survey. 
Additional Hypothesis 1: Subjects presented with a judge or campaign committee who 
is actively raising campaign funds from attorneys will have a lower sense of institutional trust 
and legitimacy than subjects presented with a judge or campaign committee who is actively 
raising campaign funds from citizens. 
 
Additional Hypothesis 2: Subjects presented with a judge or campaign committee who 
solicits campaign funds face-to-face (at a fundraising event) will have a lower sense of 
institutional trust and legitimacy than subjects presented with a judge or campaign committee 
who solicits campaign funds via letters. 
 
 The first two additional hypotheses build off of the issues that the justices were 
concerned with in Williams-Yulee. If, as the majority posits, direct solicitation is dangerous in 
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part because of how it will pressure attorneys to donate to judges, the public may perceive 
judges who target attorneys as being less impartial or unbiased than those who target citizens.  






























1.965 2.030 0.080 0.220 0.015 0.144 
Legitimate 
Court 




2.778 2.774 0.011 0.857 -0.051 0.073 
* When accounting for the ten separate tests run on each of the three outcome measurements, the Šidák 
correction results in an alpha level of .005. Coefficients and p-values in bold fall below the 
Šidák-corrected significance level. 
** Pre-treatment covariates include: age, sex, education, income, race (white), political ideology, political 
party affiliation (Democrat), previous presidential vote (Trump), whether the subjects have been 
personally involved in a court case, and whether the subjects personally know any judge or former judge. 
 





























2.008 1.987 -0.063 0.337 -0.003 0.128 
Legitimate 
Court 




2.772 2.779 0.027 0.670 -0.089 0.036 
* When accounting for the ten separate tests run on each of the three outcome measurements, the Šidák 
correction results in an alpha level of .005. Coefficients and p-values in bold fall below the 
Šidák-corrected significance level. 
** Pre-treatment covariates include: age, sex, education, income, race (white), political ideology, political 
party affiliation (Democrat), previous presidential vote (Trump), whether the subjects have been 
personally involved in a court case, and whether the subjects personally know any judge or former judge. 
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Similarly, asking for donations in person may be seen as a more direct form of solicitation than 
asking for donations via campaign letters and may therefore influence how the public views 
judges who make such appeals. Tables 7a and 8a test these hypotheses. Given the results of the 
tests on Empirical Claim 2, it is perhaps not surprising that there are no significant treatment 
effects on any of the outcomes. 
Additional Hypothesis 3: Subjects who are told that the judge publicly announces a 
policy to recuse himself from any case in which one or more of the parties or attorneys had 
previously donated to his political campaign will have a higher sense of institutional trust and 
legitimacy than subjects who are told that the judge declined to announce such a policy. 
Previous survey experiments by Gibson and Caldeira have shown that while public 
perceptions of judicial legitimacy are damaged when judges hear cases in which a campaign 
donor is a participant, much (but not all) of that legitimacy can be recovered if the judge recuses 
from such cases.71 Consistent with these findings, Table 9a indicates that subjects perceived the 
judges who refuse to recuse from cases that feature a donor attorney as moderately more 
impartial (.43 points) than judges who made a policy of recusing from such cases. Similarly, the 
court to which the judge was elected is seen as more legitimate (.32 points), and the judge is 
believed to be less biased (.21 points) when the judge recuses from cases. All of these results are 
significant at levels that survive a multiple comparison correction.  
To determine whether this effect is driven by a proactive policy to recuse or the refusal to 
recuse, a vignette variation in which no mention of the judge’s recusal policy is included. The 
regression results in Table 10a compare the perceptions of subjects who were not told a judge’s 
recusal policy against those who were told that the judge has publicly stated that he will recuse. 
None of the outcomes are substantively or statistically significant, suggesting that the effects 
 
71 James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Judicial Impartiality, Campaign Contributions, and Recusals: 
Results from a National Survey, 10 J. EMP. L. STUD. 76 (2013); James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, 
Campaign Support, Conflicts of Interest, and Judicial Impartiality: Can Recusals Rescue the Legitimacy 
of Courts?, 74 J. POL. 18 (2012). 
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presented in Table 9 are likely a result of both an aversion to a judge declining to recuse and an 
appreciation of a judge who positively states that he will recuse. 































2.255 1.846 -0.431 0.000 -0.313 -0.349 
Legitimate 
Court 




2.916 2.692 -0.209 0.006 -0.285 -0.133 
* When accounting for the ten separate tests run on each of the three outcome measurements, the Šidák 
correction results in an alpha level of .005. Coefficients and p-values in bold fall below the 
Šidák-corrected significance level. 
** Pre-treatment covariates include: age, sex, education, income, race (white), political ideology, political 
party affiliation (Democrat), previous presidential vote (Trump), whether the subjects have been 
personally involved in a court case, and whether the subjects personally know any judge or former judge. 
 



























1.900 1.846 -0.037 0.613 -0.109 0.036 
Legitimate 
Court 




2.723 2.692 -0.062 0.422 -0.140 0.015 
* When accounting for the ten separate tests run on each of the three outcome measurements, the Šidák 
correction results in an alpha level of .005. Coefficients and p-values in bold fall below the 
Šidák-corrected significance level. 
** Pre-treatment covariates include: age, sex, education, income, race (white), political ideology, political 
party affiliation (Democrat), previous presidential vote (Trump), whether the subjects have been 
personally involved in a court case, and whether the subjects personally know any judge or former judge. 
 
Additional Hypothesis 4: Subjects who are told that the judge’s fundraising efforts led 
to large average donations or a large total donation amount will have a lower sense of 
  186  
 
institutional trust and legitimacy than subjects who are told that the efforts led to small 
average donations or a small total donation amount. 
 
The amount of fundraising and spending in judicial elections has drastically increased 
over the last thirty years,72 and non-experimental empirical research has identified a strong, 
positive correlation between whether an individual (a party or an attorney) donates and how 
favorably the done judge rules on their case.73 Similarly, national survey have shown that the 
majority of the broader public and nearly a majority of state-court judges themselves believe 
that money is influencing judicial behavior,74 so it is likely that a judge who raises more money 
in his campaign will be seen as less legitimate, fair, and unbiased. 
 Table 11a compares the responses of subjects who were told that the judge raised a large 
amount of money ($101,000) or had large average donation amounts ($1,010 per donor) against 
those who were told that the judge raised a small amount of money ($4,500 total) or had small 
average donations ($45 per donor). Interestingly, the results of the multivariate regression 
suggest that increased money does not affect general perceptions of legitimacy or impartiality 
but does slightly (0.16 points) increase the likelihood that the subject believes the judge would 
 
72  See, e.g., Chris W. Bonneau, What Price Justice(s)? Understanding Campaign Spending in State 
Supreme Court Elections, STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 5: 107-125 (2005); Chris W. Bonneau, The Dynamics of 
Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, 
FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 63 fig.4.1 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007); Phillip L. 
Dubois, Voting Cues in Nonpartisan Trial Court Elections: A Multivariate Assessment, 18 L. & SOC. REV. 
395 (1984) (reporting that the cost of election in the California Superior Courts (the trial courts) doubled 
from 1978 to 1982); California Commission on Campaign Financing, The Price of Justice: A Los Angeles 
Area Case Study in Judicial Campaign Financing (1995) (reporting that the “spending for Los Angeles 
County Superior Court races increased 22-fold’’ (at 51) between 1976 and 1994). 
73 See, e.g., Morgan L. W. Hazelton, Jacob M. Montgomery, & Brendan Nyhan, Does Public Financing Affect 
Judicial Behavior? Evidence from the North Carolina Supreme Court, 44 AM. POL. RES. 587 (2015); 
Michael Heise, The Complicated Business of State Supreme Court Elections: An Empirical Perspective, 
Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper (2018). 
74  Justice at Stake, Justice at Stake Frequency Questionnaire, available at 
http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/ JASNationalSurveyResults_6F537F99272D4.pdf (reporting 
that 76 percent of voters believe that campaign contributions have at least “some influence” on judicial 
behavior); Justice at Stake, State Judges Frequency Questionnaire (2002), available at 
http://www.justiceatstake.org /media/cms/JASJudgesSurveyResults_EA8838C0504A5.pdf. (reporting 
that 46 percent of state court judges stated that they believe campaign contributions influence judicial 
behavior). 
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be biased if a donor appeared in his courtroom. This finding is statistically significant at the .05 
level but does not survive the multiple comparisons correction. 






























2.004 2.079 0.081 0.393 -0.002 0.163 
Legitimate 
Court 




2.700 2.864 0.163 0.037 0.085 0.241 
* When accounting for the ten separate tests run on each of the three outcome measurements, the Šidák 
correction results in an alpha level of .005. Coefficients and p-values in bold fall below the 
Šidák-corrected significance level. 
** Pre-treatment covariates include: age, sex, education, income, race (white), political ideology, political 
party affiliation (Democrat), previous presidential vote (Trump), whether the subjects have been 
personally involved in a court case, and whether the subjects personally know any judge or former judge. 
 
E. Florida Sub-group Analysis 
 Sub-group analyses for the 330 subjects residing in Florida allows for the tests that most 
closely match the fact pattern in Williams-Yulee. The results of the Florida sub-group analyses 
are presented in Tables 1b-6b (see Appendix B: Florida Sub-group Analysis). The outcomes on 
the four empirical claims are similar to those for the full sample—perceptions of the judiciary 
were not impacted by direct solicitation75 or thank you letters, and the likelihood of donation 
was the same regardless of whether the judge asked for donations personally or did so through 
his campaign committee. The substantive size of the estimated ATEs were generally bigger for 
the Florida sample, but these effects were not statistically distinguishable from zero, possibly 
due to the smaller sample size and thus lower power of the tests. 
 
75 Direct solicitation did result in a .214-point increase in the respondent that believe a judge would be 
biased, and this estimated effect was significant at the .05 level.  However, after accounting for multiple 
comparisons, this result is also indistinguishable from zero. 
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 As with the analysis on the full sample, the Florida sub-sample test did identify some 
treatment effects pertaining to the additional hypotheses. Florida respondents were more 
skeptical of judges who asked for donations from attorneys than of those who asked for 
donations from citizens, although the neither of these effects survived the multiple comparison 
correction. Florida respondents were significantly more likely to think a judge would be biased 
in a case featuring a donor attorney (.345 points) when the average or total amount raised by the 
judge is high, and they were more skeptical across the board regarding judges who explicitly 
promised quid pro quo benefits to donors.  
F. Limitations and Concerns:  
i. Design-based Limitations: The key empirical questions in Williams-Yulee relate to the 
causal effect that various judicial campaign strategies have on the public’s perception of the 
judiciary. The ideal empirical design for addressing these questions would satisfy the following 
three conditions: 1) random assignment, 2) treatment conditions that reproduce strategies used 
by judges in election campaigns, and 3) reliable measures for public perception of impartiality, 
legitimacy, and bias.  
As an experiment, the survey featured in this Chapter satisfies the first of these 
requirements through the factorial randomization of vignette content. As a nationally 
representative survey, it also arguably satisfies the third condition. Although the majority in 
Williams-Yulee argued that “[t]he concept of public confidence in judicial integrity does not 
easily reduce to precise definition, nor does it lend itself to proof by documentary record,”76 
social scientists have long understood opinion surveys as a reliable method for collecting data on 
the public’s trust in political institutions and beliefs regarding the impartiality of judges.77 
Additionally, the format and content of the questions included in this survey were adopted from 
 
76 Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1667. 
77 See the works of Gibson and Caldeira, supra note 39. 
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leading research in the area of judicial legitimacy and reflect the discipline’s most tried and true 
approach for capturing such concepts.78 
The question of how well a survey experiment can satisfy the second condition listed 
above is less clear. Both the majority and dissents in Williams-Yulee are concerned with the 
effect of actual campaign strategies used by actual judges. While the vignette used in this study 
is based largely on the campaign materials used by Williams-Yulee during her run for judgeship, 
the subjects are exposed to these materials in a survey context and are explicitly told that they 
are describing a hypothetical judicial candidate. Without a field experiment, it is unclear if 
subjects would react to the experimental treatments differently than they would in a natural 
setting. Additionally, citizens might be unaware of the campaign strategies of judges running for 
local seats in actual elections, in which case the effect that strategies such as direct fundraising 
will have on the public consciousness would be negligible, not because the public does not care, 
but because they are uninformed.  
ii. The Weak-Null Problem: The empirical questions in Williams-Yulee are interesting 
because a null finding may be as interesting and valuable as an identified effect, and perhaps 
more so given that the majority assumed an effect. Most of the tests presented above resulted in 
estimated treatment effects that were statistically indistinguishable from zero. Finding a “true 
null” effect (a statistically significant but substantively small effect) for these treatments would 
provide more confidence that there actually no difference between the campaign strategies used 
in the vignettes. While the fact that the coefficients were small and the standard errors and the 
confidence intervals were tight, the “weak” nulls provides some confidence of negligible 
treatment effects, but to more reliable determine that there is no treatment effect, a larger and 
more powerful study is necessary. 
 
78 See Id and supra note 63. 
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V. Conclusions and Implications 
 The majority’s decision in Williams-Yulee relied on the empirical conclusion that there is 
a substantial distinction between how the public views judges who raise campaign funds 
through direct solicitation and those who do so through indirect solicitation. The results of this 
study do not support this conclusion and therefore call into question the constitutional 
precedent set by Williams-Yulee and the subsequent decisions made by the U.S. Circuit and 
District Courts. While the evidence produced by this study should be understood with the 
limitations inherent in survey experiments in mind, this methodology is particularly well-suited 
for the questions raised in Williams-Yulee because surveys are best used to test public opinion 
and perception, which are the very outcomes that form the justification for the laws restricting 
direct solicitation by judicial candidates. 
 More broadly, the results of this study highlights value of critically evaluating the 
Supreme Court when it relies on empirical assumptions that are not supported by empirical 
data. While the Court cannot constrain its decisions purely to those questions that can and have 
been addressed by empiricists, continuing to rely on inherently empirical assumptions without 
the proper support will likely lead to flawed jurisprudence and lower public support (the very 
problem the Court sought to alleviate in Williams-Yulee). Survey experiments such as the one 
featured in this Chapter are particularly well suited to this task, particularly when the empirical 
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Case Type Divorce 0/6 (0%) 1/6 (17%) .17 
.20 
--- Non-Divorce 2/24 (8%) 1/22 (5%) -.03 
Judge Gender Female 1/7 (14%) 1/9 (11%) -.03 
.04 




Same 1/19 (5%) 1/18 (6%) .01 
.00 




Unopposed 0/11 (0%) 0/12 (0%) .00 
.02 
--- Opposed 2/19 (11%) 2/16 (13%) .02 
Donation 
Amount 
< $350 2/21 (10%) 2/18 (11%) .01 
.01 






< 5% 1/20 (5%) 1/20 (5%) .00 
.03 
--- > 5% 1/10 (10%) 1/8 (13%) .03 
* External Donations exclude any donations made by the candidate or individuals with the same 
surname as the candidate. 













































0/24 (0%) 5/22 (23%) .23 
Judge 
Gender 
Female 0/7 (0%) 2/9 (22%) .22 
.15 




Same 0/19 (0%) 4/18 (22%) .22 
.28 




Unopposed 0/11 (0%) 5/12 (42%) .42 
.17 
--- Opposed 0/19 (0%) 4/16 (25%) .25 
Donation 
Amount 
< $350 0/21 (0%) 7/18 (39%) .39 
.19 






< 5% 0/20 (0%) 7/20 (35%) .35 
.10 
--- > 5% 0/10 (0%) 2/8 (25%) .25 
* External Donations exclude any donations made by the candidate or individuals with the 
same surname as the candidate. 
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Figure 6: Harris County Attorney Verification Protocol Script 
1. Does the Texas Bar database have an individual with the same first and last name as the 
individual in the case and the individual in the campaign finance data (note: there was never any 
discrepancy between the names in the cases and the names in the bar database)? 
o If Yes: Move on to next step. 
o If No: Does the Texas Bar database have an individual with the same last name and a 
similar first name as the individual in the case and the individual in the campaign finance 
data? (Examples: Bob and Robert, Rusty and Russel, Tony and Anthony, and anyone with 
a middle name that matches a first name.) 
▪ If Yes: Move onto next step. 
▪ If No: Exclude from the sample. 
2. Is there more than one individual in the Texas Bar database that has that first and last name or a 
similar name? (Examples: There are two William Stouts, two Keith Fletchers, and six Jose Lopez 
on the Texas Bar database.) 
o If No: Include in the sample as a treatable case. 
o If Yes: Move onto next step. 
3. Do any of the individuals of this name on the Texas Bar database list the same law firm as the 
individual on the campaign finance list? 
o If Yes: Move onto step 4. 
o If No: Move onto step 5. 
4. Is there more than one individual of this name on the Texas Bar database with the same law firm 
as the individual on the campaign finance list? (Examples: There are two Keith Fletchers who 
work at the same firm--clearly father and son) 
o If Yes: Move onto step 5. 
o If No: Include in the sample as a treatable case. 
5. Do any of the individuals of this name on the Texas Bar database list the same postal code as the 
individual on the campaign finance list? 
o If Yes: Move onto step 6. 
o If No: Move onto step 7. 
6. Is there more than one individual of this name on the Texas Bar database with the same postal 
code as the individual on the campaign finance list? 
o If Yes: Move onto step 6. 
o If No: Include in the sample as a treatable case. 
7. Is there any good evidence? 
o Examples of good evidence: After going to the attorney’s firm page (the firm that is listed 
in the Bar database), we see that she worked at the firm listed in the campaign finance 
data at the time she made the donation. OR The firm names are not an exact match, but 
are clearly the same firm (Thorley and partners = Thorley LLC) OR There are two 
attorneys of the same name working at the same firm, but the donor attorney is listed as a 
partner in the campaign finance data and only one of these two individuals is a partner. 
OR There are two attorneys of the same name working at the same firm, but only one was 
an attorney at the time the donation was made. 
o No: Exclude from the sample. 
o Yes: Include in the sample as a treatable case and make note of this evidence in the excel 
file. 
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Block 1 (1 judge, 3 
cases) 
1 2 3 
Block 2 (1 judge, 2 
cases) 
1 1 2 
Block 3 (1 judge, 2 
cases) 
1 1 2 
Block 4 (1 judge, 2 
cases) 
1 1 2 
Block 5 (1 judge, 2 
cases) 
1 1 2 
Block 6 (5 judges, 5 
cases) 
2 3 5 
Block 7 (2 judges, 2 
cases) 
1 1 2 
Block 8 (2 judges, 2 
cases) 
1 1 2 
Block 9 (1 judge, 1 case) 0 1 1 
Block 10 (1 judge, 2 
cases) 
1 1 2 
Block 11 (1 judge, 1 
case) 
0 1 1 
Block 12 (1 judge, 1 
case) 
0 1 1 
Block 13 (1 judge, 1 
case) 
1 0 1 
Block 14 (3 judges, 3 
cases) 
2 1 3 
Block 15 (2 judges, 2 
cases) 
1 1 2 
Block 16 (1 judge, 1 
case) 
1 0 1 
Block 17 (1 judge, 1 
case) 
0 1 1 
Block 18 (1 judge, 1 
case) 
0 1 1 
Block 19 (1 judge, 1 
case) 
0 1 1 
Block 20 (1 judge, 1 
case) 
0 1 1 
Block 21 (1 judge, 1 
case) 
1 0 1 
Block 22 (1 judge, 1 
case) 
0 1 1 
Block 23 (3 judges, 3 
cases) 
2 1 3 
Block 24 (1 judge, 1 
case) 
0 1 1 
Block 25 (2 judges, 2 
cases) 
0 1 1 
Block 26 (1 judge, 1 
case) 
0 1 1 
Block 27 (1 judge, 1 
case) 
1 0 1 
Block 28 (1 judge, 1 
case) 
1 0 1 






Appendices to Chapter 3 
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Text of Original Williams-Yulee Letter1 
 
 
Reply to Tampa Post Office Box 340031 




“Bringing Diversity to the Judicial Bench” 
 
RE: Elect Lanell Williams-Yulee For County Court 




I have served as a public servant for this community as Public Defender as well as a Prosecutor for the past 
18 years. Having been involved in various civic activities such as “The Great American Teach In,” Inns Of Court, Pro 
Bono Attorney, Metropolitan Ministries outreach program, as well as a mentor for various young men and women 
residing within Hillsborough County, I have long worked for positive change in Tampa. With the support of my 
family, I now feel that the time has come for me to seek elected office. I want to bring fresh ideas and positive 
solutions to the Judicial bench. I am certain that I can uphold the Laws, Statutes, Ordinances as prescribed by the 
Constitution Of the State Of Florida as well as the Constitution of the United States Of America. I am confident that I 
can serve as a positive attribute to the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit by running for County Court Judge, Group 10. To 
succeed in this effort, I need to mount an aggressive campaign. I’m inviting the people that know me best to join my 
campaign and help make a real difference. An early contribution of $25, $50, $100, $250, or $500, made payable to 
“Lanell Williams-Yulee Campaign for County Judge”, will help raise the initial funds needed to launch the campaign 
and get our message out to the public. I ask for your support In meeting the primary election fund raiser goals. Thank 




Lanell Williams-Yulee, Esq. 
 
Political Advertisement paid for and approved by 
Lanell Williams-Yulee, Nonpartisan, for County 




1 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 31a–32a, Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, 138 So.3d 379 (No. 13-
1499) (June 17, 2014), 2014 WL 2769040. 
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Florida Sub-Group Analysis 





Median Minimum Maximum 
Age (Years) 44.79 44 18 92 
Sex (Female) 0.53 Female NA NA 
Education (College 
or Higher) 





$55,877 $45,000 $0 $275,000 
Race (White) 0.74 White NA NA 
Ideology (5-point 
Scale; Low = 
Conservative) 




0.35 Republican NA NA 
Vote in Last 
Presidential 
Election (Trump) 









a Judge (Yes) 
0.12 
































1.950 2.85 0.941 0.000 0.755 1.127 
Legitimate 
Court 








3.586 3.950 0.340 0.208 0.071 0.610 
* When accounting for the ten separate tests run on each of the three outcome measurements, the Šidák 
correction results in an alpha level of .005. Coefficients and p-values in bold fall below the 
Šidák-corrected significance level. 
** Pre-treatment covariates include: age, sex, education, income, race, state of residence, political 
ideology, political party affiliation, previous presidential vote, whether the subjects have been personally 
involved in a court case, and whether the subjects personally know any judge or former judge. 
 









(n = 64) 
Mean of 
Solicitation 



















1.891 1.966 0.053 0.667 -0.070 0.175 
Legitimate 
Court 




2.718 2.706 0.019 0.872 -0.098 0.136 
* When accounting for the ten separate tests run on each of the three outcome measurements, the Šidák 
correction results in an alpha level of .005. Coefficients and p-values in bold fall below the 
Šidák-corrected significance level. 
** Pre-treatment covariates include: age, sex, education, income, race, state of residence, political 
ideology, political party affiliation, previous presidential vote, whether the subjects have been personally 
involved in a court case, and whether the subjects personally know any judge or former judge. 
 
 




























1.913 2.016 0.106 0.355 -0.008 0.221 
Legitimate 
Court 




2.600 2.808 0.215 0.043 0.109 0.320 
* When accounting for the ten separate tests run on each of the three outcome measurements, the Šidák 
correction results in an alpha level of .005. Coefficients and p-values in bold fall below the 
Šidák-corrected significance level. 
** Pre-treatment covariates include: age, sex, education, income, race (white), political ideology, political 
party affiliation (Democrat), previous presidential vote (Trump), whether the subjects have been 
personally involved in a court case, and whether the subjects personally know any judge or former judge. 
 
 































1.983 1.947 0.008 0.937 -0.102 0.120 
Legitimate 
Court 
2.131 2.186 0.072 0.554 -0.049 0.192 
Bias Due To 
Donation 
2.672 2.743 0.102 0.325 -0.001 0.206 
* When accounting for the ten separate tests run on each of the three outcome measurements, the Šidák 
correction results in an alpha level of .005. Coefficients and p-values in bold fall below the 
Šidák-corrected significance level. 
** Pre-treatment covariates include: age, sex, education, income, race (white), political ideology, political 
party affiliation (Democrat), previous presidential vote (Trump), whether the subjects have been 
personally involved in a court case, and whether the subjects personally know any judge or former judge. 
 
 





(n = 117) 
Mean of 
Solicitation 





















3.586 3.950 0.340 0.208 0.071 0.609 
** Pre-treatment covariates include: age, sex, education, income, race (white), state of residence, political 
ideology, political party affiliation (Democrat), previous presidential vote (Trump), whether the subjects 
have been personally involved in a court case, and whether the subjects personally know any judge or 
former judge. 
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Survey Text and Logic 
 
 
Note: Language in [brackets] did not appear to the survey subjects. 
 
 
START OF SURVEY 
 
 
[Start of Block 1: Consent] 
 
[If subjects do not consent to taking the survey, they were not allowed to proceed.] 
 
 
Thank you for choosing to take this survey! 
 
In order for you to participate in this survey, we need you to read over and accept the consent 
form below.   
 
When you are done reading the form, you can begin the survey by selecting the option, "I 
consent to take this survey." By selecting that option, you are indicating that the you have read 
the below information, have had the opportunity to have any questions about this study 





Responsible Institution: Columbia University  
 
Investigators: Dane Thorley and Donald Green (Principal Investigator) IRB Protocol # 
AAAR7367    
 
Purpose:  We are conducting a research study to examine people’s opinions about individuals 
and their behavior.      
 
Procedures:  Participation in this study will involve answering some basic demographic 
questions, answering some questions about your political views, reading a short scenario, and 
answering some questions about what you read.      
 
Risks and Benefits:  Participants in this study may experience mild boredom due to 
participating in this study. Although this study will not benefit you personally, we hope that our 
results will add to the knowledge about legal disputes.       
 
Confidentiality:  All of your responses will be anonymous. We will not ask for, or record, your 
name or other information that could lead back to you. Only the researchers involved in this 
study and those responsible for research oversight will have access to the information you 
provide. When we publish any results from this study we will do so in a way that does not 
identify you.      
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Voluntary Participation:  Participation in this study is completely voluntary.  You are free to 
decline to participate, to end participation at any time for any reason, or to refuse to answer any 
individual question. Refusing to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits or 
compensation to which you are otherwise entitled or affect your relationship with any person or 
institution involved in the study.       
Questions:  If you have any questions about this study, you may contact Dane Thorley at 
drt2121@columbia.edu.      
 
If you would like to talk with someone other than the researchers to discuss problems or 
concerns, to discuss situations in the event that a member of the research team is not available, 
or to discuss your rights as a research participant, you may contact the Columbia University 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) Administrator. They can be reached at (+1) 212-851-7040 or 
at: Columbia University Morningside IRB, 615 West 131st Street, 3rd Floor (Mail Code 8716) 
New York, NY 10027 (email address askirb@columbia.edu). Please mention protocol number # 
AAAR7367 when you write to the IRB. 
 
o I consent to take this survey. 
o No. I do not consent, and I do not want to take this survey.  
 
 






[Start of Block 2: I – Intro] 
 
 
To begin, we have a few questions about you. 
 
 






[Start of Block 3: I - Demographic Questions] 
 
 








What is your sex? 
o Female 
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o Male  





What is your current education level? 
o Eight grade or less 
o Some high school 
o High school graduate  
o Some college 
o College graduate 














What is your race or ethnicity? 
o Asian 
o Black 
o Caucasian (White) 
o Hispanic 
o Latin  
o Middle-Eastern 








In what U.S. state do you currently live? 









  206  
 
 
Do you consider yourself ideologically conservative, ideologically liberal, or somewhere in the 
middle? 
o Strongly conservative 
o Somewhat conservative 
o Moderate (the middle)  
o Somewhat liberal  






Do you consider yourself a Democrat, Republican, or an Independent? 
o Democrat  
o Republican  
o Independent/Unaffiliated  






Who did you vote for in the last US presidential election? 
o Hillary Clinton  
o Donald Trump  
o Gary Johnson  
o Jill Stein  
o Evan McMullen  
o Darrell Castle  
o Other  






Have you ever been personally involved in a court case? 
o Yes  






Do you personally know any judges or former judges? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
 
[End of Block 3: I - Demographic Questions] 








[Start of Block 4: II - Intro] 
 
 
Now you will be presented with a hypothetical (fictional) description of a judicial candidate 
running for election. We will then ask you for your opinions about this candidate and his 
election campaign. 
 
Please read the description of the candidate and questions carefully.  At the end of this survey, 
we will ask you a question about the details of this individual's campaign to make sure you have 
read closely.  
 
 






[Start of Block 5: II - Experimental Vignette Part 1/3]  
 
[Each subject was randomly assigned to one of the following texts for part 1/3 of the total 
vignette. All conditions in this part were assigned with equal probability, with the exception of 
the treatment condition (A.), which was assigned at twice the probability of all other sections. 





Last year, Fairview County (a fictional county in Florida) held elections for the judges in their 
trial courts. A citizen and attorney of Fairview County named George Anderson decided that he 
would like to run for one of the judicial positions. Like most of the judicial candidates running in 
the election, George Anderson needed to raise money for his campaign. 
 
In order to do this, Anderson included his name on the official election registry. While he did 
not solicit or ask for any donations, he was willing to take donations from individuals who knew 
he was running for office and wanted to support his campaign. He also created a website for his 
campaign, which included the following statement:     
   
Dear Friends:   
 
I have served as a public servant for this community as public defender as well as a prosecutor 
for the past 18 years. Having been involved in various civic activities such as “The Great 
American Teach In”, Inns of Court, pro bono legal assistance, Metropolitan Ministries outreach 
program, as well as a mentor for various young men and women residing within Fairview, I have 
long worked for positive change in this county and in Florida broadly.  
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With the support of my family, I now feel that the time has come for me to seek elected office. I 
want to bring fresh ideas and positive solutions to the Fairview County judicial branch. I am 
certain that I can uphold the laws, statutes, and ordinances as prescribed by the Constitution of 
The State Of Florida as well as the Constitution of the United States of America.  
 





[B. Judge Sends Letter to Attorneys] 
 
Last year, Fairview County (a fictional county in Florida) held elections for the judges in their 
trial court. A citizen and attorney of Fairview County named George Anderson decided that he 
would like to run for one of the judicial positions. Like most of the judicial candidates running in 
the election, George Anderson needed to raise money for his campaign.  
 
In order to do this, Anderson sent the following letter to all of the attorneys in Fairview County: 
 
Dear Friend:  
 
I have served as a public servant for this community as public defender as well as a prosecutor 
for the past 18 years. Having been involved in various civic activities such as “The Great 
American Teach In”, Inns of Court, pro bono legal assistance, Metropolitan Ministries outreach 
program, as well as a mentor for various young men and women residing within Fairview, I have 
long worked for positive change in this county and in Florida broadly.  
 
With the support of my family, I now feel that the time has come for me to seek elected office. I 
want to bring fresh ideas and positive solutions to the Fairview County judicial branch. I am 
certain that I can uphold the laws, statutes, and ordinances as prescribed by the Constitution of 
The State Of Florida as well as the Constitution of the United States of America.  
 
To succeed in this effort, I need to mount an aggressive campaign. I’m inviting the people that 
know me best to join my campaign and help make a real difference. An early contribution of 
$25, $50, $100, $250, or $500, made payable to the “George Anderson Campaign for County 
Judge” will help raise the initial funds needed to launch the campaign and get out our message 
to the public.  
 
You can make online donations at Anderson_for_Judge.com or mail in contributions to:  
 
George Anderson Campaign for Fairview County Judge, Fairview PO Box 100101, Fairview, 
Florida 33456.  
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[C. Judge Sends Letter to Citizens] 
 
Last year, Fairview County (a fictional county in Florida) held elections for the judges in their 
trial court. A citizen and attorney of Fairview County named George Anderson decided that he 
would like to run for one of the judicial positions. Like most of the judicial candidates running in 
the election, George Anderson needed to raise money for his campaign.  
 
In order to do this, Anderson sent the following letter to all of the citizens in Fairview County: 
 
Dear Friend:  
 
I have served as a public servant for this community as public defender as well as a prosecutor 
for the past 18 years. Having been involved in various civic activities such as “The Great 
American Teach In”, Inns of Court, pro bono legal assistance, Metropolitan Ministries outreach 
program, as well as a mentor for various young men and women residing within Fairview, I have 
long worked for positive change in this county and in Florida broadly.  
 
With the support of my family, I now feel that the time has come for me to seek elected office. I 
want to bring fresh ideas and positive solutions to the Fairview County judicial branch. I am 
certain that I can uphold the laws, statutes, and ordinances as prescribed by the Constitution of 
The State Of Florida as well as the Constitution of the United States of America.  
 
To succeed in this effort, I need to mount an aggressive campaign. I’m inviting the people that 
know me best to join my campaign and help make a real difference. An early contribution of 
$25, $50, $100, $250, or $500, made payable to the “George Anderson Campaign for County 
Judge” will help raise the initial funds needed to launch the campaign and get out our message 
to the public.  
 
You can make online donations at Anderson_for_Judge.com or mail in contributions to:  
 
George Anderson Campaign for Fairview County Judge, Fairview PO Box 100101, Fairview, 
Florida 33456.  
 





[D. Committee Sends Letter to Attorneys] 
 
Last year, Fairview County (a fictional county in Florida) held elections for the judges in their 
trial court. A citizen and attorney of Fairview County named George Anderson decided that he 
would like to run for one of the judicial positions. Like most of the judicial candidates running in 
the election, George Anderson needed to raise money for his campaign.  
 
In order to do this, Anderson had his campaign committee send the following letter to all of the 
attorneys in Fairview County: 
                   
Dear Friend: 
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George Anderson has served as a public servant for this community as public defender as well as 
a prosecutor for the past 18 years. Having been involved in various civic activities such as “The 
Great American Teach In”, Inns of Court, pro bono legal assistance, Metropolitan Ministries 
outreach program, as well as a mentor for various young men and women residing within 
Fairview, he has long worked for positive change in this county and in Florida broadly.      
 
 
With the support of his family, George Anderson now feels that the time has come for him to 
seek elected office. He wants to bring fresh ideas and positive solutions to the Fairview County 
judicial branch. He is certain that he can uphold the laws, statutes, and ordinances as prescribed 
by the Constitution of The State Of Florida as well as the Constitution of the United States of 
America.      
 
To succeed in this effort, he needs to mount an aggressive campaign. As his campaign 
committee, we are inviting the people that know him best to join his campaign and help make a 
real difference. An early contribution of $25, $50, $100, $250, or $500, made payable to “The 
George Anderson Campaign for County Judge” will help raise the initial funds needed to launch 
the campaign and get out our message to the public. 
 
You can make online donations at Anderson_for_Judge.com or mail in contributions to:      
 
The George Anderson Campaign for County Judge, Fairview PO Box 100101, Fairview, 
Florida 33456      
 
Thank you in advance for your support!      
 
The George Anderson Campaign for County Judge 
 
 
[E. Committee Sends Letter to Citizens] 
 
Last year, Fairview County (a fictional county in Florida) held elections for the judges in their 
trial court. A citizen and attorney of Fairview County named George Anderson decided that he 
would like to run for one of the judicial positions. Like most of the judicial candidates running in 
the election, George Anderson needed to raise money for his campaign.  
 
In order to do this, Anderson had his campaign committee send the following letter to all of the 
citizens in Fairview County: 
                   
Dear Friend:      
 
George Anderson has served as a public servant for this community as public defender as well as 
a prosecutor for the past 18 years. Having been involved in various civic activities such as “The 
Great American Teach In”, Inns of Court, pro bono legal assistance, Metropolitan Ministries 
outreach program, as well as a mentor for various young men and women residing within 
Fairview, he has long worked for positive change in this county and in Florida broadly.      
 
With the support of his family, George Anderson now feels that the time has come for him to 
seek elected office. He wants to bring fresh ideas and positive solutions to the Fairview County 
judicial branch. He is certain that he can uphold the laws, statutes, and ordinances as prescribed 
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by the Constitution of The State Of Florida as well as the Constitution of the United States of 
America.      
 
To succeed in this effort, he needs to mount an aggressive campaign. As his campaign 
committee, we are inviting the people that know him best to join his campaign and help make a 
real difference. An early contribution of $25, $50, $100, $250, or $500, made payable to “The 
George Anderson Campaign for County Judge” will help raise the initial funds needed to launch 
the campaign and get out our message to the public.      
 
You can make online donations at Anderson_for_Judge.com or mail in contributions to:      
 
The George Anderson Campaign for County Judge, Fairview PO Box 100101, Fairview, 
Florida 33456      
 
Thank you in advance for your support!     The George Anderson Campaign for County Judge 
 
 
[F. Judge Asks Attorneys at Event] 
 
Last year, Fairview County (a fictional county in Florida) held elections for the judges in their 
trial court. A citizen and attorney of Fairview County named George Anderson decided that he 
would like to run for one of the judicial positions. Like most of the judicial candidates running in 
the election, George Anderson needed to raise money for his campaign.  
 
In order to do this, Anderson organized a campaign donation event, at which he personally 
asked guests (who were mostly attorneys in Fairview County) to donate to his campaign, 
generally saying something like this: 
 
I have served as a public servant for this community as public defender as well as a prosecutor 
for the past 18 years. Having been involved in various civic activities such as “The Great 
American Teach In”, Inns of Court, pro bono legal assistance, Metropolitan Ministries outreach 
program, as well as a mentor for various young men and women residing within Fairview, I have 
long worked for positive change in this county and in Florida broadly.    
 
With the support of my family, I now feel that the time has come for me to seek elected office. I 
want to bring fresh ideas and positive solutions to the Fairview County judicial branch. I am 
certain that I can uphold the laws, statutes, and ordinances as prescribed by the Constitution of 
The State Of Florida as well as the Constitution of the United States of America.      
 
To succeed in this effort, I need to mount an aggressive campaign. I’m inviting the people that 
know me best to join my campaign and help make a real difference. An early contribution of 
$25, $50, $100, $250, or $500, made payable to the “George Anderson Campaign for County 
Judge” will help raise the initial funds needed to launch the campaign and get out our message 
to the public.      
 
You can make donations at the table over there or visit my website and make payments online.      
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[G. Judge Asks Citizens at Event] 
 
Last year, Fairview County (a fictional county in Florida) held elections for the judges in their 
trial court. A citizen and attorney of Fairview County named George Anderson decided that he 
would like to run for one of the judicial positions. Like most of the judicial candidates running in 
the election, George Anderson needed to raise money for his campaign.  
 
In order to do this, Anderson organized a campaign donation event, at which he personally 
asked guests (who were mostly citizens of Fairview County) to donate to his campaign, generally 
saying something like this: 
 
I have served as a public servant for this community as public defender as well as a prosecutor 
for the past 18 years. Having been involved in various civic activities such as “The Great 
American Teach In”, Inns of Court, pro bono legal assistance, Metropolitan Ministries outreach 
program, as well as a mentor for various young men and women residing within Fairview, I have 
long worked for positive change in this county and in Florida broadly.      
 
With the support of my family, I now feel that the time has come for me to seek elected office. I 
want to bring fresh ideas and positive solutions to the Fairview County judicial branch. I am 
certain that I can uphold the laws, statutes, and ordinances as prescribed by the Constitution of 
The State Of Florida as well as the Constitution of the United States of America.      
 
To succeed in this effort, I need to mount an aggressive campaign. I’m inviting the people that 
know me best to join my campaign and help make a real difference. An early contribution of 
$25, $50, $100, $250, or $500, made payable to the “George Anderson Campaign for County 
Judge” will help raise the initial funds needed to launch the campaign and get out our message 
to the public.      
 
You can make donations at the table over there or visit my website and make payments online.      
 
Thank you in advance for your support!     
 
 
[H. Committee Asks Attorneys at Event] 
 
Last year, Fairview County (a fictional county in Florida) held elections for the judges in their 
trial court. A citizen and attorney of Fairview County named George Anderson decided that he 
would like to run for one of the judicial positions. Like most of the judicial candidates running in 
the election, George Anderson needed to raise money for his campaign.  
 
In order to do this, Anderson organized a campaign donation event (Anderson was not in 
attendance), at which his campaign committee asked guests (who were mostly attorneys in 
Fairview County) to donate to his campaign, generally saying something like this: 
 
George Anderson has served as a public servant for this community as public defender as well as 
a prosecutor for the past 18 years. Having been involved in various civic activities such as “The 
Great American Teach In”, Inns of Court, pro bono legal assistance, Metropolitan Ministries 
outreach program, as well as a mentor for various young men and women residing within 
Fairview, he has long worked for positive change in this county and in Florida broadly.      
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With the support of his family, George Anderson now feels that the time has come for him to 
seek elected office. He wants to bring fresh ideas and positive solutions to the Fairview County 
judicial branch. He is certain that he can uphold the laws, statutes, and ordinances as prescribed 
by the Constitution of The State Of Florida as well as the Constitution of the United States of 
America.      
 
To succeed in this effort, he needs to mount an aggressive campaign. As his campaign 
committee, we are inviting the people that know him best to join his campaign and help make a 
real difference. An early contribution of $25, $50, $100, $250, or $500, made payable to “The 
George Anderson Campaign for County Judge” will help raise the initial funds needed to launch 
the campaign and get out our message to the public.      
 
You can make donations at the table over there or visit his website and make payments online.      
 
Thank you in advance for your support! 
 
 
[I. Committee Asks Citizens at Event] 
 
Last year, Fairview County (a fictional county in Florida) held elections for the judges in their 
trial court. A citizen and attorney of Fairview County named George Anderson decided that he 
would like to run for one of the judicial positions. Like most of the judicial candidates running in 
the election, George Anderson needed to raise money for his campaign.  
 
In order to do this, Anderson organized a campaign donation event (Anderson was not in 
attendance), at which his campaign committee asked guests (who were mostly citizens of 
Fairview County) to donate to his campaign, generally saying something like this: 
 
George Anderson has served as a public servant for this community as public defender as well as 
a prosecutor for the past 18 years. Having been involved in various civic activities such as “The 
Great American Teach In”, Inns of Court, pro bono legal assistance, Metropolitan Ministries 
outreach program, as well as a mentor for various young men and women residing within 
Fairview, he has long worked for positive change in this county and in Florida broadly.  
 
With the support of his family, George Anderson now feels that the time has come for him to 
seek elected office. He wants to bring fresh ideas and positive solutions to the Fairview County 
judicial branch. He is certain that he can uphold the laws, statutes, and ordinances as prescribed 
by the Constitution of The State Of Florida as well as the Constitution of the United States of 
America.  
 
To succeed in this effort, he needs to mount an aggressive campaign. As his campaign 
committee, we are inviting the people that know him best to join his campaign and help make a 
real difference. An early contribution of $25, $50, $100, $250, or $500, made payable to “The 
George Anderson Campaign for County Judge” will help raise the initial funds needed to launch 
the campaign and get out our message to the public.  
 
You can make donations at the table over there or visit his website and make payments online.  
 
Thank you in advance for your support! 
 
 
  214  
 
[J. Explicit Quid Pro Quo] 
 
Last year, Fairview County (a fictional county in Florida) held elections for the judges in their 
trial court. A citizen and attorney of Fairview County named George Anderson decided that he 
would like to run for one of the judicial positions. Like most of the judicial candidates running in 
the election, George Anderson needed to raise money for his campaign.  
 
In order to do this, Anderson directly asked a number of prominent attorneys in Fairview 
County for campaign money, promising to “make it up to them” when they argued cases in his 
courtroom. While he did not guarantee that they would win those cases, he did promise to give 
extra considerations to their arguments if they made significant donations to his campaign. 
 
 






Start of Block 6: II - Experimental Vignette Part 2/3 
 
 
[Each subject was randomly assigned to one of the following texts for part 2/3 of the total 
vignette. All conditions in this part were assigned with equal probability. Assignments of 
conditions in this part were independent of assignments in other vignette parts.] 
 
 
[K. High Average Donation] 
  
The average donation amount resulting from these efforts was $1,010 per donor. 
 
 
[L. Medium Average Donation] 
 
The average donation amount resulting from these efforts was $480 per donor. 
 
 
[M. Low Average Donation] 
 
The average donation amount resulting from these efforts was $45 per donor. 
 
 
[N. High Total Donations] 
 
The total donation amount resulting from these efforts was $101,000. 
 
 
[O. Medium Total Donations] 
 
The total donation amount resulting from these efforts was $48,000. 
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[P. Low Total Donations] 
 
The total donation amount resulting from these efforts was $4,500. 
 
 






Start of Block 7: II - Experimental Vignette Part 3/3 
 
[Each subject was randomly assigned to one of the following texts for part 3/3 of the total 
vignette. All conditions in this part were assigned with equal probability. Assignments of 
conditions in this part were independent of assignments in other vignette parts.] 
 
 
[Q. Recusal - No Thank You Letter] 
 
Anderson ended up winning the election and is now serving as a judge for the Fairview County 
Trial Court.  
 
When he later realized that some of those that donated to his campaign would end up as parties 
or attorneys in his court, he decided to remove himself from any cases involving a donor (the 
cases were reassigned to other judges). 
 
 
[R. No Recusal - No Thank You Letter] 
 
Anderson ended up winning the election and is now serving as a judge for the Fairview County 
Trial Court.  
 
Although he later realized that some of those that donated to his campaign would end up as 
parties or attorneys in his court, he decided not to remove himself from any cases involving a 
donor (the cases were not reassigned to other judges). 
 
 
[S. Recusal Not Considered - No Thank You Letter] 
 




[T. Recusal - Thank You Letter] 
 
Anderson ended up winning the election and is now serving as a judge for the Fairview County 
Trial Court.  
 
To express his gratitude for those who helped him win his election, Anderson sent personally-
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signed thank you letters to every individual who donated to his campaign. 
 
When he later realized that some of those that donated to his campaign would end up as parties 
or attorneys in his court, he decided to remove himself from any cases involving a donor (the 
cases were reassigned to other judges). 
 
 
[U. No Recusal - Thank You Letter] 
 
Anderson ended up winning the election and is now serving as a judge for the Fairview County 
Trial Court.  
 
To express his gratitude for those who helped him win his election, Anderson sent personally-
signed thank you letters to every individual who donated to his campaign. 
 
Although he later realized that some of those that donated to his campaign would end up as 
parties or attorneys in his court, he decided not to remove himself from any cases involving a 
donor (the cases were not reassigned to other judges). 
 
[V. Recusal Not Considered - Thank You Letter] 
 
Anderson ended up winning the election and is now serving as a judge for the Fairview County 
Trial Court. 
 
To express his gratitude for those who helped him win his election, Anderson sent personally-
signed thank you letters to every individual who donated to his campaign. 
 
 





Start of Block 8: III - Introduction 
 
 
Now we would like to ask you some questions about the description you just read. Please tell us 
which answer comes closest to how you feel. 
 
 






Start of Block 9: III - Donation Questions 
 
[The questions presented in this section vary slightly depending on which text was previously 
assigned to the subject in part 1/3 of the vignette section.] 
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[If “A” was assigned] 
 
Imagine that you lived in Fairview County during the judicial election. You hear about 
Anderson’s election campaign. How likely would you be to donate to his campaign? 
o Extremely likely  
o Moderately likely  
o Slightly likely  
o Neither likely nor unlikely  
o Slightly unlikely  
o Moderately unlikely  
o Extremely unlikely  
 
 
[If “B” was assigned] 
 
Imagine that you were an attorney in Fairview County during the judicial election. You receive 
the letter from Anderson asking for donations. How likely would you be to donate to his 
campaign? 
o Extremely likely  
o Moderately likely  
o Slightly likely  
o Neither likely nor unlikely  
o Slightly unlikely  
o Moderately unlikely  
o Extremely unlikely  
 
 
[If “C” was assigned] 
 
Imagine that you were a citizen of Fairview County during the judicial election. You receive the 
letter from Anderson asking for donations. How likely would you be to donate to his campaign? 
o Extremely likely  
o Moderately likely  
o Slightly likely  
o Neither likely nor unlikely  
o Slightly unlikely  
o Moderately unlikely  
o Extremely unlikely  
 
 
[If “D” was assigned] 
 
Imagine that you were an attorney in Fairview County during the judicial election. You receive 
the letter from Anderson's campaign committee asking for donations. How likely would you be 
to donate to his campaign? 
o Extremely likely  
o Moderately likely  
o Slightly likely  
o Neither likely nor unlikely  
o Slightly unlikely  
o Moderately unlikely  
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o Extremely unlikely  
 
 
[If “E” was assigned] 
 
Imagine that you were a citizen of Fairview County during the judicial election. You receive the 
letter from Anderson's campaign committee asking for donations. How likely would you be to 
donate to his campaign? 
o Extremely likely  
o Moderately likely  
o Slightly likely  
o Neither likely nor unlikely  
o Slightly unlikely  
o Moderately unlikely  
o Extremely unlikely  
 
 
[If “F” was assigned] 
 
Imagine that you were an attorney in Fairview County during the judicial election. You attend 
the donation event, and Anderson asks you to donate. How likely would you be to donate to his 
campaign? 
o Extremely likely  
o Moderately likely  
o Slightly likely  
o Neither likely nor unlikely  
o Slightly unlikely  
o Moderately unlikely  
o Extremely unlikely  
 
 
[If “G” was assigned] 
 
Imagine that you were a citizen of Fairview County during the judicial election. You attend the 
donation event, and Anderson asks you to donate. How likely would you be to donate to his 
campaign? 
o Extremely likely  
o Moderately likely  
o Slightly likely  
o Neither likely nor unlikely  
o Slightly unlikely  
o Moderately unlikely  
o Extremely unlikely  
 
 
[If “H” was assigned] 
 
Imagine that you were an attorney in Fairview County during the judicial election. You attend 
the donation event, and Anderson's campaign committee asks you to donate. How likely would 
you be to donate to Anderson's campaign? 
o Extremely likely  
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o Moderately likely  
o Slightly likely  
o Neither likely nor unlikely  
o Slightly unlikely  
o Moderately unlikely  
o Extremely unlikely  
 
 
[If “I” was assigned] 
 
Imagine that you were a citizen of Fairview County during the judicial election. You attend the 
donation event, and Anderson's campaign committee asks you to donate. How likely would you 
be to donate to his campaign? 
o Extremely likely  
o Moderately likely  
o Slightly likely  
o Neither likely nor unlikely  
o Slightly unlikely  
o Moderately unlikely  
o Extremely unlikely  
 
 
[If “J” was assigned] 
 
Imagine that you are an attorney in Fairview County during the election. You are one of the 
attorneys from whom Anderson asked for donations. How likely would you be to donate to his 
campaign? 
o Extremely likely  
o Moderately likely  
o Slightly likely  
o Neither likely nor unlikely  
o Slightly unlikely  
o Moderately unlikely  
o Extremely unlikely  
 






Start of Block 10: III - Impartiality Question 
 
 
Do you believe Judge Anderson can serve as a fair and impartial judge for Fairview County? 
o I strongly believe Anderson can be fair and impartial  
o I somewhat believe Anderson can be fair and impartial  
o I somewhat believe Anderson cannot be fair and impartial  
o I strongly believe Anderson cannot be fair and impartial  
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Start of Block 11: III - Legitimacy Question 
Assume for the moment that all elected judges in the Fairview County Court used the same 
campaigning strategies as Judge Anderson. How legitimate would you consider the Fairview 
County Court? 
o I would consider it a very legitimate institution  
o I would consider it a somewhat legitimate institution  
o I would not consider it a very legitimate institution  
o I would not consider it a very legitimate institution at all  
 
 






Start of Block 12: III - Accept Decisions As Citizen Question 
 
 
How likely would you be to accept decisions made by Judge Anderson as impartial, fair, and 
legitimate? 
o Extremely likely  
o Moderately likely  
o Slightly likely  
o Neither likely nor unlikely  
o Slightly unlikely  
o Moderately unlikely  
o Extremely unlikely  
 
 






Start of Block 13: III - Judicial Bias Questions 
 
 
Assume for a moment that one of the individuals who donated to Judge Anderson is now an 
attorney who is arguing a case in Judge Anderson’s Court. Do you think that the relationship 
between the donor and Judge Anderson will bias Judge Anderson’s judicial behavior? 
o It will definitely bias the judge's behavior.  
o It will probably bias the judge's behavior.  
o It will probably not bias the judge's behavior.  
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Assume for a moment that one of the individuals who donated to Judge Anderson is now a party 
in a case in Judge Anderson’s Court. Do you think that the relationship between the donor and 
Judge Anderson will bias Judge Anderson’s judicial behavior? 
o It will definitely bias the judge's behavior.  
o It will probably bias the judge's behavior.  
o It will probably not bias the judge's behavior.  
o It will definitely not bias the judge's behavior.  
 
 






Start of Block 14: III - State Election Law Knowledge Quiz 
 
 
Election Law Which of the following laws reflects what you understand the actual election laws 
in your state to be? Please select all that apply. 
o Judges running for election are allowed to ask for campaign donations.  
o Judges running for election are not allowed to ask for campaign donations, but their 
campaign committees can ask for donations.  
o Judges running for election are not allowed to receive any donations.  
o If a judge is assigned to case in which a party or an attorney has donated to the judge's 
political campaign, the judge has to remove himself or herself from the case, and the case 
will be assigned to another judge.  
o Judges do not run for election in my state.  
 
 






Start of Block 15: IV - Introduction 
 
 
Finally, we have a question about the hypothetical description of Judge Anderson you read 
earlier. Please answer to the best of your ability. 
 
 
End of Block 15: IV - Introduction 
 






Start of Block 16: IV - Manipulation Check 
 
[The questions presented in this section vary slightly depending on which text was previously 
assigned to the subject in part 1/3 of the vignette section. The correct answer will also depend on 
that previous assignment.] 
 
 
[If “B”, “C”, “D”, or “E” was assigned] 
 
In the vignette you read, who sent the campaign letters? 
o Judge Anderson sent out his own letters asking for campaign donations.  
o Judge Anderson's Campaign Committee sent out letters asking for campaign donations on 
Judge Anderson's behalf.  
o The Florida State Election Bureau sent out letters asking for campaign donations on Judge 
Anderson's behalf.  
o No one sent letters asking for campaign donations.  
 
 
[If “F”, “G”, “H”, or “I” was assigned] 
 
In the vignette you read, who asked potential donors for campaign donations at the fundraising 
event? 
o Judge Anderson asked for campaign donations.  
o Judge Anderson's Campaign Committee asked for campaign donations on Judge Anderson's 
behalf.  
o The Florida State Election Bureau asked for campaign donations on Judge Anderson's 
behalf.  
o No one asked for campaign donations.  
 
 
[If “A” or “J” was assigned] 
 
In the vignette you read, who asked potential donors for money? 
o Judge Anderson  
o Judge Anderson's Campaign Committee  
o The Florida State Election Bureau  
o No one asked for donations  
 
 






Start of Block 17: Ending 
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Thank you for participating in this survey. Did you run into any problems or errors in the 




End of Block 17: Ending 
 
 
END OF SURVEY 
 
 
 
 
